Miners and their families never share the wealth generated from coal. They only take the risks. The disaster at the Upper Big Branch Mine in Raleigh County, West Virginia highlights the price they sometimes pay for those risks. This is a sad day in Montcoal with the death toll at 25 and 4 missing.
"All we have left is hope, and we're going to continue to do what we can, but I'm just trying to be honest with everybody and say that the situation does look dire."
Kevin Stricklin, Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) administrator
The blood is on the hands of Massey Energy.
Let's start with the Upper Big Branch mine disaster. Massey Energy owns and operates this mine under its Performance Coal subsidy. The safety and violation record at this mine has been poor and getting worse, especially since 2008.
In seven of the last 10 years, the mine has recorded a non-fatal injury rate worse than the national average for similar operations, according to MSHA statistics.
Between 2008 and last year, safety violations at the operation more than doubled and fines issued by MSHA tripled, according to agency records.
One miner was killed at the operation in a July 2003 electrical accident and another in a March 2001 roof fall, according to MSHA records.
Charleston Gazette (April 5, 2010)
The Upper Big Branch mine is at very high risk for methane gas buildup and explosion. The coal seam in this mine releases up to 2 million cubic feet of methane gas every day. So what were the safety violations by Massey Energy at this mine over the past several years?
In the past year, federal inspectors fined the company more than $382,000 for repeated serious violations involving its ventilation plan and equipment at Upper Big Branch. The violations also cover failing to follow the plan, allowing combustible coal dust to pile up, and having improper firefighting equipment.
Roanoke Times (April 6, 2010)
Massey cut corners by failing to protect the miners at Upper Big Branch from methane gas explosions. A methane explosion is the suspected culprit in the disaster although the investigation is only in the early stages.
Dennis O’Dell, an official with the union who was in contact with state and federal safety officials, said the current theory was that the explosion might have been caused by a buildup of methane gas in a sealed-off section of the mine. A similar type of explosion occurred in the 2006 Sago mining disaster, which left 12 miners dead after trapping them underground for nearly two days.
NY Times (April 6, 2010)
In 2006, Massey also cut corners at the Aracoma Alma No. 1 Mine. A conveyor belt fire caused the death of two miners due to smoke inhalation on January 19, 2006. See MSHA records for the accident here.
Federal investigators cited a variety of major safety violations that led to the fire, including “prolonged operation” of a misaligned conveyor belt and allowing large spills of combustible coal dust and grease to build up on the belt. Serious safety problems at Aracoma built up over time, and an independent report found that a lack of tough enforcement by state and federal agencies contributed to those problems.
Of course, a huge problem at Aracoma was also that Massey officials had removed key ventilation walls, or stoppings, allowing smoke to enter that primary escape tunnel in the first place – a move that U.S. District Judge John T. Copenhaver later said “doomed two workers to a tragic death.”
Massey’s Aracoma Coal Co. subsidiary pleaded guilty to criminal safety violations that led to the deaths of Bragg and Hatfield. The company agreed to pay a $2.5 million criminal fine and an additional $1.7 million in civil penalties.
Charleston Gazette (Jan. 18, 2010)
And why was Massey cutting corners in 2005 before the Aracoma tragedy in early 2006?
The company saw negative operating income again in 2005, due primarily to higher costs of administration and executive compensation.
Wikinvest
In addition to recklessly endangering the safety of miners, Massey Energy has poisoned the streams in West Virginia and Kentucky.
Specifically, the notice alleges that, Between April 1, 2008, and March 31, 2009, Massey violated its effluent limits at its various operations at least 971 times, and accrued 12,977 days of violation during that 12-month period. The U.S. government’s lawsuit against Massey, which resulted in the $20 million settlement, alleged more than 60,000 days of violations over a six-year period, or about 10,000 days of violations per year.
Charleston Gazette (January 11, 2010)
Massey Energy has recently been found to be cutting corners in its coal ash impoundments in West Virginia. Again, this is far from a first time offense. Massey Energy has a history of problems with coal ash impoundments and had a massive spill from an impoundment in Martin County, Kentucky in 2000.
Massey Energy and CEO Don Blankenship (Boss Tweed) was also at the heart of an influence scandal on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Blankenship has personal ties with former Justice Spike Maynard (now running for Congress) and former Chief Justice Brent Benjamin. Because of overwhelming evidence of influence peddling by Massey, judicial campaign financing laws have had to be revised.
The measure aims to restore public trust in the integrity of the judiciary. It was badly eroded by Massey Energy’s involvement in the election of Chief Justice Brent Benjamin, who then voted twice to throw out a major damage award against the company.
NY Times (March 19, 2010)
Judges under Massey influence extend throughout the West Virginia court system. For example, there is this Circuit Judge conveniently located in the heart of a county where Massey operates mountaintop removal mines.
Mingo County Circuit Judge Michael Thornsbury has been ordered by the state Supreme Court to step down from hearing a lawsuit against Massey Energy over alleged pollution of drinking water by the injection of the company’s coal slurry.
In an order signed Monday, Acting Chief Justice Robin Davis cited Thornsbury’s previous representation of a Massey company in a case brought by a resident (who is also a plaintiff in the slurry case) over blasting at one of Massey’s mines.
Charleston Gazette (July 20, 2009)
Massey likes to refer to protestors at its facilities as "domestic terrorists." That is an interesting choice of words for an organization that has recklessly endangered the lives of miners and poisoned the streams of Appalachia putting the health of thousands at risk. With emotions running raw over the Upper Big Branch Mine tragedy, politicians are promising action. In a statement, Congressman Nick Rahall said:
We will scrutinize the health and safety violations at this mine to see whether the law was circumvented and miners precious lives were willfully put at risk, and there will be accountability.
I wonder how many violations of the law can you have and how many deaths do you have to contribute to before there is real accountability for corporations like Massey Energy? Whatever happens to Massey, it will be too late for Benny Willingham, one of the victims of Upper Branch mine disaster. His family members learned of his death from a list posted by Massey Energy.
Benny R. Willingham, 62, who was five weeks away from retiring, was among those who perished, said his sister-in-law Sheila Prillaman.
He had mined for 30 years, the last 17 with Massey, and planned to take his wife on a cruise to the Virgin Islands next month, she said.
"Benny was the type - he probably wouldn't have stayed retired long," Prillaman said. "He wasn't much of a homebody."
Prillaman said family members were angry because they learned of Willingham's death after reading it on a list Massey posted, instead of being contacted by the company.
Roanoke Times (April 6, 2010)
Here is a link to the MSHA log for onsite activities after the explosion. From the handwritten notes, rescue teams were ordered withdrawn at 12:45 a.m. due to air quality issues.
Meanwhile, Don Blankenship told an interviewer several hours ago:
I mean violations are unfortunately a normal part of the mining process. You have inspections every day and it’s hard to differentiate sometimes between head count or number counts of violations and the seriousness or type of it.
[Upper Big Branch] was a mine that had violations. I think the fact that MSHA and the state and our firebosses and the best engineers you can find were all in and order this mine and all belive it was safe … speaks for itself.
Any suspicion that the mine was improperly operated or illegally operated or anything like that would be unfounded. None of these groups would have allowed this mine to operate had it been unsafe.
Charleston Gazette (April 6, 2010)
Mine violations are a normal part of the mining process? 458 violations last month, many directly related to methane, but those are not improper, illegal, or indicative of unsafe operation? Spoken like a man desperate to cover his tracks and his big butt.