(This is combined from two posts I made on my blog in July. The subject matter just keeps getting more relevant.)
The Art of War, by Sun Tzu, is one of those classics that people study who are interested in history and military matters, like von Clausewitz and Julius Caesar and Josephus. Sun Tzu's book is more theoretical in some ways, more concerned with underlying principles of strategy and logistics, but not with politics per se, and without specific (and debatable) case studies. As usual, there is lots of debate over who the real lord of the House of Sun who wrote it might have been, did he really exist, was it a collaborative effort, when was it written etc etc, which I'm not qualified to pass judgment on. It's been applied to all sorts of possibly inappropriate things, like running a business and romantic relationships, in new books.
It's also been a textbook for real officers, for a long time.
But now that's being challenged.
Pat over at Whiskey Bar once cited an article in which "cutting edge" proponents of their own military doctrine argue that General Sun's theories are as outdated as the Iron Age weapons he referred to.
Here is the article, which I have finally relocated, so that you can read along parallel with the exerpts from The Art of War which I thought relevant even before the situation had reached where I foresaw it likely would: Sun Tzu's Bad Advice: Urban Warfare in the Information Age (April 2003, By Lt. Col. Robert R. Leonhard, U.S. Army retired).
He takes exception particularly with the famous dicta which he renders "The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative" (the other famous line from Sun Tzu is "in death ground, fight" invariably quoted without any of the accompanying notes about what optimal terrain and tactics are to avoid getting stuck at the enemy's mercy.)
I want to go back a little further, and start with the beginning chapters, which are all short, going from the translation I use by Ralph D. Sawyer, which met my standards of being clear and not archaic/fussy without excessive modernization (as usual, so far as I can tell).
One thing which is intersting is that apparently Sun Tzu and Lao Tzu (remember that tzu is an honorific, "Master" and last names go first in Chinese, they're not relatives necessarily) were probably roughly contemporary, and Sun Tzu (whose personal name might have been Wu) makes reference to the "Tao of War," a sort of overarching ethos of understanding which he tries to nail down, while Lao Tzu makes a lot of references to military and political matters in his writing on the Great Way, the Universal Tao. It doesn't prove anything specific, but it sounds like there was a lot of cross-disciplinary discussion of ethics/metaphysics in relationship to everyday society going on then, just like a ways away in Athens. Socrates too was a soldier, even as Xenophon (who surely knew the Tao of War) was his student.
So - on to the text (I'm leaving out the translator's commentary, you just judge for yourselves):
Chapter 1, Intial Estimations
Sun-tzu said:
Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Tao to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed.
Therefore, structure it according to the following five factors, evaluate it comparatively through estimations, and seek out its true nature. The first is termed the Tao, the second Heaven, the third Earth, the fourth generals, and the fifth the laws for military organization and discipline.
The Tao causes people to be in accord with the ruler. Thus they will die with him; they will live with him and not fear danger.
Heaven encompasses yin and yang, cold and heat, and the constraint of the seasons.
Earth encompasses far and near, difficult or easy, expansive or confined, fatal or tenable terrain.
The laws for military organization and discipline encompass organization and regulations, the Tao of command, and the management of logistics.
There are no generals who have not heard of these five. Those who understand them will be victorious; those who do not understand them will not be victorious.
Thus when making a comparative evaluation through estimation, seeking out its true nature, ask:
Which ruler has the Tao?
Which general has greater ability?
Who has gained the advantages of Heaven and Earth?
Whose laws and orders are more thoroughly implemented?
Whose forces are stronger?
Whose officers and troops are better trained?
Whose rewards and punishments are clearer?
From these I will know victory and defeat!
[...]
After estimating the advantages in accord with what you have heard, put it into effect with strategic power supplemented by field tactics that respond to external factors. As for strategic power, it is controlling the tactical balance of power in accord with the gains to be realized.
Warfare is the Tao of deception. Thus although you are capable, display incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When your objective is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby.
Display profits to entice them. Create disorder in their forces and take them.
· If they are substantial, prepare for them; if they are strong, avoid them.
· If they are angry, perturb them; be deferential to foster their arrogance.
· If they are rested, force them to exert themselves.
· If they are united, cause them to be separated.
· Attack where they are unprepared.
· Go forth where they will not expect it.
These are the ways military strategists are victorious. They cannot be spoken of in advance.
Before the engagement, one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will be victorious has found that the majority of factors are in his favor. Before the engagement one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will not be victorious has found few factors are in his favor.
If one who finds that the majority of factors favor him will be victorious, while one who has found few factors favor him will be defeated, what about someone who finds no factors in his favor?
If I observe it from this perspective, victory and defeat will be apparent.
Chapter 2, Waging War
Sun-Tzu said:
In general, the strategy for employing the military is this: if there are one thousand four-horse attack chariots, one thousand leather-armoured support chariots, one hundred thousand mailed troops, and provisions are transported one thousand kilometers, then the domestic and external campaign expenses, the expenditures for advisors and guests, materials such as glue and lacquer, and providing chariots and armor will be one thousand gold pieces per day. Only then can an army of one hundred thousand be mobilized.
When employing them in battle, a victory that is long in coming will blunt their weapons and dampen their ardor. If you attack cities, their strength will be exhausted. If you expose the army to a prolonged campaign, the state's resources will be inadequate.
When our weapons have grown dull and spirits depressed, when our strength has been expended and resources consumed, then the feudal lords will take advantage of our exhaustion to arise. Even though you have wise generals, they will not be able to achieve a good result.
Thus in military campaigns I have heard of "awkward speed" but have never seen any skill in lengthy campaigns. No country has ever profited from protracted warfare. Those who do not thoroughly comprehend the dangers inherent in employing the military are incapable of truly knowing the potential advantages of military action.
One who excels in employing the military does not conscript the people twice or transport provisions a third time. If you obtain your equipment from within the state and rely on seizing provisions from the enemy, then the army's foodstuffs will be sufficient.
The state is impoverished by the army when it transports provisions far off. When provisions are transported far off, the hundred surnames are impoverished.
Those in proximity to the army will sell their goods expensively. When goods are expensive, the hundred surnames' wealth will be exhausted. When their wealth is exhausted, they weill be extremely hard-pressed to supply their village's military impositions.
When their strength has been expended and their wealth depleted, then the houses
Thus the wise general will concentrate on securing provisions from the enemy. One bushel of the enemy's foodstuffs is worth twenty of ours; one picul of fodder is worth twenty of ours.
Thus what motivates men to slay is anger; what stimulates them to seize profits from the enemy is material goods. Thus in chariot encoutners, when ten or more chariots are captured, reward the first to get one. Change their flags and pennants to ours; intermix and employ them with our own chariots. Treat the captured soldiers well in order to nurture them for our use. This is referred to as 'conquering the enemy and growing stronger.'
Thus the army values being victorious, it does not value prolonged warfare. Therefore a general who undertands warfare is Master of Fate for the people, ruler of the state's security or endangerment.
Chapter 3, Planning Offensives
Sun-Tzu said:
In general, the method for employing the military is this: Preserving the enemy's state capital is best, destroying their state capital second-best. Preserving their army is best, destroying their army is second-best. Preserving their battalions is best, destroying their battalions second-best. Preserving their companies is best, destroying their companies second-best. Preserving their squads is best, destroying their squads second-best.
For this reason, attaining one hundred victories in battle is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.
Thus the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities.
This tactic of attacking fortified cities is adopted only when unavoidable. Preparing large movable protective shields, armoured assault wagons, and other equipment and devices will require three months. Building earthworks will require another three months to complete. If the general cannot overcome his impatience but instead launches an assault wherein his men swarm over the walls like ants, he will kill one-third of his officers and troops, and the city will still not be taken. This is the disaster that restults from attacking fortified cities.
The one who excels at employing the military subjugates other people's armies without engaging in battle, captures other people's fortified cities without attacking them, and destroys other people's states without prolonged fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim of preservation. Thus his weapons will not become dull, and the gains can be be preserved. This is the strategy for planning offensives.
[...]
Thus there are five factors from which victory can be known:
One who knows when he can fight, and when he cannot fight, will be victorious.
One who recognizes how to employ large and small numbers wil be victorious.
One whose upper and lower ranks have the same desires will be victorious.
One who, fully prepared, awaits the unprepared will be victorious.
One whose general is capable and not interfered with by the ruler will be victorious.
These five are the Tao to know victory.
Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement.
So, you be the judge: is Sun-Tzu, with all his talk of chariots and mail and crossbows and pieces of gold and foraging in enemy territory - and his concern for protecting the enemy's infrastructure, materiel, and men in so far as possible - simply an outdated relic of a simpler time? Or is the technocratic American general preaching urban warfare the gullible one, who does not know the Tao of War? And what of the architects of this present war?
Or to put it another way, what did Master Sun have to say about Halliburton, and was he right? And about not having enough armoured Humvees in advance? And about alienating your captives? Or about the "war planners" with their budget estimates before the government and comittees?
Time has told, imo.
(part II)
I was going to leave it at that, but there are so many more appropriate passages that I'm going to post some more from the latter parts of the Art of War dealing with the overall ethics of warfare, with the value of "humint", and with basic strategy. (There's a lot of other useful technical stuff in the Art of War on morale, terrain, and dealing with rear-eschelon micromanaging rulers who don't understand what's going on, and when and why you should ignore their orders, but you can read all that on your own sometime.)
Chapter 12, Incendiary Attacks
Sun-Tzu said:
There are five types of incendiary attack: the first is to incinerate men, the second to incinerate provisions, the third to incinerate supply trains, the fourth to incinerate armories, and the fifth to incinerate formations. [...]
Now if someone is victorious in battle and succeeds in attack but does not exploit the achievement, it is disastrous, and his fate should be termed "wasteful and tarrying." Thus it is said that the wise general ponders it, the good general cultivates it.
If it is not advantageous, do not move. If objectives cannot be attained, do not employ the army. Unless endangered do not engage in warfare. The ruler cannot mobilize the army out of personal anger. The general cannot engage in battle because of personal frustration. When it is advantageous, move; when not advantageous, stop. Anger can revert to happiness, annoyance can revert to joy, but a vanquished state cannot be revived, the dead cannot be brought back to life.
Thus the enlightened ruler is cautious about it, the good general respectful of it. This is the Tao for bringing about security and preserving the army intact.
Chapter 13, Employing Spies
Sun-Tzu said:
When you send forth an army of a hundred thousand on a campaign, marching them out a thousand kilometers, the expenditures of the common people and the contributions of the feudal house will be one thousand pieces of gold per day. Those inconvenienced and troubled both within and without the border, who are exhausted on the road or unable to pursue their agricultural work, will be seven hundred thousand families.
Armies remain locked in a standoff for years to fight for victory on a single day, yet generals begrudge bestowing ranks and emoluments of one hundred pieces of gold and therefore do not know the enemy's situation. This is the ultimate inhumanity. Such a person is not a general for the people, an assistant for a ruler, or the arbiter of victory.
The means by which enlightened rulers and sagacious generals moved and conquered others, that their achievements surpassed the masses, was advance knowledge.
Advance knowledge cannot be gained from ghosts and spirits, inferred from phenomena, or projected from the measures of Heaven, but must be gained from men for it is the knowledge of the enemy's true situation.
Thus there are five types of spies to be employed: local spy, internal spy, turned spy or double agent, dead or expendable spy, and the living spy. When all five are employed together, and no one knows their Tao, this is termed "spiritual methodology." They are a ruler's treasures.
Local spies - employ people from the local district.
Internal spies - employ their people who hold government positions.
Double agents - employ the enemy's spies.
Expendable spies - are employed to spread disinformation outside the state. Provide our expendable spies with false information and have them leak it to enemy agents.
Living spies - return with their reports.
Thus of all the Three Armies' affairs, no relationship is closer than with spies; no rewards are more generous than those given to spies; no affairs are more secret than those pertaining to spies.
Unless someone has the wisdom of a Sage, he cannot use spies; unless he is benevolent and righteous, he cannot employ spies; unless he is subtle and perspicacious, he cannot perceive the substance in intelligence reports. It is subtle, subtle! There are no areas in which one does not employ spies.
[...]
In general, as for the armies you want to strike, the cities you want to attack, and the men you want to assassinate, you must first know the names of the defensive commander, his assistants, staff, door guards, and attendants. You must have our spies search out and learn them all.
You must search for enemy agents who have come to spy on us. Tempt them with profits, instruct and retain them. Thus double agents can be obtained and employed. Through knowledge gained from them, you can recruit both local and internal spies. Through knowledge gained from them, the expendable spy can spread his falsehoods, can be used to misinform the enemy. Through knowledge gained from them, our living spies can be employed as times require.
The ruler must know these five aspects of espionage work. This knowledge inevitably depends on turned spies; therefore you must be generous to double agents. [...]
and finally, a hypothetical discussion between Sun Tzu and his ruler, the King of Wu:
"The enemy is courageous and unafraid, arrogant and reckless. His soldiers are numerous and strong. What should we do?"
Sun Tzu said: "Speak and act submissively in order to accord with their intentions. Do not cause them to comprehend the situation, and thereby increase their indolence. In accord with the enemy's shifts and changes, submerge our forces in ambush to await the moment. Then do not look at their forward motion, nor look back to their rearward movement, but strike them in the middle. Even though they are numerous, they can be taken. The Tao for attacking the arrogant is not to engage their advance front."
--Here endeth the lesson.
(all exerpts from The Complete Art of War translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, Westview, 1996. This is a good edition besides the clarity of the translation because it also includes the follow-up work by Sun Pin, Sun Tzu's grandson who was also a military commander and theorist, plus lots of explanatory notes on obscurer points.)