, two researchers at the Chr. Michelsen Institute for development and human rights studies explain why the situation in Afghanistan is no better than that in Iraq. They also offer constructive proposals for the Pentagon to blithely ignore.
A peace we cannot win?
By Astri Suhrke and Arne Strand, the Chr. Michelsen Institute.
Dagbladet, 20.06.06. From the Norwegian by Sirocco
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY has since November 2001 engaged in two distinct and partly contradictory processes in Afghanistan. On the one hand is a diverse peace building project involving economic reconstruction, political elections, reform of the state administration and the courts, and support for human rights; on the other hand, warfare.
The war has primarily been prosecuted by US forces against al-Qaeda elements and the Taliban. Since 2003 the US has switched to a classic counter-insurgency strategy whereby the enemy is to be crushed militarily while the population is won over with economic assistance, humanitarian aid, and political initiatives.
Yet innocent lives are often claimed. In May, some 35 civilians (women, children, and elderly men) were killed in a US airstrike against a village in the Kandahar province. Such incidents have occurred several times before. Every time, President Karzai expresses regret and asks the Americans to wage war without harming the civil population. Every time, tempers rise as it becomes clear that Karzai's pleas are unheeded. When even mosques are bombed -- as recently in Kandahar -- the conflict is further intensified.
WAGING WAR against a locally entrenched guerrilla force without harming the civilian population is exceedingly difficult in the first place. Nor is Washington interested in advice from the Afghan government, and it has therefore not signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), as standard protocol between sovereign states demands.
When Karzai traveled to Kandahar to convey his regrets for the incident, the inhabitants of the local village requested that foreign forces be pulled out. The coalition forces do not contribute to people's highest priority: enhanced protection against "everyday violence" at the hands of local strongmen. The international troops are waging a war in Afghanistan that at best does not concern the village and at worst affects it directly and adversely.
US forces have also adopted a mode of operation that provokes counter-reactions almost whereever they go. In Kabul they disregard every traffic rule for their own security. When a lot of such minor issues add to a deeper sense of anger and frustration, things may turn explosive -- as recently in Kabul.
THE MAJOR GRIEVANCES are related to much of what has been done in the names of both warfare and peacebuilding. The ambitious program for economic reconstruction and the visions of modernization, democracy, and human rights have created expectations as well as fear. Many were hoping for peace and progress in terms of a restored house, a job, and security. Every poll shows that most Afghans still consider lack of work and security the biggest problems. Meanwhile, others have quite visibly become staggeringly rich; largely, it is assumed, on corruption, smuggling, and drug trade. Similarly, one person's hopes for greater freedom is another person's threat against fundamental religious and traditional social values. This conflict plays out both in the public sphere and the interface to the private sphere, as when a female TV host, known for her liberated demeanor on camera, was murdered.
Development invariably fosters contrast and conflict, but the Afghan case is unique. The development is programme-bound to be extensive and swift, and is mainly to be financed by means of development aid. Only some 8 percent of the national budget stems from domestic taxes. Foreigners are conspicuous both in Kabul and on the countryside as advisers, development managers, and so on. This makes the reconstruction -- which effectively has become an extensive modernization project -- appear to be promoted and owned by foreigners.
When in addition foreign forces wage war in a way that harms ordinary people and militants alike, there is fertile ground for broad mobilization against foreigners, the regime, and those who have gained most from the peace. The Kabul riots targeted them all.
IS THERE A WAY OUT OF this misfortune? Previous attempts to swiftly develop Afghanistan under King Amanullah in the 1920s and President Daoud in the 1970s misfired. When Afghan communists backed by Soviet forces set out to modernize the country while waging war, they failed even worse. There may be a lesson here.
One could likely diminish the antagonism toward the peacebuilding by slowing down the reform programme, putting more weight on basic needs like jobs and security from everyday violence, and lowering the profile of foreigners.
As to the warfare, it does not appear feasible to crush the Taliban guerrilla militarily, nor by letting the military forces assume more humanitarian tasks. In fact the militants have multiplied in proportion to the growing number of foreign troops since November 2001. ISAF and the coalition forces now count some 32,000 combined (USA 23,000, NATO 9,000). Yet the security (as measured by the numbers of military or civilian casualties, or the number of combat incidents) has been weakened, especially since 2003.
Blaming Pakistan -- where the Taliban is openly mobilizing -- serves to obscure how complex the opposition to the international presence is. Schools for girls are torched in areas where the Taliban never had a foothold, such as the areas where Norwegian troops were attacked, and drugs are cultivated all across the country. Besides, Pakistan's role must be understood in a regional context and in terms of the fear of being "surrounded" by India, which has now forcefully entered Afghanistan and enhanced its relations with Washington. Political innovation and agility are called for here.
Those are also needed on the military front. The planned US force reduction gave NATO an opportunity to rethink ISAF's role. Instead, it decided to follow in the coalition's footsteps by branching out to the south and east and operating with a more offensive mandate. The Brits are going to wage war on the drug smugglers of Helmand; another war they are unlikely to win. The Canadians in Kandahar have already launched offensive operations. This makes not only them, but probably all foreign forces, magnets and targets for the militants.
ONE ALTERNATIVE is actually to deescalate the offensive warfare in the south and east, and lower the profile of foreign forces by concentrating them in a few urban settlements. If such a strategy of stabilization is tied to a more active diplomacy of reconciliation with respect to the Taliban, it needs not spawn garrison towns in a negative sense.
The Afghans have ancient traditions for negotiating as well as fighting. Karzai is a skilled negotiator in this game, as e.g. his selection of governors shows. He has long stressed the necessity of a political solution. To send in Canadian troops or American A-10 aircraft can only clutter up this strategy and bring out the drawback of deploying military force when what is needed is the will to innovative thinking and political solutions.