What's going on with
France in Lebanon? They did an excellent job in the negotiation process, but it's pretty clear that one principal reason for their success was the belief, both by Washington and by the UN, that France would be the backbone of the international force intended to support the relatively weak Labanese army. But France has now faltered, only committing to a token 200 additional troops. As a result, the support force, which was supposed to include up to 15000 additional troops, now has commitments for only about 3500 (Israel has rejected, for obvious reasons, the idea that troops from countries that do not recognize it, or with which it has no diplomatic relations, be included).
So what's the deal here? Jacques Chirac has stated that the number of French troops is still open, that the 200 are just those who already are on route to Lebanon; he has also stated that he insists on clear rules of engagement and on it being the Lebanese forces who are responsible for disarming Hezbollah, not the international ones. He is worried about getting France into another Bosnia or about lots of French soldiers dying such as the 58 killed by the attack by Hezbollah on the "Drakkar" building in Beirut in 1983. Presumably, there are still circumstances where France will increase substantially the number of troops committed there, but how realistic is this?
The editors of Le Monde ask the French government to "dissipate the ambuity" regarding their position. Are they simply reneging on their commitment, taken as a given by all parties to the negotiating process, or are they in effect extending the negotiations in order to increase the involvement of Labanon and of a wider range of countries in the forces (along with clearly stated rules of engagement)?
Those are two possibilities, of course, to which I add a third: poker strategy. Was France in effect gaming the negotiations by letting everyone assume they would come forward immediately with several thousand troops, but never actually committing to any given number? And if this is the case, was it a good idea, and what will be its consequences?
At the time, the main concern around the world was to attain a cease-fire, as quickly as possible. Yet, the US was acting against a too-hasty cessation of hostilities, and was supporting Israel in its attempt to create a largely empty buffer zone. There is no question about what country is most responsible for the cease fire: it was France, who took the lead in the negotiations and got Washington and Israel to back off. So at this level, assuming that France was indeed gaming everyone, they succeeded in getting what most of the world wanted, the current fragile, but so far successful, cease fire.
The question is, what happens now? Can the Lebanese army, supported only by some 3500 international troops, manage to achieve its goals of disarming Hezbollah and creating a 20-mile wide buffer between Lebanon and Hezbollah? Remember, as Thomas L Friedman points out in his subscribers-only column this morning, Hezbollah is being supported by the profits Iran is receiving from the very high prices of oil; their resources are essentially unlimited.
Those who were pushing for an immediate cease-fire do not have the right to criticize France about this, because they were not concerned about such things as disarming Hezbollah or establishing a buffer zone. Since immediate cessation of hostilities was the predominant view here at Daily Kos, it may be that the whole question raised by this diary will be seen as irrelevant. Yet some of us, while deeply hurt by the casualties in the 30-day war, were optimistic enough to hope that a buffer could be established, that Hezbollah could be disarmed, or at least held back 20 miles from the Israeli border, and the there would be, in the long term, a greatly improved situation vis à vis Israel and Lebanon. But it was always clear even to the most starry-eyed of us, that an effective international force was key to this hope.
So, I believe that if France really did mislead her negotiating partners regarding the number of French troops to be supplied to the UN forces in Lebanon, that they will have produced a very mixed outcome: yes, there is a cease fire, but there will be no long-term improvement, and in fact, things will probably get worse.
As was clearly stated in this NY Times editorial, Hezbollah is winning the aftermath of the war, by throwing itself fully and visibly into the rebuilding effort. It is paying for peoples' lost homes, providing food and other supplies, and generally cementing its propaganda victories from the war into permanence (using, as Friedman points out in the article cited above, billions of Iranian oil dollars to fund all this). The US, for example, has made various pledges to help rebuilding, etc., but it is simply not moving fast enough to compete with Hezbollah. Therefore, what we may end up with by, say, next summer, is an even more well-armed Hezbollah, which will be even more fully supported by the Lebanese people and by Israel's neighbors. The next war will be even bloodier and more likely to explode regionally.
If this happens, then I will attach a good part of the blame to France's negotiating policies, even while continuing to credit them for facilitating the current cease-fire. Obviously, the hope for a disarmed Hezbollah and secure border was just that, a hope, and it might not have happened even if there were 10,000 French troops in Lebanon today. But if France continues down this path, then in my opinion, that hope will have been dashed, and the war will have been, as many have already stated, completely useless.
Now, if the other branch of the "ambiguity" turns out to be the correct one, and France is indeed simply holding out for certain protections before it commits a large force to the region, then and only then will we optimists be able to keep our hope for a long term improvement in Lebanon.