I was tooling around in Diebolds online email archive, the one that was liberated from their mail servers a while ago.
Sorry, that company SUCKS.
In the space of an hour I've found a bunch of scary messages. This one is a good example.
Email message from concerned employee:
Jennifer Price at Metamor (about to be Ciber) has indicated that she can access the GEMS Access database and alter the Audit log without entering a password. What is the position of our development staff on this issue? Can we justify this? Or should this be anathema?
answer (very bad one, IMO) from diebold geek:
Its a tough question, and it has a lot to do with perception. Of course
everyone knows perception is reality.
Right now you can open GEMS' .mdb file with MS-Access, and alter its contents. That includes the audit log. This isn't anything new. In VTS, you can open the database with progress and do the same. The same would go for anyone else's system using whatever database they are using. Hard drives are read-write entities. You can change their contents.
...
etc
from
http://chroot.net/s/lists/support.w3archive/200110/msg00122.html
from
http://chroot.net/s/support.2001.html
from
http://chroot.net/s/lists/
please recommend this diary if you think the mail archive is worth looking through and more apalling/scary/disgusting examples of what systems and procedures we are placing our democratic trust in, can be found.
In case this isn't clear:
Diebold leaked like a sieve until mid 2003. Their software was on open FTP servers, their mail servers were public, their stuff is out there on the net. Not many people are aware of it. More should be. Their system (the voting machines running on access databases) and the tabulators (GEMS) are apalling from a design perspective and from looking at their emails they seem to run the software development cycle fast and loose (i'm not the first to conclude this - computer professors say it gets an "F" grade. The media has lost the plot on diebold though).
Go through their mail archive and see for yourself. Then get mad. Very mad.
I've found email messages documenting..
question on availability of windows OS from GEMS (the master tabulator software) and answer from diebold geek that blocking OS access to the operator would mean the software is impractical to use in an election(!).
employees getting virus infections
openly admitting their ftp server has been completely public
passwords for zip files for software in plain text distributed over email
loads and loads of seemingly stupid bugs including in demos and production that give lie to their PR
dismissive messages about XML open standards initiatives for voting
desperate emails when newspaper articles appeared noting problems like negative 16000 votes for Gore, with poor/uncaring answers
you can find more emails, the archive is huge, I only dipped for an hour or so.
Perhaps this stuff will shake a journalist to re-open the pressure to get PAPER TRAILS on all e-voting initiatives.
Consider the effort on the right that was put into disputing the CBS memogate stuff - applied to this Diebold mail archive. The outrage, the media letters. But we're libs, and we're too NICE. Their software is buggy, stone-age, computer diploma crap, and their procedures appear to be abysmal, and their security was zero. What is it now? we're not allowed to know? The key central tabulator database that summarizes hundreds of machines, and audit trail as well, can be erased/reset/fiddled with by anyone using the Start menu. The machines leave no paper trail. What have we done in allowing this?
Edit, copy-pasted from the comments: resources:
Here is the link to BlackBoxVoting, Bev Harriss's outfit (you MUST watch her movie, she demonstrates to Dean the weakness of GEM):
http://blackboxvoting.org/
And I personally recommend the following article as the very best single article on this issue that I have read (and I've been following this for some time --though I'm no expert!)
http://www.alternet.org/story/19432/
and, if you're interested in reading further, here are some more articles:
"Ghosts in the Machines: The Business of Counting Votes"
http://www.counterpunch.org/leopold09022003.html
'The Voting Rights Struggle of Our Time"
http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=16476
"Voting and Democracy: The Challenges Ahead"
http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=16508
"The Theft of Your Vote is Just a Chip Away" http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=16474
"Beyond Voting Machines"
http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=16490
"November Surprise"
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11518
"Down for the Count"
http://lacitybeat.com/article.php?id=1013&IssueNum=55
Greg Palast
http://www.gregpalast.com/detail.cfm?artid=342&row=0