Dilma Rousseff's historic victory in the Brazilian Presidential race last October not only extended the gains of the "Lula era" for at least another four years, but also slammed the door on Brazil's political opposition. The two principal opposition parties, the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democratic Party) and the DEM (Democrats) lost big in the presidential and congressional races, but more critically, have also completely lost their sense of purpose and direction as political parties. It is unlikely that either of them will survive until 2014 in their present form.
This doesn't mean that the ruling PT (Workers' Party)-led coalition has only smooth sailing ahead of it. Its "massive tent" now embraces parties from the Communist far left to the traditional center-right, such as the PR (Party of the Republic), and there is no guarantee that any of these groups will indefinitely continue to check its own ambitions in support of PT. The centrist PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) has already made noises of dissatisfaction during the naming of Dilma's cabinet, while the left PSB (Brazilian Socialist Party) has hinted at a possible independent run for the presidency in 2014. But more than anything, the fact that so many potentially antagonistic ideologies have sought a home under the petista umbrella demonstrates the complete impotence and incompetence of the Brazilian right at the present time.
This diary will examine the forces that are rupturing Brazil's traditional opposition parties and what this new political realignment could mean for elections in 2014 and beyond.
Brazil's Political Parties
Brazil today is home to one of the world's most fractured multi-party democracies. No fewer than 22 parties currently hold seats in Congress, and the largest single party bloc, the PT (Workers' Party), holds only 87 of 513 seats (17%). Attempts at analyzing the dynamics of Brazilian politics are further frustrated by the transitory shifting of alliances and coalitions, which are often contradictory and based more on personal whims than partisan ideology. Nonetheless, some political alignments have formed that are relatively stable:
1. The PT-led center-left coalition which includes the PDT (Democratic Labor Party), the PSB (Brazilian Socialist Party), and the PCdoB (Communist Party of Brazil)
2. The center-right opposition coalition of the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democratic Party) and the DEM (Democrats)
3. The large centrist parties PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party), PP (Progressive Party), and PR (Party of the Republic), whose main goal appears to be to align themselves with whoever is in power and leverage that into favors for themselves, their family, and their business associates
4. The tiny far-left splinter parties, which have resisted any compromise with the center or the right and generally elect few representatives
Most other small parties can be categorized into one of these four groups.
New Alliances
The election of 2010 was the first in which PT and the centrist PMDB cemented their previously tenuous alliance, leading to Chamber of Deputies President (analogous to the Speaker of the House) Michel Temer's selection as Dilma Rousseff's vice-presidential running mate. This strengthening left+center alliance had its roots in Lula's first victory in the presidential race in 2002, when he deliberately broke from PT's radical left ideology and embraced a social-democratic "middle way", pointedly choosing José Alencar as his running mate and forming an alliance with the center-right Liberal Party (PL). While this "big tent" strategy has paid off in electoral dividends (three straight presidential and congressional election victories) it has not been without some "casualties" on the left, starting with the expulsion of dissident PT members back in 2003 and continuing in 2011 with a potential rift between PT and some members of the left-wing PDT over the recently-passed minimum wage hike.
For the time being, however, these splits have proved more of a distraction than a fatal blow (left wing splinter candidates haven't gotten out of mid-single digits in either the 2006 or 2010 elections), and the broad center-left coalition is continuing to prove strong. On the right however, the picture is entirely different. Senator Kátia Abreu of the rightwing Democrats, discussing her own party, commented recently that, "the opposition is in the ICU." Not surprisingly, she and a number of her colleagues are looking for a way out.
The Democrats - On their deathbed?
The worst electoral defeats in recent elections have fallen squarely on the shoulders of the former rightwing ruling party. The party currently known as the Democrats was, prior to 2007, the PFL (Liberal Front Party) - a faction of the old military ruling body, ARENA (National Renewal Alliance) which broke apart in the 1980s with the return of direct democracy. The PFL was one of the few Brazilian parties to adhere strictly to the neoliberal "Washington consensus" and became a strong ally of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). Then, their fortunes began to change.
In 2002, the PFL held the largest bloc of seats in the lower house of Congress and the second largest in the Senate, in both cases larger than the then-ruling PSDB party and the opposition PT. They decided that, instead of remaining a mere coalition ally of PSDB, they would strike out on their own with their own presidential candidate. They chose Roseana Sarney, governor of Maranhão and daughter of ex-President and current Senator José Sarney. However, as the early presidential campaign begin to heat up, Sarney was hit with a number of large corruption scandals and chose to withdraw from the race -- leaving the PFL without a candidate and outside of a coalition. They were hammered in congressional elections in 2002 and 2006, seeing their bloc of congressional seats shrink from 105 to 65 and their number of Senators shrink from 20 to 15. In 2007, they decided to completely reform and re-found the party under a new "brand": The Democrats.
In 2010, the Democrats were allied again with the PSDB, and just as in the previous two elections, were hammered at the polls. They dropped from 65 to only 43 congressional seats and from 15 all the way down to 6 Senators. They retained only two of Brazil's 27 governorships. Worse yet, they lost nearly all of their "big names". The Sarneys had long since bolted to the PMDB and allied with Lula. Former Vice-President Marco Maciel and other stalwarts of the Senate such as Heráclito Fortes were crushed in their re-election bids, while AC Magalhães Júnior wisely chose not to seek re-election. As of 2011, the Democrats could boast of only one well-known politician at the national level, their "shining star": Gilberto Kassab, Mayor of São Paulo.
Shortly after the election, the party leadership began to float a number of trial balloons regarding their future. First came the idea of fusion with the PSDB - forming a single party with their largest ally. PSDB came out against it. Embroiled in their own internal split (more on that later), the party feared a fusion would allow their own dissidents to break away (party fusion is one of the few conditions for which switching parties is allowed under current Brazilian Law). Next came the idea of fusion with the PMDB. Yes, the opposition leadership actually proposed fusing with part of the governing coalition! Needless to say, this idea was D.O.A. Lastly, came the boldest idea of all - that the DEM would cut ties with PSDB and run Gilberto Kassab for president in the 2014 elections and rebuild some of their lost prestige on his image. Kassab himself shot this down... and then went a whole lot further.
Late in 2010, Kassab began openly hinting that he planned to withdraw from the DEM and move to the centrist PMDB. When the news broke publicly, DEM party president Rodrigo Maia and other leaders took it in stride, but claimed they would go to court to seek Kassab's expulsion from the mayor's office. (Political offices are considered to be held by a party, not by an individual. If a politician changes parties, his/her original party has the right to go to court to remove the party-switcher, though they sometimes choose not to.) Now Kassab claims that he will lead a faction of DEMs to form a brand-new political party, allied with Dilma and the PT governing coalition! Senator Kátia Abreu is on board with this plan, as well as Raimundo Colombo (one of only 2 current DEM governors). Kassab claims that around 20 of the 43 DEMs remaining in congress will also join his new party. His goal is to break the PSDB's 20-year hold on the governorship of São Paulo (as an ally of PSDB, the DEMs would never let Kassab challenge them directly), and he sees an alliance between his new party and the left as the route to achieve this. Crass political opportunism? Without a doubt. The side effects of his brazen power play, however, might finally nail the coffin shut on the moribund Democrats.
Kassab's "exit date" is currently set for March 31.
The Social Democrats - Center/Left or Center/Right?
Brazil's social democratic party (at least in name) fared slightly less poorly than the Democrats over the past three national elections. From a high of 99 congressional seats prior to 2002, it has fallen to 53 at present. However, the PSDB did manage to hold onto 8 of 27 governorships, including those of Brazil's two most populous states, São Paulo and Minas Gerais. As a force of opposition to Dilma and the PT, they hold a lot more cards than the Democrats. But the force of three straight crushing defeats in the Presidential race have intensified a long-festering internal schism.
The PSDB was created in the late 1980s as the center-left social democratic "answer" to the radicalism then preached by PT and other parties on the left. When Fernando Henrique Cardoso (known as FHC) won the presidential race in 1994, the party began to move toward the center right at the national level, and formed a strong alliance with the DEM (née PFL). The nomination of José Serra (x2) and Geraldo Alckmin (both governors of São Paulo State) as presidential candidates in 2002, 2006, and 2010 strengthened the rightist elements of the party, mostly centered in São Paulo. This schism burst into the open in 2010, with the intra-party battle for control between José Serra and Minas Gerais governor Aécio Neves for the nomination, a battle won by Serra and the São Paulo faction.
Aécio Neves, grandson of Tancredo Neves (the only person to ever serve as Prime Minister of Brazil and a beloved icon of the struggle for democracy during the military dictatorship), has been touted as PSDB's "Golden Boy" - one of the most highly approved governors in the country and someone who could sway the crucial Minas Gerais electorate back into the PSDB column on a national level. Many considered him the favorite for the 2010 nomination. When José Serra and the São Paulo faction forced him out so that Serra could have a second shot at the presidency, he was offered the vice-presidency, which he declined. Neves, term-limited as governor, ran for Senate instead, and was elected with 79% of the vote. His vice-governor and hand-picked successor Antonio Anastacia won easily as well, picking up almost 63% in the first round. The depth of the party schism can be seen in the fact that José Serra only managed to attract 30% of mineiro voters in the first round, and lost the second round in Minas Gerais decisively by a margin of 58-42, worse than he performed nationally! This fact led to angry public denunciations by Serra's campaign manager just days after the election that Neves had intentionally sabotaged Serra in Minas Gerais, a charge that Neves laughed off by commenting that he was not to blame for the voters' dislike of Serra.
Although Serra won the battle for the nomination, he may have lost the war. Neves is now a de facto leader of the opposition in the Senate with a platform to attract national attention for a possible 2014 bid, while Serra is out of elected office until at least 2012 (if he chooses to make another run for Mayor of São Paulo). In any case, it is clear that the São Paulo and Minas Gerias factions of the PSDB are more divided than ever. Aécio Neves has recently commented that he feels the PSDB needs to be "re-founded." What this means is unclear, but there seems to be a growing movement within the party to break the stranglehold on party leadership held by São Paulo, a move which would personally benefit Aécio Neves a great deal. Serra, for his part, has not ruled out a third run for the presidency in 2014.
Realignment?
With the PT continuing and strengthening its political ties to the Brazilian center, and factions of both major opposition parties also considering a move towards the center (or at least away from the extreme right "opposition for opposition's sake"), the time may be ripe for yet another realignment in either 2014 or 2018. But where will it come from? The media has certainly played its part to sell the "Aécio Neves as savior" narrative, doing whatever it can to build up his approval and name recognition nationwide (they seem to have dropped Serra like a hot potato). But other intriguing possibilities exist. Marina Silva, ex-PT and current member of the Green Party (PV), earned 20% of the vote in the first round and showed that there is a significant segment of the population looking for something outside of the traditional PT-PSDB dispute. The same proved true in 2002, when 30% opted for Ciro Gomes and Anthony Garotinho.
Eduardo Campos, popular governor of Pernambuco State and president of the growing Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), has hinted that his party may leave the PT coalition in 2014 and run its own candidate (most likely Campos himself). Such a move as this would further box PT into the political center (or move the political center further to the left?), but it would probably only happen if Dilma and the PT are polling weakly in the months leading to the election. Another oft-rumoured possibility would be for Lula himself to make a comeback in 2014 (the Brazilian Constitution permits unlimited non-consecutive terms). Lula has denied any interest, but four years is an eternity in politics. His return would almost certainly put the election out of reach for anyone else.
Other rumours point to a possible third run by cearense Ciro Gomes (marginalized by his own party in 2010 in favor of alliance with Lula and Dilma) or the entry of a dark-horse PSDB candidate such as Paraná's Beto Richa.
The Brazilian political alignment post-dictatorship continues to be a very fluid and dynamic animal. Even the "long-running" polarization between PT and PSDB has only been in existence for a bit over 20 years. The only thing that can be known for sure is that the partisan alignment will look considerably different in 2014 than it does today.