Suicide/euthanasia is a highly complex issue with two oppositional streams of consciousness, both of which present ostensibly logical arguments. In light of this, intellectual progress on this issue may have to apply the principle of incrementalism and proceed slowly, cautiously, and carefully through a dialectic process that retains as much collective objectivity as possible.
Suicide/euthanasia is a highly complex issue with two oppositional streams of consciousness, both of which present ostensibly logical arguments. In light of this, intellectual progress on this issue may have to apply the principle of incrementalism and proceed slowly, cautiously, and carefully through a dialectic process that retains as much collective objectivity as possible. It stands to reason that, since both sides of this issue are in contention, then they can't both logically be right, and thus, at length, we should be able to determine the correct course of action. In the interim, it would be best to exercise moderation and utilize extensive but expeditious arbitration of individualized case decision making in order to determine whether or not measures are taken to end the life of a person.
In "Active and Passive Euthanasia" James Rachels contends with the American Medical Association's stance on doctor-assisted suicide that direct action resulting in the death of a patient is unethical. Rachels asserts that there is no ethical distinction between actively being responsible for the death of patient by administering lethal substances or lethal doses of nonlethal substances and passively being responsible for the death of a patient by extubating them or negatively affecting other conditions that are instituted to keep the alive. This seems logical, because in both cases there is a decision to stop prolonging the agony of a terminally ill patient. In the latter case the agony of the patient will potentially continue longer than in the former case. So, what is important here is the commonality, the apprehension of a decision to end the pain of a suffering patient. In the view of Rachels, it is illogical to assert that indirect measures resulting in the death of a patient which will potentially prolong the suffering of that patient longer than direct measures, with the same result, are moral given that the intent, in either case, is to alleviate extended duration of pain given the inevitability of demise. Simply put, Rachels contends that there is no moral distinction between letting someone die and killing them.
Perhaps, however, euthanasia/suicide is far too complex an issue about which to establish dogmatic principles. In, "Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making," Dr. Timothy Quill engages the subject matter from a personal perspective, talking about the case of a leukemia victim named Diane. Though constrained by the legal context, Dr. Quill assisted Diane in acquiring barbiturates with which to commit suicide. He had discussed with Diane the potentialities of comfort care, which perhaps would be more accurately referred to as "relative comfort care." Diane was cognizant of the options, but she did not want to linger around, suffering in the face of an imminent death. So she pursued a safe way to end her life (Quill 694). However, in the face of social constraints, if Diane had found herself in the same situation with a less empathetic and inclined physician, she may have had to endure a slower and more painful death. This seems to be unfortunate. There are rational fears that abound in allowing individualized decision making processes to persist, especially in mechanisms that result in the death of human beings. Yet, for all the distrust in the context of case-specific arbitration about euthanasia/suicide, it appears necessary for a movement of societal streams of consciousness to begin resolving this issue. I must concede that it is a very complex practice, and as asserted by the Supreme Court, as told in an amicus curiae brief by Ronald Dworkin et al., there is a "'slippery slope' argument: that it would be impossible to limit a right to assisted suicide in an acceptable way, once the right was recognized (Dworkin et al. 41)." The right to die, defined as "Freedom from unwanted medical attention, even to the point of death (Plano & Greenberg 362)," is recognized by the laws of the United States, while the right to suicide is not, thus making suicide an illegal action. Under the principles of the law, the two are clearly distinguished from one another. Perhaps there is a logical paradox that involves not forcing life prolonging medical care and yet not allowing suicide outright. Maybe neither practice should be acceptable, if the preservation of life itself is regarded as a supreme virtue.
Suicide itself, as a concept, must be dealt with philosophically. An excerpt from Richard Brandt's "The Morality and Rationality of Suicide" offers a stipulative definition of suicide that is more rational and extensive than the typical conception. He expands on the traditional definition by stating that suicide is taking any action that results in one's own death (Brandt 70). The neutrality of this definition allows us to re-frame our conception about suicide and regard it as either rational and moral suicide or irrational and immoral suicide. This allows for a context of justification for the causing of one's death for some unspecified but rationally articulable reason, for example, a soldier dying on the battlefield to save a comrade. However, this extensive view can still be contended on ethical grounds. Kant's Categorical Imperative stated that for an action to be moral it must respect the independent nature and rationality of all human beings and not treat them as expedient. Therefore, even the seemingly noble act of intentional self-sacrifice is immoral, because it does not respect the independent nature of the one making the sacrifice. Self-sacrifice itself is not irrational, but if one is cognizant of that sacrifice he has violated his own right to self-preservation. If it is immoral for one to violate the right to preserve his/her own existence, then it must surely be immoral to cause one's own death in cases where the death is the sole object of action, though the alleviation of pain is the object of intention. This author cannot frame to apprehend a pain so unbearable as to facilitate the desire to forfeit his own life. Yet, the fundamental question is not if the pain is so unbearable that a person should want to die, but is the right to die inherent and is it contradictory to the inalienable right to life that all Americans should enjoy? The Declaration of Independence states that,
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.-That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,"
So, in the document that outlines the generative principles of our nation, we see that the right to life is regarded as unalienable, which means "incapable of being alienated, surrendered, or transferred (
http://www.m-w.com/...)," without an expressed exception. Hence, a person's life should not be regarded as expedient, but the ultimate aim should be to preserve life in all its forms. All entities with the capability to grow, react to stimuli, metabolize, and reproduce are alive. Yet, nair but humans possess the capability to rise above their animal nature and engage in rational thought. So, because of this additional capability, we should take extra care in preserving the life of a human. Self-preservation is a fundamental component of our animal and rational nature, so it could be said that no one who desires to forfeit their inalienable right to life is engaging in rational thought on the matter. It may be inadvisable to give decisions about life and death to those who, while undergoing pitiable and unenviable circumstances of pain and misfortune, whether physiological or psychological, are rendered because of their conditions incapable of making the intuitive and rational decision to preserve their own life. Furthermore, this logic may dictate that those who assist them in committing the act of suicide, are engaged in the immoral and irrational activity of euthanasia and are not truly conducting their best interests.
There are two distinct and clearly oppositional streams of consciousness about this issue, and I have presented but an overview of them. Empirical philosophy holds that, if we can arrive at a commonly accepted language and logic of inquiry, we should agree, at length, on the conclusion at which we arrive. The ultimate question here may be: why is there such a stark divergence of moral philosophy amongst people with similar language and logical processes about an issue? There is an ethical fundamentalist opposition to suicide, as the act may damn the soul to an eternity in hell, that may bias many. Yet, there is also a logical opposition to suicide, holding that the recognition and preservation of life is of supreme import. The problem with this idea is that the individual "owner" of a life may not value their life because of the prevalence and pervasiveness of agony, and the true concept of a right may involve all forms of exercise of that right, even abstention from exercising that right. There is a logical proposition to supporting suicide/euthanasia, that extended suffering in the face of imminent death is no virtue at all. The problem with this is that given our temporally confined cognizance, we can never be truly assured of any form of inevitability. This author must confess that he cannot arrive at an indisputable truth favoring one over the other in such a way as the logic of that side prevails, and he desperately hopes that someone else can. For now, one suggests the paradigm of extensive but expeditious arbitration of individualized case decision making in order to determine whether it is better to live or die.