Claims the Surge is "succeeding" in Iraq appear to be confusing, even rattling some Democrats. John McCain is now mainly basing his campaign on it, and it seems to have boosted him in the Republican primaries. Meanwhile, there are growing numbers of articles like neo-con prophet Bill Kristol's in The New York Times demanding to know why Democrats "can't admit we're winning the war in Iraq." The short answer is we're not. But this uncertainty is starting to have a serious effect on the Democratic primary race.
From a long view, this race should've been in Hillary Clinton's pocket from the start-- a total non-contest. The reason it was not was because Clinton's support for the war created an opening for anti-war candidates like Obama and Edwards. The war split away the women voters who were long assumed to be Clinton stalwarts: they were repelled by her positions on Iraq.
Restoring some missing clarity on the nature of guerilla war is over due.
A better understanding of guerilla conflict will put the surge in context and puncture the euphoria being peddled by war cheerleaders like Kristol. It would also clarify the position progressives need to take in the primaries. The best starting place is Mao Tse-Tung's Rules For Guerilla Warfare. They can be summarized as:
*When the enemy advances, we retreat
*When the enemy stands, we harass
*When the enemy tires & retreats, we attack
This cycle wasn't new to Mao-- resistance fighters have followed it throughout history. One example is the patriot campaign against the Royal Army in the South during the American Revolution. Mao's cycle is responsible for the normal ebb and flow of action and activity in a guerilla war, for instance, the period of relative quiet before the Tet Offensive. This ebb and flow is also one of the most striking features of the war that most resembles our incursion into Iraq, France's misadventure in its Algerian War.
Accordingly, it should not be a surprise that last summer, Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of what had been the most active resistance group in Iraq, declared a unilateral six month cease-fire. This act alone was responsible for the most of the statistics behind the claim violence is down in Iraq. Indeed, why wouldn't violence go down when the most powerful, active force just stops shooting for awhile?
In a sense, we were not responsible for this part of the decline in violence, and that part was due only indirectly to our actions, and-- very importantly-- it means we do not hold the initiative in that area.
Why would al-Sadr call a ceasefire? Because he is not an idiot. He understands what he is about: fighting an urban guerilla war. When his enemy advanced, he retreated, just as Mao stipulated. Al-Sadr has a satellite dish, an internet connection, and probably very good intel reports from his supporters in the Iraqi government inside the Green Zone (our supposed allies) and knows full well that the surge is unsustainable.
In order to create the surge, the Pentagon had to first scrape the bottom of the barrel to dredge up the man and woman power to find the extra brigades. Duty tours in Iraq were extended to 15 months, with the time back stateside to rest, retrain and rebuild war weary units slashed.
To put this in perspective, before D-Day the U.S. Army built up for two and a half years. But from D-Day to VE-Day, only eleven months passed. Each duty tour in Iraq is four months longer than the war in Northern Europe in WWII. And unlike WWII, some of these soldiers, marines, aircrew and sailors have already done multiple tours in Iraq, in some cases as many as two or three previous tours. The U.S. military is being ground to powder by over-deployments. 58% of new West Point graduates now do not reenlist after their first mandatory term of service. That means the future officer corps of the U.S. Army is being gutted. The Army is being broken by Iraq.
What's more immediately perilous, is that essentially all our reserves were thrown in to make the surge. The U.S. Army has almost never been "all in." It was all in during the Battle Of The Bulge-- there were no reserves. It was make or break. Gen. Washington went all in during the Battles of Trenton and Princeton. If he had failed, there was nothing to fall back and the Revolution was over. But other than that, it is hard to see where and when the U.S. Army was ever all in. It was never all in, in Vietnam: the Guard and Reserve was never even called up. Ditto Korea. In WWI 250,000 fresh troops were arriving in France every month. Even in the Civil War, only the Confederate Army was all in-- the Union always had plenty more troops available, particularly in the big fortification regiments up and down the coast and facing Canada.
The surge cannot be sustained, everyone in the Pentagon knows it, so does al-Sadr and the other Iraqi guerilla fighters. Why should he hurl his troops against a force that has to be withdrawn before long anyway? That makes no sense. No, instead, like a classic guerilla fighter, he can wait to shift to the next phase, as the surge is inevitably drawn down.
That means the moment of greatest peril may well be approaching U.S. forces in Iraq, which is why U.S. commanders, as opposed to Bush himself, or his ideologically blinkered neo-con cheerleaders, are considerably more reserved about the future in Iraq.
In a widely overlooked but major story, on January 8th, in an address at the Heritage Foundation, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle Eastern Affairs Mark Kimmitt said 2008 will be “far more difficult” than 2007 for the U.S. strategy because
“it depends far more on the Iraqis themselves to show progress on key legislation, on their economy, and reconciliation.” Kimmitt predicted only a mild chance that “surge” security gains will last: "2008 and beyond will be a success, the surge will be a success, if the gains in security can be translated into gains in stability…if I had to put a number to it, maybe it’s three in 10, maybe it’s 50-50, if we play our cards right."
Chances Of Surge No More Than 50-50
Maybe three in ten, maybe 50-50. Given the natural "can-do" spirit of military cultures, and the usual White House pressure to spin success, the real number is probably the three in ten. That's like playing russian roulette with a revolver with ten cylinders, seven of which are loaded.
Everyone in the Pentagon also knows Mao's rules by heart. And that brings up al-Sadr's ceasefire. As the surge is drawn down, not only will the various insurgent groups be facing a weaker U.S. force but, in a development completely different than at any point in the war so far, the insurgents will be facing a U.S. force that cannot be reinforced, precisely because the surge used those units up. The surge was a one-off. It cannot be repeated. The units that were sent cannot be sent back. If the U.S. Army and Marines get in trouble facing a big wave of attacks, there are no longer any forces to ride to the rescue. The force that will remain in Iraq is on its own.
Something else has happened along the way that could also increase the danger ahead: as part of its pacification strategy, the U.S. military has essentially been trying to buy peace by paying and arming the so-called "awakening councils." That is, they are trying to bribe their way to peace.
According to a recent story in the Boston Globe:
"the funneling of money to Sunni sheiks has alarmed some US officials and members of the Shi'ite-led Iraqi government, who fear that the Sunnis could resume their attacks against either the government or Shi'ite militias if and when the cash dries up."
"They say the United States needs to develop a longer-term strategy to ensure that the sheiks continue to support the Iraqi government when the US funds disappear."
"We're not thinking through the impact of abetting further corruption and perpetuating tribal power," said a senior US military adviser who spoke on the condition of anonymity."
Andrew Bracevich makes much the same case in Surge To Nowhere in today's Washington Post.
What's interesting about this is that this is really a form of appeasement-- so it is amusing to see the neo-cons, who try to view every foreign policy issue through the lens of the 1938 Munich Conference, now supporting it.
We are arming men without gaining or conditioning their support on a political settlement. It's temporizing with guns and suitcases of cash, hoping something develops later. But, since there is no political settlement, and the prospects for one still seem very dim, there is nothing to stop those weapons from being turned on American forces. If this policy of appeasement fails-- and here the neo-con's long standing aversion to appeasement may be right-- the level of violence in the Iraqi civil war and danger to the remaining American troops will be that much higher.
Will this gloomy scenario occur? Will there be a bloody Spring offensive as the U.S. garrison inevitably shrinks? There's no way of knowing. It may not happen. But even top Pentagon officials seem gloomy about our prospects. In either case, the likelihood of a political settlement is low, because the parties in Iraq do not appear to want one, and this is widely conceded.
Could all this policy of bribery and appeasement be a final riverboat gamble by our gambler president, the last double-down, to buy a temporary lull, just to get the Republicans through the election before all hell breaks loose? Maybe. It would certainly fit the pattern of the last five years. However, the draw down will be complete by summer, well before the election but, unfortunately, after the primaries.
One thing is clear from this: progressives should not fear sticking to their positions against the war. What we are witnessing is partly the normal ebb and flow of guerilla conflict, the rest a perilous bet on bribery. Either way, the Iraq war is far from over, and, as an issue it is not "off the table."
That takes us back to the primaries.
If HIllary Clinton had come out against the original Authorization Of Force Resolution, she would have put the prestige and credibility of the Clinton White House against the war, which would probably have prevented it from happening. Her responsibility for this war is real, and far greater than other Senators who voted for it, because of her status as the former First Lady and self-proclaimed co-president, a status that is the basis of her current campaign. She cannot reduce her responsibility for the war without undermining her own claim to the White House.
But because the war issue is has been slowly drifting off Democrat's front burner, many voters, including women voters, are beginning to forget these facts. The exit polls on New Hampshire appear to indicate women voters have started gravitating back to Clinton, a phenomena confirmed by pollster Andrew Kohut in today's New York Times.
That opened the path to her victory in New Hampshire. Candidates like Edwards and Obama need to keep reminding voters, particularly women voters, of Clinton's role in this bloody mess, or the window of opportunity opened up by Clinton's support for the war may well close.
Governor Dean showed Democrats the way back five years ago by speaking out strongly against the war.
"What I want to know... is why in the world the Democratic party leadership is supporting the president's unilateral attack on Iraq?" -- DNC Winter Meeting, February 21, 2003.
Amazingly, what he was saying then is every bit as as relevant today. There can be no Great American Restoration that Dean talked about, no Taking Back America, that is, returning America to its original priorities, without taking on the war and the political forces that back it. Progressives must continue their attack on the Iraq war, keep its failures fresh in everyone's mind, and the culpability of those responsible. Indeed, there is nothing to be gained in slacking off, and little to be risked in keeping up the pressure.
Crossposted and updated from Tea In The Harbor and
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