Given all the bloviating on both sides in recent days over the potential terror threat to the US, represented by a possible takeover of cargo terminals in the US by a company based in the United Arab Emirates, I thought it might be helpful to offer some background on the workings of the current US system for cargo security.
I have been working as a consultant to the maritime industry for nearly two decades and hopefully this information will give everyone a better understanding of how things work and perhaps a better insight to just how some of the flying charges being loosed by pundits, politicians and even Kossacks, stand up to the facts.
In recent years, even before 9/11, the government has been taking steps to beef up cargo security. The initial stages of this effort were driven more by issues of stowaways and drug smuggling than by terror, but they were the first steps in the process leading to today's system.
You have heard lots of rhetoric about how only 5% of containers entering the US are actually inspected and that figure is within reasonable bounds. It is also one which frightens many people, including some members of Congress, who want to pass legislation which would demand that EVERY container entering the US be inspected - either with X-rays or (worse yet) by opening every box, emptying all the contents and checking it.
When you realize that literally MILLIONS of containers enter the US every year, you can quickly see that such a task would be almost impossible. In fact it would bring our transportation and trade pipeline to a screeching halt. It would create chaos in manufacturing and warehouse systems which today operate on "just in time" delivery systems designed to move raw materials and parts rapidly from origin to final manufacturing and then to the end consumer. Delay is money, warehouses are delay, inventory is cost. Slowing down these systems would be costly and highly disruptive.
Customs, the Coast Guard and Immigration have the key tasks of trying to create and operate a system which will meet the conflicting needs of security and minimal disruption. The system as devised today focuses on trying to drive assurances of cargo security offshore as much as possible and it works in several different ways:
1- Every ship headed for the US is required to provide a full copy of its entire cargo manifest, in electronic format, to Customs before that ship departs its final foreign port headed for the U.S. While the ship is in transit, Customs runs that data and similar manifest data for all ships headed here, through a sensitive software filter which is constantly tweaked. What the system is looking for are things which are out of the ordinary:
- A shipment from a new shipper or to a new or unknown consignee
- Shipments with unusual payment or handling conditions
- Shipments from or to sensitive areas.
- Items which just don't seem to fit in some way.
This approach is used in light of the following basic fact.....Of all those millions of containers coming to the U.S., the vast majority of them are pretty easy to categorize, and with proper handling requirements, track and safeguard during transit. For example, while there are literally tens of thousands of shippers worldwide, the vast majority of the containers in transit are actually generated by a surprisingly small number (a few hundred) of big global shippers -- WalMart, auto companies, chemical companies, computers, etc. etc. These companies ship the same stuff on a regular basis from the same plant through the same port/terminals and warehouses or stores on a regular basis.
Customs recognizes this and they have set regulations with these very large shippers to assure that each can document proper security procedures for their shipments from point of origin to destination. Once they do so (and they have), Customs treats their shipments as essentially background noise.
Next they concentrate on the smaller shippers...still legitimate businesses...who may ship anywhere from a few dozen to a few hundred boxes a year. Again, these companies must demonstrate that they "know" their suppliers and can document that they and the suppliers are following proper procedurs for security. They too can win certification for such documentation and they too become part of the background noise.
Meanwhile, as part of their efforts to push the risk "offshore", Customs now has agents working in ports and terminals in between 50 and 60 different countries, identified as higher potential terror origin risk points. They are constantly reviewing outbound movements headed to the U.S. and can and do require individual shippers to open up boxes or let them watch the loading of a box if they have questions about it.
Finally, there is the question of what happens when the boxes arrive in a U.S. port. There are additional steps available should Customs have questions about an incoming shipment -- often identified through their pre-screening of inbound manifests. These include X-rays of the container and a screening for neutron emissions - a clear sign of radioactivity.
Finally, if an X-Ray or a neutron detector suggests something may need greater scrutiny, they can pull the box aside and demand it be opened for a complete inspection. (I recently heard a Customs official recount that while neutron detections are exceedingly rare, they do occur...most often caused by ceramic tiles which can have background radiation. In one case a neutron alarm caught a container which had, during an earlier transit, carried a load of blueberries from a growing area which had been contaminated by fallout from Chernobyl. The berries were long gone, but the background radiation was still there and detectable.)
So....the bottom line is this. While only 5% of containers are being inspected, we should NOT be as freaked out about this fact as scaremongers would want us to be. The 5% that ARE being inspected are being inspected because pre-screening has identified them as something which warrants greater scrutiny.
Now comes the question as to possible risks of a Dubai Ports World operator being given control of US TERMINALS....and I capitalize that word because too many of those making charges on this issue in recent days keep asserting that DPW is a PORT operator. A PORT is a harbor area and often can contain multiple terminals -- areas where ships can berth and be loaded and unloaded, and where containers can be stored. The TERMINAL operator's task is to provide cranes and trucks and lift stackers and space to manage container flow to and from the ships.
The port operator, meantime, oversees the maritime operations of the port and harbor and grants concessions to terminal operators.
Could a DPW slip a terror container into its own terminals? DPW doesn't generate shipments...it handles them. A container coming to the port from overseas will be aboard a ship run by a shipping company and one which is required to report that container and its alleged contents to Customs via the electronic manifest. Any attempt by a DPW to jigger its own records would show up as a discrepancy against the manifest data sent by the shipping company directly to Customs.
And as numerous commentators have noted, employees at US terminals are largely Americans....many of them stevedores who load and unload ships and members of either the ILWU or the ILA. They have to pass security screenings themselves as part of their employment and these screenings have gotten more and more strict. These are carried out by US authorities and not the terminal operator and the terminal operator must also demonstrate that security systems for their terminals meet increasingly tough standards.
So....what does all this mean? It means that allowing DPW to operate US terminals does NOT open our doors to terrorists. That does not mean that there are not some serious questions about the quality of scrutiny given to this deal by the Bush Administration, but it is not an open door to bad guys. This Administration, so hot to tell everyone that it will protect us from terrorists, can also be faulted for its slowness in making funds available to ports and terminals for increased security. There are not enough large-scale x-ray units for example. And of course, when one looks at this Administration's record on things like Medicare reform and Katrina and even the vetting of this business deal, one can get really frightened because with Bush and Company, it is ALWAYS about politics and rhetoric and NEVER about sound policy and effective administration.
Could a container get slipped in with a hinky contents? Given the huge volumes of containerized cargo, one cannot rule out that possibility. However, it would not be as easy as scaremongers want us to believe. In fact a far greater threat to the public (other than an atomic weapon or dirty bomb) would be something like the triggering of a loaded natural gas tanker in a port like Boston. The fireball from such an occurrence, and the shockwave, would devastate a large portion of the city.
The world is full of risky propositions these days and there isn't enough paranoia in the world to think up all the things that MIGHT happen and which we MIGHT want to prepare for. But in the case of containerized cargo, things are not as bleak as they have been painted. More work is definitely needed and more funds are crucial to further increase security and safety.
Researchers are looking at tougher container sealing systems and working strongly to develop Radio Frequency tagging systems which can continually monitor containers and send warnings when cargo doors are breached at any point in the transport pipeline. The challenge is to come up with a common standard for a system which can operate with well under 1% of false readings out of a total of millions of shipments per year.....and a system for which each tag costs just a few pennies.
Hopefully, this will help provide a greater level of understanding to the debate on this important issue.