Sitting at home on a day off, I got to wondering, why on earth is NATO interested in having the Republic of GEORGIA as a member? I mean, Georgia is pretty far from the North Atlantic and just barely in Europe, yet there is our preznut saying they should be admitted forthwith. Even the NATO secretary general seems to agree.
Now I'm not expert on this so I did some surfing. In the spirit of sharing, what I learned is below the fold.
Georgia and NATO
At first glance it hard to see what strategic interest would be served by NATO admitting Georgia into membership. Almost surely Bush's support derives partly from the neo-con's grandiose geopolitical views and a desire to isolate Russia, but why would our NATO partners, none of whom are exactly enthralled with the neo-con agenda, show even marginal interest in this? Even worse, adding Georgia to the alliance would appear to involve NATO in a partisan way in the difficult ethnic conflicts in the region. Indeed, the parliamentary speaker of Georgia has announced that it would enter talks on its break-away regions "after joining NATO." Unsurprisingly, Russia is less than enthusiastic at this prospect.
Georgia is certainly far removed from the North Atlantic. So why is NATO interested in this extension at all?
The answer, it would appear, is energy and most particularly natural gas. According to a Swedish Defense Mininstry Study, in 2005, 50% of the natural gas supplies to the European Union came from Russia, with an additional 23% coming from Algeria and most of the remainder from Norway. A recent NATO memorandum, coupled with a cooperation agreementbetween Algeria and Russia on natural gas ventures, stoked fears that Russian, in league with Algeria, might initiate an OPEC-like cartel in the natrual gas markets. Of course the Heritage Foundation chimed in with its own alarmist report. Today the EU energy ministry issued a more sanguine statement, but clearly this is a matter of some strategic concern.
This is where Georgia come in. There are considerable oil and natrual gas reserves in the Caspian Sea basin. Estimates of the exact extent of these reserves remains uncertain, ranging from 32 billion to 220 billion barrels of oil. The high figure, for context, would supply world oil demand for eight years at current levels. The problem is how to get this oil and natrual gas out to world markets.
The shortest pipeline route for oil runs through Iran. Given the US embargo however, it is difficult for western businesses to develop the Iranian route, so instead the longer route from Baku in Azerbaijan then through Georgia and Turkey was develped, at an expense of over $4 billion. This pipeline, which terminates at the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, opened in July of this year.
Getting the natural gas out is a little more difficult. While new technologymay make liquified natural gas transport by sea more viable especially for US imports, currently the only way to transport is via pipeline. There are existing pipelines from Caspian to the EU, but they almost all transit Russia. Indeed, while 50% of EU natural gas come through Russia, only about 25% actually currently comes from Gazprom, the state-owned energy company, with remaining 25% cominng from central Asian and other sources but transiting using Gazprom's pipelines. In part to counter this, the south Caucusus oil pipeline was expandedto move natrual gas from the natural gas fields near Baku to Europe.Complementing this pipeline will be another planned linkjoining the Turkish and EU pipelines. It is worth noting in passing that this natural gas pipeline is owned 25% by British Petroleum and and 25% by Statoil, the Norwegian energy company. Norway supplies 22% the EU's natural gas, again according to the Swedish study.
Another trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline has been proposed, with strong US political support, but has been confounded in part by unresolved and conflicting claims to the Caspian sea energy rights. Unsurprisingly, Russia and Iran, both with claims on parts of the Caspian petroleum and gas reserves, have not been supportive of this move.
All of this is background on why NATO would have interest in Georgia: it is in a critical location for transporting energy from south Asia to Europe and beyond. Alternative routes transit nations that US in particular is hostile to, Russia and Iran. Further complicating the situation are long-standing tensions between Armenia and Turkey and Armenia and Georgia, making an alternative route through Armenia not viable. Turkey and Georgia share a common cultural heritage thus adding another dimension to the complex conflicts between the various nationalities in the region. Notwithstanding Turkey's interest in the pipelines, it is worth noting that press reports in Turkey preceding the NATO summit were not supportive of US positions on the expansion of NATO.
All of this brings us back to NATO and Georgia and, of course, our dimwit preznut. At the start of the NATO summit in Riga, Bush called for a "peaceful resolution" of "Russia's neighborhood" conflicts. As noted in a previous link, it is the Russian view that US military assistance to Georgia has emboldened the Georgians and made them less likely to negotiate in good faith. Indeed, the statement by the leader of the Georgian parliament about negotiating only after Georgia joins NATO can only be seen as provocative. Similarly, Bush's characterization of "Russia's neighborhood conflicts", implying the blame is with the Russian leadership, delivered on the doorstep of Russia, must also be seen as disingenous at best. Further the US has taken a leading role in training the Georgian military, to the extent that the NATO flag already flies at some Georgian miltiary posts. Finally, during the expansion of NATO to eastern Europe the US and NATO gave assurances to Russia regarding placing military infrastructure in former Warsaw pact countries; the US has now broken those assurances.
The neo-cons conviction that there is a unilateral military solution to all problems is simply exacerbating the already volatile and complex relationships between Russia, Europe and the US. Our growing military engagement in the Caucusus considerably raises the stakes and makes diplomatic solutions more difficult.
Note that in many ways, the current Russian leadership is the mirror image of the US administration. While it promotes a democratic and peaceful image, it no less plays the power game than the US administration. It certainly uses its monopoly position on engery supplies to Eastern Euruope to engage in price discrimination, rewarding compliant regimes and punishing non-compliant regimes. The beligerant threats from the US administration on this only exacerbate the problems, as do the blatant military maneuvers. The consisten all-or-nothing, you're-either-with-us-or-against us approach makes it impossible to find compromise and common ground.
Georgia, and the long-standing conflicts between the nationalities of the region, could become a fulcrum for global confrontation over access to energy. Or, with proper vision and determined diplomacy, it could become a pathway to improved collaboration and cooperation and regional prosperity. That won't happen as long as the US continues to demonize the key players and refuses to have substative discussions with them. Of course this all also points to the increasing urgency to develop alternative energy sources and to reduce western dependence on petroleum and natural gas. I will leave the policy implications to those more able to comment on them -- my goal here was simply to share my own background research on why NATO and Georgia were suddenly surfacing as an issue.