There's a problem with saying that there are a million ways to "falsify" evolutionary theory: which of these arises from a risky prediction? To what extent does the Haldane example facilitate corroboration of the theory? If we don't observe fossil rabbits in the PreCambrian period, to what extent do we conclude that we have learned something about the applicability of evolutionary theory? I can't say that we learn absolutely nothing from this case, but its anecdotal form attributes little in the way of meaningful evidence. The proper question to ask is what is the probability that the theory is still true or false in the presence or absence of the observation. Scientists would say that this is therefore not a severe test, and thus it does little to establish evolutionary theory as scientific.

I think most scientists find the work of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Scheffler, Salmon, Hacking, Mayo, etc.. as quite relevant to the practice of science. Kuhn's "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" didn't make the NYTimes 100 most influential books since WWII for nothing. But this is a digression.