A week ago, there was jubilation in Cairo, and across the globe at the resignation of Mubarak, and the success of the protesters in achieving a transition to a Democracy, not least on DKos.
I was of a different opinion, as I wrote back then:
There is a lot of jubilation and consideration of this being a complete break with the previous regime, but that would be a complete misreading: the Mubarak regime consisted of a coalition with Mubarak and the patronage he supported, and the military and their patronage. The plan was for Gamal, Hosni's son to become heir apparent in Sept, but that plan failed.
As soon as this uprising started around the 28th Jan, I thought to myself "there will be a coup d'etat", and the last day was a brilliantly presented coup d'etat: The military sides with the protesters in a communique, saying "Mubarak" is leaving. Hosni predictably says, "no I'm not." Suleiman then gives Mubarak the final shove and the military, Suleiman included, take over.
The military has a year to position themselves towards a new regime, and they largely control the economy.
Ah, (some of) you say! Suleiman is gone. Right? Actually, as I supposed... notsomuch
As well as being nominated VP by Mubarak, Suleiman remained a Lt. General and as such is in the first class of the Supreme Military Council. There are a few players on the council: Tantawi, Enan, Suleiman , Reda Mohamed, Seif-Eldeein & Mohab Mamish... more or less in that order of significance.
Suleiman APPEARED to fade away, but I knew that was a facade: the group are close and have been for decades, despite some in fighting and jockeying. Tantawi has risen above Suleiman in the transition, but S. was never going to be the head guy. He's a manager. Not an A type personality as Tantawi and Enan are. S is more "AB" type; more Eichmann (very roughly.)
Haaretz hinted at this idea.
Despite twitter being flooded with tweets about "The Man Behind Suleiman" (who is now, if reports are correct, the new minister of education,) if you scan tweets you'll notice all over that Suleiman is still very much around.
A couple of tweet examples regarding Suleiman being part of the coup regime currently:
Tantawi, Soliman, Shafiq, No Transparency, Marginalizing Egyptians - a lot still needs to be changed #jan25 10:27 PM Feb 14th via Twitter for Mac
tamersalama
Tamer Salama
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
Ehab Elsayed
On Wednesday 16th February 2011, @elsaehaa123 said:
(In reply to Ghonim)
@Ghonim, I feel that there is something wrong is happening.
1) Omar Soliman still acting as the VP and still in the presidential palace
2) Mubarak still in Sharm having full security and communication with every one
3) many of political prisoners still in jail with no valid reasons
Alot of questions have no answers
A Brilliant Coup D'etat
The New York Times has a brilliant article entitled Egyptians Say Military Discourages an Open Economy, where they note
Since the ouster last week of President Hosni Mubarak, of course, the military also runs the government. And some scholars, economists and business groups say it has already begun taking steps to protect the privileges of its gated economy, discouraging changes that some argue are crucial if Egypt is to emerge as a more stable, prosperous country.
---
But the military-led government also struck at advocates of economic openness, including the former finance minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali, who was forced from his job, and the former trade minister Rachid Mohamed Rachid, whose assets were frozen under allegations of corruption. Both are highly regarded internationally and had not been previously accused of corruption.
“That mystified everybody,” said Hisham A. Fahmy, chief executive of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt.
In an interview, Mr. Rachid said he felt like a scapegoat. “People who have been supporting liberal reforms or an open economy are being caught up in the anticorruption campaign,” he said. “My case is one of them.”
---
Moreover, the military’s power to guide policy is, at the moment, unchecked. The military has invited no civilian input into the transitional government, and it has enjoyed such a surge in prestige since it helped usher out Mr. Mubarak that almost no one in the opposition is criticizing it.
“We trust them,” said Walid Rachid, a member of the April 6 Youth Movement that helped set off the revolt. “Because of the army our revolution has become safe.”
---
“People think that liberalization creates corruption,” said Abdel Fattah el-Gibaly, director of economic research at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. “I think we will go back, not exactly to socialism, but maybe halfway.”
And the Egyptian military, said Mr. Springborg of the Naval Postgraduate School, is happy to go along. “The military is like the matador with the red cape attracting the bull of resentment against the corruption of the old regime,” he said, “and they are playing it very successfully.”
Gen. Fathy el-Sady, a spokesman for the Ministry of Defense Production, declined to comment, saying the minister in charge was tied up dealing with strikes at military-run companies.
In a brilliant exploitation of the situation, the military council is playing this perfectly; the civilian cronies that Mubarak extended patronage are being thrown under the bus, but similarly, so are the guys that are potential financial reformers.
The public-in-total's will to protest for reforms has been neutered. The military is generally viewed as heroic even if its intentions, if you dig a little, are not pure.
The guy that will be pushed as the leader going forward (in my view,) by the coup will be Enan, second in command and a charismatic type A personality. Tantawi will stay in command of the Army (and largely be in control of the economy,) and Suleiman will stay in the shadows and manage the military intelligence apparatus, as he has done for two and a half decades.
Now, you say... the protesters will never stand for this! I say... its much much more complicated than that; first don't imagine the military as a blunt and stupid entity. View them as Machiavellian princes, who'll use every tool of deceit and cunning to bend the future to their will. There will be Democracy in Egypt, and the people may even be able to vote for the parties they choose, but no matter what, the generals will never let the people wrest the true power of economic freedom from their grasp. Thirty years of consolidating economic power makes them too entrenched, unless they are spectacular failures in their approach... yet we see from the reporting of the NY Times, they are not.
Now what does this all mean? For the U.S. (and the West in general) probably a best case scenario... these figures are all well-known and well liked here. They have regularly visited the U.S. military brass here and have a relationship that meets or maybe even exceeds that of NATO. Their and our views largely align in regional stability and cooperation.
For Egypt? There will be political reform and more freedoms, certainly, but not financial reform (Tantawi's view in the article says as much.) The new Egypt will "Look and Sound" like a Democracy, but "Taste and Smell" something different. Like Pakistan only with a more profound military, perhaps.
For the people, life will improve some. Mubarak's network of patronage is gone, and those resources to be distributed like bread to the circus: there is every likelihood that the new boss will be quite the same as the old boss, but such is life in one of the worlds oldest civilizations.
(Originally drafted at 4:00am local... and testing a timed publication)