Since the Potomac primaries, I've been making the case to anyone who will listen that Hillary Clinton can't win the Democratic nomination without destroying her general election chances. But in response to Booman’s diary, after yesterday's results, I now see a plausible scenario for a HRC victory that will not irretrievably alienate a significant chunk of Obama supporters that she’ll need to win in the general election. While each hypothetical event is independently plausible (I've studiously avoided improbable scenarios like a colossal Obama gaffe), it’s extremely unlikely that everything will fall into place as described. In fact, I'd say the chances of Clinton pulling off a non-self-immolating victory are roughly the same as the likelihood of a somewhat inferior football team prevailing after trailing by three touchdowns with 8 minutes to go in the 4th quarter.
Still, she now has a chance to win the nod without killing the party, and in fact, she appears to be laying the groundwork for just the kind of scenario I’ve outlined below (calls for FL/MI re-vote and today's renewed talk of a Clinton/Obama "dream ticket", for example). But as you’ll see, this scenario depends in no small part on Obama failing to adjust to a changing media narrative or make his own breaks, neither of which I would count on.
MARCH-APRIL
* The Media Narrative Shifts. The post-March 4th narrative of the race shifts dramatically in HRC’s favor, with Clinton opening up a consistent 5-7 point lead in the polls (the latest Gallup tracking poll shows it’s not far-fetched for her to grab a lead in the polls). The media, which would love the ratings-bonanza race to continue to the convention, downplays the delegate math in favor of a more dramatic "can Hillary come back" storyline. The chatter on Obama centers around "buyer’s remorse" and "Obama can’t close the deal," with the high-minded candidate caricatured as a guy with a glass jaw. On the campaign trail, Obama is dogged by questions about his inability to win white working class voters and bigger states.
* Obama’s Faltering Attacks. Seeking to turn the narrative around, Obama launches into a furious counterattack against HRC in the next two months ahead of Pennsylvania. But they do little damage and instead diminish his standing with younger voters and indies. (This is actually quite possible, since folks typically support HRC not because of "experience" per se but because of (1) familiarity (to low information voters who are generally risk-averse); (2) the "I like Bill Clinton back in the WH" rationale for core Democrats; and (3) female solidarity reasons. The voters drawn to HRC’s (manufactured) image of "competence" may be swayed by negative attacks, but her core supporters are unlikely to be moved. (By contrast, folks support Obama mainly because of his perceived better character, higher purpose, likeability, good judgment, and "movement generating" qualities. Because he’s less familiar, it’s far easier to taint Obama’s image through scurrilous attacks.))
* Clinton Pulls Back from the Brink. Ahead of the big vote in Pennsylvania, Clinton continues to attack Obama on experience and readiness to be commander-in-chief, and repeats her gambit of calling on the media to vet Obama (by feeding the media negative story ideas). However, her campaign's negative tactics become the media focus for a week or two, and the Party establishment and/or her own polls get her to stop echoing McCain talking points and drop the smears. Pulling back, HRC begins to strike a good balance between a positive populist message and pointed but not excessive attacks on Obama.
* Primary Fatigue Sets In. By the middle of April, fatigue with the primary spats leave Obama and Clinton weakened, and both begin to both fall behind McCain by 5 points or more in the match-up polls. This eliminates the edge Obama has on perceived electability, damaging his appeal to Supers and Dem insiders. Enthusiasm dampens as a poisonous atmosphere starts to loom over the race, with each candidate's supporters going at each other's throats. The Democrats’ old image of the "circular firing squad" gets revived with a vengeance.
* Obama’s Big Pennsylvania Loss. In spite Obama pouring resources and campaigning tirelessly in Pennsylvania for a month, Clinton ends up winning the Quaker State by 12+ points (9 delegates) due to a favorable media climate and demographic advantages. The media (with Clinton’s help) hypes this closed primary as a referendum on Obama’s ability to "close the deal" with white working class Democrats, so the double-digit loss (especially with exit polls showing a decent-sized racist opposition to Obama) leads to further questions about Obama’s perceived electability.
MAY-JUNE
* Obama’s Negative Mo. In this climate, it’s not hard to see Clinton winning North Carolina (where today’s PPP poll already showing a tightening race) and Indiana on May 6th, racking up 10 more delegates. Obama squeezes out wins in Western caucus states and Oregon, but by this time the media begins to treat Obama as something like the iPhone, the trendy new thing which won the enthusiasm of early adopters but doesn’t quite live up to the hype as a game-changer. Fickle younger voters begin losing their faith in Obama, as the "movement" stalls and the novelty wears off. Sensing an opening, in May Clinton begins to expressly float a "Dream Ticket" with Obama as Veep, expressed always as a way for party unity. While Obama continues to resist Clinton's bait and falls back to talk about the inevitable math, the voters, tired of the fighting, start viewing the "Dream Ticket" as the best way to resolve this unpleasant internecine war.
* Groundwork for Florida and Michigan Re-vote, Which HRC Wins. During March and April, Clinton starts making the case for a Michigan and Florida re-vote in June, after Puerto Rico. The party gets behind the idea in mid-April, and re-votes for the two renegade states are set for late June (hyped as Super Tuesday, Part 3), with Obama’s blessing. With the momentum going her way, she wins Florida by 15+ points (15 delegates) and Michigan by 8+ points (10 delegates). By this point, Obama’s primary voting block is the African-American voting block, but even this loyal block has become discouraged by Obama’s hemorrhaging of the white vote.
* HRC’s Case for the Nomination. By the end of the Michigan and Florida re-vote, Clinton is slightly ahead of Obama in the popular vote total, and trails by about 80 in the pledged delegate total. But the media narrative concentrates on Obama’s diminishing appeal, redefining him as an exciting talent who’s proven by the long-campaign to be not quite ready for the top spot – a Lebron James who just needs more seasoning. Clinton talks up momentum, "big" states, but also electability, as , by this time, Clinton begins to do better in match-up polls against McCain than a hobbled Obama. In the meantime, the Democratic base is clamoring loudly for unity and closure in the form of a "Dream Ticket".
* Superdelegates Swing to Clinton. By the end of the voting, many of the remaining uncommited Superdelegates start swinging Clinton’s way by about a 3-1 ratio. Some Supers will be convinced by the "big state" argument; others by the idea that Obama's lead is built on "undemocratic" caucuses. Others by electability. The Supers’ mentality will be similar to the NCAA Tourney committee awarding a spot in the Big Dance to a "streaking" 19-10 team playing a strong schedule over a 22-8 team in a weak conference that has lost 5 in a row. By the end of June, as coverage centers on behind the scenes Superdelegate intrigue, we have close to a tie in overall delegates. A handful of Supers hold out, not wanting to decide this historical battle, but calls grow louder for the party establishment to step in and broker a deal before the convention.
JULY
* The Elders Broker a Deal: The "Dream Ticket". Convinced that Obama, in spite his delegate lead, is a talented but weakened candidate likely to lose in the GE, the Party Elders, led by Gore, Pelosi and Edwards, broker a deal: Clinton/Obama, with Obama given the power to install a number of his people in key positions in the campaign (on organization) and in the Clinton/Obama administration. Obama supporters would not be happy, but the Supers’ anointing of Clinton is at least defensible by this point. Some of Obama’s disillusioned indie and younger supporters drift to McCain, and McCain goes into the Fall with a 5 point lead.
NOVEMBER
* Clinton/Obama in a Squeaker v. McCain. Iraq is up and down and the economy continues to deteriorate in the run up to November 4th. Core Dems, including African-Americans, swallow their resentment and come home to vote for the Clinton/Obama ticket. Meanwhile, the right-wing noise machine engage in a nasty, deeply misogynistic campaign (with racial and anti-Islamic smears thrown in) that leads to a backlash among higher educated independents, helping Clinton to a tight 50+1 victory (Kerry states + Ohio), but with negative coattails due to her intractable unpopularity in red states and many purple states. The Obama dream of a Reagan-style Democratic realignment is totally shot, and Obama bides his time until 2016.
Endnote: Not every event has to go exactly the way I’ve outlined, but Clinton needs a high number of these events to go her way to avoid the Clinton conundrum: how to overcome Obama's substantial pledged delegate lead without resorting to tactics that will destroy her general election prospects. If Florida and Michigan do not have new elections, and if Obama and Clinton continue to be perceived as at least equally electable (in match-up polls vs. McCain and in the media narrative), I see no way for her to use Supers to overcome Obama’s pledged delegate lead without provoking a severe backlash from Obama supporters. She would be seen by most BO supporters as stealing an election Obama has won, which will only reinforce HRC's most negatively-perceived trait -- that she'll say or do anything to win an election. This would doom her general election prospects.
The better, and more likely scenario for a Democratic victory: Obama campaigns in Pennsylvania like he did in Iowa, winning over a sufficient chunk of the white working class, while counterpunching hard against the Clintons and attacking McCain. He ends up winning by a couple of points. In the process, he answers lingering questions about his appeal to core Democratic constituencies and finally forces Clinton to drop out. Heading into the general, Obama vastly outspends and outcampaigns McCain, and wins a map-changing victory, carrying the Kerry states, SW swing states, Virginia, Iowa, and Missouri, while helping downticket.