As Glenn Greenwald has observed, the Bush Administration is stepping up the threatening rhetoric toward Iran. This morning we also heard that our troops have stormed an Iranian consulate in Iraq.
Rather than take the approach suggested by the Iraq Study Group of engaging with Iran and Syria, the administration has evidently decided that diplomacy will not work. According to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the Iranians and Syrians will want to talk about issues other than Iraq and this will ironically amount to "extortion".
It is possible that Iranian demands would be unacceptable and that no agreement could be reached. But we won't know unless we try. The Bush Administration has apparently decided that it is better to be feared than to be liked or even trusted.
In his book Diplomacy, the British diplomat Sir Harold Nicolson contrasted the "two main currents of diplomatic theory" that existed in the 1930s.
One, the "mercantile or shop-keeper" theory was based on the belief that it is important to establish credit and trust within the community of nations, just as a merchant attempts to do in the marketplace. According to Nicolson, the British had long been practitioners of this theory.
The other, which he called the "warrior or heroic" theory, was practiced by the Germans. "Fundamental to such a conception of diplomacy," Nicolson wrote, "is the belief that the purpose of negotiation is victory, and that the denial of complete victory means defeat." International relations are a zero-sum game to practitioners of this theory. If negotiating means a compromised must be reached, then negotiations will not be held.
For the "shop-keeper" diplomatists, both sides are able to come away with something. Though neither is likely to be completely satisfied, the arrangement will most likely benefit both sides more than war.
American diplomacy today is being driven by adherents of the warrior theory. This may appeal to those who've developed a sort of armchair machismo and it might even work in practice at times. But the long-term effects may be devastating to our national security. As Nicolson wrote,
German policy, therefore, is essentially "Machtpolitick" or "power policy." Her diplomacy, as I have indicated before, reflects this warrior or military conception. It seems to them more important to inspire fear than to beget confidence; and when, as invariably happens, the frightened nations combine to protect themselves, the Germans complain of "Einkreisung" or "encirclement," wholly ignoring the fact that it is their own methods and menaces which have produced this reaction.
Though we are very far from "encirclement", the damage Bush has done to America's image and credibility has caused, among many on the right, a sort of seige mentality in which even a disagreement between allies will lead to calls for boycotts. Some on the right argue that "they already hate us", ignoring the fact that there is a wide spectrum between distrust and a willingness to blow one's self up for a cause.
In the long run we face a world in which our allies will be less willing to go along with us and other nations more willing to stand up to us. Since American hegemony cannot last, we will need the cooperation of other nations. Bush's machtpolitick risks turning the U.S. into a pariah. If we continue down that road, we will ensure ourselves of that fate.
I'm not sure what we can do or what the Democrats in Congress can do about this problem. Bush has essentially handed the Democrats a fait accompli. Democrats cannot risk cutting funding for the troops without being branded as traitors. Such a course might also put our troops at risk, depending on how it is done. If or, more likely, when Bush provokes a fight with Iran, it will be even harder for Democrats to get our troops out of Iraq. Bush may be willing to play chicken with the troops, but I don't believe the Democrats will.
The only solution I see is impeachment, the sooner the better. Then we can move away from the historically-proven failure that is machtpolitick.