The ongoing controversy over the destruction of CIA torture tapes raises several more unanswered questions. The answers call into question the very basis of the Bush Administration’s so-called Global War on Terrorism.
These are questions about selection. Who and why, and why not others?
Why were four particular "high-value" detainees water boarded? But, why weren’t the other 11 who were subjected to "enhanced interrogation techniques", and why were these 15 tortured out of the nearly 100 prisoners the CIA acknowledges it has held in secret custody around the world? What characteristics or experiences do they have in common?
MORE below . . .
What is it about the water board that made it reserved for only this special few? Was the most extreme physical torture merely to extract information from those who had resisted other measures, or was there another reason why water boarding was applied to four particular individuals – Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Hambali, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed? Of these, the CIA admits it erased the tapes of the interrogations of Zubaydah and a second al-Qaeda figure, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. Again, the common thread goes back to Kuala Lumpur. See, http://www.democraticunderground.com...
NBC News identified three al-Qaeda figures who Bush Administration sources admit were water boarded, a form of torture involving partial-drowning. A fourth detainee, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, is named by other sources. A fifth, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, is also identified as having been threatened with water boarding, but broke down to CIA interrogators before being immersed. That report states: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/...
KSM had dispatched four of seven al-Qaeda operatives who met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia during January 5-8, 2000. George Tenet has testified that meeting was monitored by the CIA and a "half-dozen allied intelligence services". During those three days, the group mapped out the details of what would be the 9/11 attack and the bombing of the USS Cole.
In addition, Abu Zubaydah, whose CIA torture tape is erased, is alleged to have been al-Qaeda’s chief recruiter and the field commander of the attack on the USS Cole that was planned in Kuala Lumpur. Zubayadah was the first major AQ figure captured in Pakistan in 03/2002, and was waterboarded before being transferred to Gitmo with the others.
As we see, above, all five of those waterboarded (or threatened) and both of those whose CIA interrogation tapes are said to have been erased, either planned, attended, or trained al-Qaeda operatives present at the Kuala Lumpur planning meeting. What might be significant to the CIA about that particular event? Paul Thompson’s 9/11 Timeline gives us a plethora of reasons why the CIA would give particular attention to those who attended: http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/...
January 4-6, 2000: CIA Prevents FBI from Learning about Hijacker’s US Visa; Other CIA Agents Are Deliberately Misled about This
The CIA has been tracking Khalid Almihdhar as he travels to Malaysia for the al-Qaeda summit that starts on January 5, 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000). The CIA has just received a photocopy of his passport that shows he has a valid visa to travel to the US (see January 2-5, 2000). But they deliberately prevent the FBI from learning about this visa. On January 4, a CIA cable containing the photocopy is sent from the CIA’s Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, office to Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit. An FBI agent named Doug Miller assigned to the unit sees the cable and drafts a memo requesting the required permission from the CIA to advise the rest of the FBI that one participant in the Malaysia summit would likely be traveling soon to the US. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 502; WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 244]
Miller further writes that Almihdhar’s visa indicates he will be traveling to New York City and that he has been connected to the 1998 embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998 and October 4, 2001) and the monitored al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen (see Late 1998-Early 2002). He also writes that photos of Almihdhar have been obtained and will be sent as well. However, a headquarters desk officer tells him that a deputy unit chief, Tom Wilshire, does not want it sent yet, and that, "This is not a matter for the FBI." [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 240 ]
Several hours later, this desk officer writes a cable that is distributed only within the CIA. It is sent the next day and claims that Almihdhar’s visa documents were shared with the FBI. This officer will later admit she didn’t personally share the information with the FBI either, and the 9/11 Commission will not be able to find anyone in the CIA who did share it with the FBI. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 502; WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 310-311]
A week later, Miller follows up by sending his rejected memo to Wilshire. Miller asks, "Is this a no go or should I remake it in some way?" He never gets an answer and drops the matter. [WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 311]
The Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will later call the failure to pass the information to the FBI a "significant failure" but will be unable to determine why the information was not passed on. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 250 ]
In 2002, CIA Director George Tenet will allude to e-mails he claims prove the information about the visa is passed to the FBI around this time. However, the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry and 9/11 Commission fail to find any evidence of these e-mails. The FBI claims it never received any such e-mails. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 ; ABC NEWS, 5/10/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 502]
Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Tom Wilshire, Alec Station, Doug Miller, Khalid Almihdhar
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar
January 5, 2000: CIA Warns Other Intelligence Agencies that Almihdhar Has Visa to US, but Lies about FBI Knowledge of This
The CIA had just learned that hijacker Khalid Almihdhar not only is travelling to an al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia, but also has a visa to travel to the US (see January 2-5, 2000). Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, sends a cable to a number of friendly intelligence agencies around the world, saying, "We need to continue the effort to identify these travelers and their activities to determine if there is any true threat posed." The cable also says that Almihdhar’s travel documents have been given to the FBI. But in fact the FBI does not know about the visa, and Alec Station is clearly aware that the FBI does not know (see January 4-6, 2000). [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004, PP. 6 ; WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 311]
The 9/11 Commission will later conclude that "the weight of available evidence does not support" that the FBI was told about the visa. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004, PP. 6 ]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Almihdhar, Alec Station, Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar
January 5, 2000: Malaysian Intelligence Only Videotapes First Day of Al-Qaeda Summit, 9/11 Hijackers Videotaped with Hambali
Acting on the behalf of the CIA, Malaysian intelligence videotapes the attendees of an al-Qaeda summit. Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna will later claim that the attendees were "videotaped by a Malaysian surveillance team on January 5, 2000." [GUNARATNA, 2003, PP. 261]
But this is only the first of four days of meetings, all held at the same location (see January 5-8, 2000), and the attendees are secretly photographed on the other days (see January 6-9, 2000). The Los Angeles Times will similarly note that Malaysian intelligence made a single surveillance videotape "that shows men arriving at the meeting, according to a US intelligence official. The tape, he said, has no sound and [isn’t] viewed as very significant at the time." [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/14/2001]
The contents of the videotape remain murky, but one account claims Ramzi bin al-Shibh was one of the attendees videotaped at the summit. [NEWSWEEK, 11/26/2001] Further, a US Treasury press release in 2003 will state that "[Hambali] was videotaped in a January 2000 meeting in Malaysia with two of the September 11, 2001 hijackers of AA Flight 77 - Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi." [US DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 1/24/2003 ]
US intelligence officials consider the summit so important that CIA Director George Tenet, FBI Director Robert Mueller, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, and other high-ranking officials are given daily briefings about it while it is taking place (see January 6-9, 2000). So it is unclear why only the first day would be videotaped and why such video would not be considered more important. Malaysia will give the CIA a copy of the tape about one month after the summit ends (see February 2000). By 1999, the FBI had connected Hambali to the 1995 Bojinka plot and also obtained a photo of him (see May 23, 1999). Yet the CIA will not share this video footage with the FBI nor will they warn Malaysian intelligence about Hambali’s Bojinka plot connection (see Shortly After January 8, 2000).
Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Khalid Almihdhar, Malaysian Secret Service, Hambali
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hambali, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Remote Surveillance, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar
<b<January 5-8, 2000: Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia Discusses 9/11 and Cole Plots; CIA Has Malaysians Monitor It</strong>
Attendees of the Malaysian summit. Top row, from left: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Middle row, from left: Khallad bin Attash, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Hambali. Bottom row, from left: Yazid Sufaat, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Fahad Al-Quso. [Source: FBI]About a dozen of bin Laden’s trusted followers hold a secret, "top-level al-Qaeda summit" in the city of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. [CNN, 8/30/2002; SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, 9/27/2002] Plans for the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the 9/11 attacks are discussed. [USA TODAY, 2/12/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002]
At the request of the CIA, the Malaysian Secret Service monitors the summit and then passes the information on to the US (see January 6-9, 2000). Attendees of the summit are said to include:
Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar.
The CIA and FBI will later miss many opportunities to foil the 9/11 plot through Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the knowledge of their presence at this summit. The CIA already knows many details about these two by the time the summit begins (see January 2-4, 2000), and tracked Almihdhar as he traveled to it (see January 2-5, 2000).
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), a top al-Qaeda leader and the alleged "mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks. The US has known KSM is an Islamic militant since the exposure of Operation Bojinka in January 1995 (see January 6, 1995), and knows what he looks like. US officials have stated that they only realized the summit was important in the summer of 2001, but the presence of KSM should have proved the its importance. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 2/2/2002] Although the possible presence of KSM at this summit is highly disputed by US officials, one counterterrorism expert will testify before the 9/11 Commission in 2003 that he has access to transcripts of KSM’s interrogations since his capture, and that KSM has admitted leading this summit and told the attendees about a planes as weapons plot targeting the US (see July 9, 2003). [NEWSWEEK, 7/9/2003; NEW YORK POST, 7/10/2003] Many other media reports identify him there as well. [INDEPENDENT, 6/6/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002; CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 10/29/2003] For instance, according to Newsweek, "Mohammed’s presence would make the intelligence failure of the CIA even greater. It would mean the agency literally watched as the 9/11 scheme was hatched—and had photographs of the attack’s mastermind... doing the plotting." [NEWSWEEK, 7/9/2003]
An Indonesian militant known as Hambali, or Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin. [BBC, 8/15/2003] He was heavily involved in the Bojinka plot, an early version of the 9/11 plot (see January 6, 1995 and June 1994). [CNN, 3/14/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002] The FBI was aware of who he was and his connections to the Bojinka plot at least by 1999 and identified a photograph of him by that time (see May 23, 1999). He will be arrested by Thai authorities in August 2003 (see August 12, 2003). [CNN, 8/14/2003; CBS NEWS, 8/15/2003] Malaysian officials recognize Hambali from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident. But the US does not tell them of his Bojinka connections so they will not know to arrest him after the summit is over (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [NEW STRAITS TIMES, 2/10/2002]
Yazid Sufaat, a Malaysian man who owned the condominium where the summit was held. [NEW YORK TIMES, 1/31/2002; NEWSWEEK, 6/2/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through Sufaat’s presence at this summit is later missed in September 2000 (see September-October 2000). Sufaat will travel to Afghanistan in June 2001 and be arrested by Malaysian authorities when he returns to Malaysia in late 2001. [AUSTRALIAN, 12/24/2002] Malaysian officials also recognize Sufaat from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [NEW STRAITS TIMES, 2/10/2002]
Fahad Al-Quso, a top al-Qaeda operative. [NEWSWEEK, 9/20/2001] Al-Quso will be arrested by Yemeni authorities in December 2000 (see Late October-Late November 2000), but the FBI will not given a chance to fully interrogate him before 9/11. He will escape from prison in 2003. [CNN, 5/15/2003]
Tawfiq bin Attash. Better known by his alias "Khallad." Bin Attash, a "trusted member of bin Laden’s inner circle," was in charge of bin Laden’s bodyguards, and served as bin Laden’s personal intermediary at least for the USS Cole bombing. [NEWSWEEK, 9/20/2001] He is also thought to be a "mastermind" of that attack. Attash is reportedly planning to be one of the hijackers, but will be unable to get a US visa. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/16/2004, PP. 8] US intelligence had been aware of his identity as early as 1995. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through bin Attash’s presence at this summit will later be missed in January 2001 (see January 4, 2001). Bin Attash had been previously arrested in Yemen for suspected terror ties, but let go (see Summer 1999). [CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, 12/1/2002] He will be captured in Pakistan by the US in April 2003 (see April 29, 2003).
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/10/2001; GRAHAM AND NUSSBAUM, 2004, PP. 59] (Note: in the sources al-Nashiri is referred to by two of his aliases: Muhammad Omar al-Harazi and Al Safani). [CNN, 12/11/2000; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 9/6/2006] Al-Nashiri is one of al-Qaeda’s top field commanders and operates out of Malaysia while 9/11 is being prepared. [GUNARATNA, 2003, PP. 188] He was involved in an arms smuggling plot (see 1997) and the East African embassy bombings (see August 22-25 1998), in which his cousin was martyred (see August 7, 1998). He also organized the attack against the USS The Sullivans (see January 3, 2000), and will be involved in the attacks against the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the Limburg (see October 6, 2002). He will be arrested in the United Arab Emirates in November 2002. An al-Qaeda operative had identified a photo of al-Nashiri for the FBI in late 1998 (see August 22-25 1998). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 152-3]
Ramzi bin al-Shibh. Investigators believe he wanted to be the twentieth hijacker. His presence at the summit may not have been realized until after 9/11, despite the fact that US intelligence had a picture of him next to bin Attash, and had video footage of him. [NEWSWEEK, 11/26/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 7/14/2002; TIME, 9/15/2002; DIE ZEIT (HAMBURG), 10/1/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002] German police have credit card receipts indicating bin al-Shibh is in Malaysia at the same time. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/1/2002] Ulrich Kersten, director of Germany’s federal anticrime agency, the Bundeskriminalamt, will later say, "There are indications that Ramzi bin al-Shibh was in Kuala Lumpur for the meeting." [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/24/2002] Another account noting he was photographed at the summit further notes that he entered and left Thailand three times in the first three weeks of January 2000. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/17/2001] Anonymous Malaysian officials claim he is there, but US officials deny it. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/20/2002] One account says he is recognized at the time of the summit, which makes it hard to understand why he is not tracked back to Germany and the Hamburg cell with Mohamed Atta and other hijackers. [DER SPIEGEL (HAMBURG), 10/1/2002] Another opportunity to expose the 9/11 plot through bin al-Shibh’s presence at this summit will be missed in June. It appears bin al-Shibh and Almihdhar are directly involved in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 (see Around September 15-16 and October 10-21, 2000). [GUARDIAN, 10/15/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 7/14/2002; NEWSWEEK, 9/4/2002] So presumably better surveillance or follow-up from this summit could have prevented that attack as well.
Ahmad Hikmat Shakir. An al-Qaeda agent of Iraqi nationality, he may have attended this summit, according to some documents, but his presence is uncertain. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/2/2002; NEWSWEEK, 10/7/2002; AUSTRALIAN, 12/24/2002] After 9/11, he will be linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Bojinka plot. Jordan will arrest him and let him go after the US says they don’t want to take custody of him (see September 17, 2001).
Salem Alhazmi, 9/11 hijacker and brother of Nawaf Alhazmi. He is possibly at the summit, although very few accounts mention it. [AUSTRALIAN, 12/24/2002] US intelligence intercepts from before the summit indicate that he at least had plans to attend. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 51 ]
Abu Bara al Taizi. A Yemeni al-Qaeda agent. He is reportedly meant to be one of the 9/11 hijackers, but will be unable to enter the US due to greater scrutiny for Yemenis. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/16/2004, PP. 8]
Mohamed al-Khatani. A Saudi, he allegedly will confess to attending the summit while being held in the US Guantanamo prison (see July 2002). He apparently will unsuccessfully attempt to enter the US in August 2001 to join the 9/11 plot (see August 4, 2001). However, al-Khatani will later recant his testimony and say he lied to avoid torture (see October 26, 2006).
Unnamed members of the Egyptian-based Islamic Jihad are also said to have been at the summit. [COX NEWS SERVICE, 10/21/2001] Islamic Jihad merged with al-Qaeda in February 1998. [ABC NEWS, 11/17/2001] However, according to the Wall Street Journal, bin Attash and al-Quso are suspected of being Islamic Jihad members at one point, so this may just be a reference to them. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/8/2001]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Fahad al-Quso, Al-Qaeda, Abu Bara al Taizi, Islamic Jihad, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, Khalid Almihdhar, Hambali, Malaysian Secret Service, Ulrich Kersten, Yazid Sufaat, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Salem Alhazmi, Tawfiq bin Attash, Mohamed al-Khatani, Nawaf Alhazmi, Ramzi bin al-Shibh
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Warning Signs, Millennium Bomb Plots, 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Hambali, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
January 5-6, 2000: CIA Liason with FBI Who Just Learned About Almihdhar’s US Visa Twice Fails to Tell FBI about It
On the night of January 5, 2000, a CIA officer known as "James" who has been assigned to the FBI’s Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) to deal with problems "in communicating between the CIA and the FBI" briefs an FBI agent who works in the FBI’s bin Laden unit (which is part of the SIOC at that time) about a number of cables he has received regarding the al-Qaeda summit that is just starting in Malaysia and one of the people attending it, hijacker Khalid Almihdhar.
The CIA agent writes an e-mail to several other CIA agents and details "exactly" what he briefed this person on. Although the CIA should inform the FBI of a terrorist like Almihdhar having a US visa, he does not mention discussing the visa with the FBI agent, even though he has just seen several CIA cables talking about it. The FBI agent will later say he does not know why James chooses to brief him, as he is not a designated contact point for the CIA. Overnight, another CIA cable comes in to him providing new details about Almihdhar and the Malaysia summit.
The next morning, the CIA agent briefs a different FBI agent in the SIOC about these new developments. Again, records indicate he fails to mention anything about Almihdhar’s US visa. This FBI agent will also say he does not know why he was briefed on the matter, as he is not a designated contact point for the CIA. James then sends an e-mail to other CIA agents describing "exactly" what he told both of the FBI agents. One section of his e-mail reads, "Thus far, a lot of suspicious activity has been observed [in Malaysia] but nothing that would indicate evidence of an impending attack or criminal enterprise. [I told the first FBI agent] that as soon as something concrete is developed leading us to the criminal arena or to known FBI cases, we will immediately bring FBI into the loop. Like [the first FBI agent] yesterday, [the second FBI agent] stated that this was a fine approach and thanked me for keeping him in the loop." Due to the briefings James gives, another CIA officer assigned to the FBI will not bother to brief the FBI on Almihdhar (see January 6, 2000). After 9/11, James will refuse to talk to the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General, but will tell the CIA’s inspector general that he has no recollection of these events. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 241-247 ; TENET, 2007, PP. 195]
Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA officer known as "James"
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
(January 5-8, 2000): CIA Fails to Act on Triangle of Calls Linking Malaysia Summit, Cole Bomber’s House, and 9/11 Hijackers’ Hotel
A series of calls by al-Qaeda operatives, some of whom are under surveillance by the CIA and the Malaysian Special Branch at this time, links three sites involved in the bombing of the USS Cole. Even though the CIA is aware of the calls, it will later say it is unable to find the hijackers in Bangkok, the location of one of the call sites. The calls made by the operatives are between the following three locations:
A payphone in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, near an apartment where about a dozen al-Qaeda operatives are holding a summit (see January 5-8, 2000);
The Washington Hotel in Bangkok, Thailand. Al-Qaeda operatives Ibrahim al-Thawar and Fahad al-Quso are staying at the hotel around this time and will go on to be involved in the Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000). They are later joined in the hotel by summit attendees Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Khallad bin Attash;
Al-Quso’s house in Yemen. The calls from the payphone to this location are made by bin Attash.
Although bin Attash and possibly others call the Washington Hotel while they are under surveillance, the CIA will be unable to locate them there during the week they spend in Bangkok, from January 8-15 (see January 8-15, 2000). Author Lawrence Wright will comment, "Although the CIA later denied that it knew anything about the phone, the number was recorded in the Malaysians’ surveillance log, which was given to the agency." [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 156-160, 181-2; NEW YORKER, 7/10/2006 ] The FBI team investigating the Cole bombing will later learn some of this information before 9/11 and ask the CIA for details. However, the CIA will fail to disclose what it knows about the Malaysia summit or that it looks for the hijackers and associates in Thailand after January 8 (see July 2001).
Entity Tags: Tawfiq bin Attash, Nawaf Alhazmi, Central Intelligence Agency, Fahad al-Quso, Khalid Almihdhar, Ibrahim al-Thawar
Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
January 6, 2000: CIA Informs FBI Leaders about Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit but Fails to Mention One Attendee Has US Visa
FBI Director Louis Freeh and other top FBI officials are briefed about the ongoing al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) as part of their regular daily update.
They are told the CIA is in the lead and that the CIA promises to let the FBI know if an FBI angle to the case develops. But they also are not told that the CIA just found out one of the participants, Khalid Almihdhar, has a US visa. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004] One FBI official familiar with the case will later complain, "[The CIA] purposely hid [Almihdhar] from the FBI, purposely refused to tell the bureau.... The thing was, they didn’t want John O’Neill and the FBI running over their case. And that’s why September 11 happened.... They have blood on their hands." [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 224] Jack Cloonan, an FBI agent in the I-49 squad that focused on al-Qaeda, later says: "If that information [got] disseminated, would it have had an impact on the events of 9/11? I’m telling you that it would have." [ABC NEWS, 5/10/2004]
Entity Tags: Louis J. Freeh, Jack Cloonan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Almihdhar, John O’Neill
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar
January 6, 2000: CIA Officer Detailed to FBI Fails to Brief FBI on Almihdhar’s US Visa, Is Told FBI Already Has Almihdhar Information
An FBI agent asks a CIA officer detailed to the FBI for an update on hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, but the CIA officer does not provide the information. When he tells another CIA officer, known as "James," that he has been asked for the information, James sends him a series of e-mails saying he has already briefed the FBI on the latest news about Almihdhar (see January 5-6, 2000). However, the briefings James gave the FBI failed to include the fact that Almihdhar has a US visa, even though James knew of the visa and should have communicated it to the FBI. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 245 ; TENET, 2007, PP. 195]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA officer known as "James"
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
January 6, 2000: Two Malaysia Summit Attendees Travel to Singapore and Thailand, But Agents Monitoring Them Fail to Get Their Names
Two of the operatives attending al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit make short trips to neighboring countries, returning to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, within 24 hours. The two operatives are Nawaf Alhazmi and Khallad bin Attash and the two countries they visit are Thailand and Singapore, but it is not definitively known which operative goes to which country. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004, PP. 4 ]
However, an associate of bin Attash’s, Fahad al-Quso, arrives in Thailand on this day. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 269 ] In addition, Alhazmi will later be said to have visited Singapore. [SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, 1/4/2003]
Presumably, therefore, it is bin Attash that travels to Thailand, whereas Alhazmi goes to Singapore. The 9/11 Commission will later say of these two trips, "After the fact, efforts were made to track them. US officials in Kuala Lumpur wondered if one of these Arabs was the still mysterious Nawaf. Both returned to Kuala Lumpur within the next 24 hours, though the authorities did not know it at the time." [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004, PP. 4 ]
Khalid Almihdhar is also said to visit Singapore, and both he and Alhazmi are said to travel to Indonesia around this time as well, but the circumstances of these additional trips, if they are actually made, are not known. [SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, 1/4/2003] Almihdhar’s passport was copied by intelligence services on the way to Malaysia (see January 2-5, 2000) and a similar operation to obtain Alhazmi’s passport details failed (see January 2-4, 2000). These two trips represent opportunities to obtain Alhazmi and bin Attash’s passport details, but this is apparently not done, even though the two are under surveillance at this point (see January 5-8, 2000).
Entity Tags: CIA Kuala Lumpur station, Nawaf Alhazmi, Tawfiq bin Attash, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Almihdhar
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
January 6-9, 2000: Malaysia Provides CIA with Information on Al-Qaeda Summit and Attendees
Hazel Evergreen Park, located on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, is the condominium complex where the terror summit was held. [Source: FBI]At the CIA’s request, the Malaysian Secret Service is monitoring an important al-Qaeda summit (see January 5-8, 2000) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and begins passing what it knows to the CIA even before the summit is over. Media accounts are consistent that the operatives at the summit are photographed, and even videotaped on the first day (see January 5, 2000), but (it is claimed) there is no wiretapping or other recording of their conversations. [OTTAWA CITIZEN, 9/17/2001; OBSERVER, 10/7/2001; NEW YORKER, 1/14/2002; CNN, 3/14/2002; NEWSWEEK, 6/2/2002; STERN, 8/13/2003; CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 10/29/2003]
However, Malaysian officials are not informed what to look for, and focus more on monitoring the local Malaysian and Indonesian hosts who serve as drivers than the visitors attending the summit. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/20/2002] One account says that in general, "As the terrorists left the [condominium where the summit was held], the Malaysian police clicked away with their cameras. There was enough material for a whole photo series. The terrorists strolled around town like regular tourists. They casually searched out an Internet cafe and spent many hours in front of the computers, always surreptitiously watched by an observation team." [DIE ZEIT (HAMBURG), 10/1/2002] Authorities find out what hotel Khalid Almihdhar is staying at and he and his associates are photographed there [NEWSWEEK, 9/20/2001; OBSERVER, 10/7/2001] , as well as coming and going from the condominium where the meeting is held. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/1/2002]
On January 7, Khalid Almihdhar and others go shopping, giving Malaysian security ample opportunity to collect information about them. They spend hours at Internet cafes, and after they leave, Malaysian intelligence searches the hard drives of the computers they used. [AUSTRALIAN, 12/24/2002; STERN, 8/13/2003] On January 8, the CIA will be told that an unnamed new person has just joined Almihdhar and the others, and that additional photographs have been taken. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 247 ]
By January 9, all the data and photos the Malaysians have collected are in the hands of the CIA, except for the video footage, which apparently is sent to US intelligence one month later (see February 2000). However, no photos or video and few details from any of this surveillance have been publicly released. It is known that there are photos of:
Khallad bin Attash with Almihdhar.
Fahad al-Quso next to Almihdhar.
Some photos are of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. [NEWSWEEK, 9/20/2001; STERN, 8/13/2003]
Hambali is in some photos, and is immediately recognized by Malaysian intelligence (see Shortly After January 8, 2000).
Yazid Sufaat also is in some photos, and also is recognized by Malaysian intelligence. [NEW STRAITS TIMES, 2/10/2002]
Entity Tags: Hambali, Al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Almihdhar, Malaysian Secret Service, Yazid Sufaat, Tawfiq bin Attash, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Fahad al-Quso, Counterterrorist Center
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar
January 6-9, 2000: Top CIA and Clinton Cabinet Officials Repeatedly Briefed about Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia
On January 6, 2000, the CIA office in Malaysia begins passing details from the Malaysian government’s surveillance of the al-Qaeda summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to the CIA Counterterrorist Center (CTC) (see January 5-8, 2000 and January 6-9, 2000). Cofer Black, head of the CTC, orders that he be continually informed about the meeting. CIA Director Tenet is frequently informed as well. They are given continual updates until the meeting ends on January 8. [STERN, 8/13/2003] National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, FBI Director Louis Freeh, and other top officials are briefed, but apparently President Clinton is not. [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 225-26]
However, it appears that the CIA deliberately and repeatedly fails to tell the FBI that one attendee, hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, has an active visa to visit the US (see January 5, 2000, January 6, 2000, and January 5-6, 2000). No evidence has been presented suggesting anyone else outside the CIA was told this crucial fact either. The Malaysian summit ended on January 8. According to the 9/11 Commission, "On January 14, the head of the CIA’s al-Qaeda unit again updated his bosses, telling them that officials were continuing to track the suspicious individuals who had now dispersed to various countries." [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 237]
Officially, the CIA will later claim to have lost hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar as they left the meeting (see January 8, 2000), however, Almihdhar will later report back to al-Qaeda that he thought he was followed to the US (see Mid-July 2000). It has never been reported if any of the other attendees were monitored after leaving the meeting or not.
Entity Tags: Sandy Berger, Nawaf Alhazmi, William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton, Khalid Almihdhar, Counterterrorist Center, George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, Cofer Black, Louis J. Freeh
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Before 9/11, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
(After January 6, 2000): CIA Fails to Check FBI Has Been Notified of Almihdhar’s US Visa, Although this Is ‘Routine Practice’
Although the CIA passes information to the FBI about the attendance of hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi at al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit, it repeatedly fails to mention that Almihdhar has a US visa (see January 6, 2000, January 4-6, 2000, January 5-6, 2000). It also fails to check that the FBI has received this information. The CIA’s inspector general will say it "found no indication that anyone in [the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center] checked to ensure FBI receipt of the information, which, a few [Osama bin Laden] Station officers said, should have been routine practice." [CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 6/2005, PP. XV ]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Counterterrorist Center, Office of the Inspector General (CIA)
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
January 8, 2000: Al-Qaeda Summit Ends; CIA Still Fails to Add Attendees to Watch List
The al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) ends and the participants leave. Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar fly to Bangkok, Thailand, with al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash (see January 8, 2000). Other attendees depart to other locales. There have been no media reports that any of the others were followed by intelligence agents. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/20/2002; US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 131 ]
Before the summit started the CIA knew one attendee was named Khalid Almihdhar and that another had the first name Nawaf. At the end of the summit the CIA appears to have learned little more, and still does not know Nawaf’s last name is Alhazmi. Around this time, on January 7 and 10, the CIA searches for their names in their databases but get no hits. Yet they don’t ask for a search of the much larger NSA databases, which had vital information on them (see Early 1999). CIA headquarters asks the NSA to put Almihdhar on their watch list so they can pass on more information about him (see Mid-January 2000). However, neither Alhazmi nor Almihdhar are placed on the State Department’s watch list, which would actually prevent them from coming to the US. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004]
The CIA still fails to tell the FBI that Almihdhar has a valid US visa, and in fact seems to go out of their way not to tell the FBI about it (see January 4-6, 2000, January 6, 2000, January 5, 2000, and January 5-6, 2000). [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 131 ; STERN, 8/13/2003]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda, Nawaf Alhazmi, Tawfiq bin Attash
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar
Page 11 of 42 (4158 events)
So many indicators. Too many coincidences. All the link charts tie to the CIA's Kuala Lumpur surveillance operation.