I haven't posted a diary in some time. To be honest, I've been playing a kind of involuntary waiting game, a Cassandra struck dumb by the sheer enormity of the disaster we have loosed upon ourselves. Call me Chicken Little, but the sky really is falling.
It doesn't matter, really, what Bush says or does. In terms of what's already happened and about to happen, it doesn't matter what the Democratic Congressional majority says or does. It's cooked. We're done.
If by some miracle, Bush grew a brain overnight and made a complete change in his "strategy" (like, having one), the war has been lost. The only thing left to be decided is how much gravy we want with our crow. How many more of our soldiers will come home in a box. Currently, the answer is a lot more. A whole lot more.
We may soon be mourning not thousands but tens of thousands of American soldiers and sailors who will die as a result of this stupid, misbegotten, illegal, immoral and did I say stupid war--a war that is now a sideshow to the set up of the main event, which will possibly result in the greatest defeat dealt to a superpower since the Spanish Armada sailed to invade England.
I've been doing a lot of reading instead; finding in the dusty old classics no comfort; but startlingly apt observations of the error of our ways:
Protracted battles will frustrate the soldiers and diminish their morale. Besieging a fortified city will sap an army’s strength to exhaustion. Sending an army on a long expedition will bankrupt the country. Exhausted and demoralised troops coupled with depleted national resources presents an opportunity for neighbouring feudal warlords to attack you as you are now most vulnerable. Even if you have the most able commander, he will not be able to avert the disastrous consequences under such circumstances.
Thus, I have learnt that although an incompetent commander will try to score a quick victory, I am yet to witness a clever commander who deliberately prolongs a war. To engage in an interminable war and simultaneously bring benefit to the nation is not possible.
There is no instance of a nation benefiting from prolonged warfare.
To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the supreme skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme skill.
Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.
The victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.
Those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him.
The best policy is to thwart your opponent’s plans by superior strategy, the second best is to weaken the enemy’s alliance by the use of skillful diplomacy, the third option is to resort to military operations and the last is to besiege a fortress.
There are three ways in which the ruler can wreak havoc upon his own army. Firstly, by not having a good grasp at the prevailing circumstances, he orders an attack or retreat when the real situation demands otherwise. This action cripples the army. Secondly, by being ignorant of the complexity of military internal affairs, he recklessly interferes with the administration. This causes confusion within the rank and file. Thirdly, by not knowing the importance of military expediency, he intervenes in the assignment of military forces. This will beget uncertainty and distrust. Once your own army is confused, invasion from neighbouring states becomes dangerously imminent. This is the classic case of sowing discord among your own army and giving away the advantage to your enemy.
The art of war is the art of deceit.
Sun Tzu
The first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them.
Many have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality; for how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather bring about his own ruin than his preservation.
Niccolo Machiavelli