"We have put Al Qaeda on a path to defeat, and we will not relent until the job is done." --President Barack Obama, June 22, 2011
For the past several years, I had often wondered -- as I imagine many others have -- what we might consider "winning" the War in Afghanistan. The answer has changed depending on whom was asked and when the question was raised.
Was it to defeat Al Qaeda, as the President seems to suggest in the quotation above? That goal may have been part of the original motivation to invade Afghanistan in the first place, but considering that U.S. intelligence officials concluded that Al Qaeda's presence there was extremely limited even before the escalation of troops in December 2009, it seems far-fetched to believe that Al Qaeda serves as anything except a pretext for our continued use of combat forces, currently slated to withdraw completely by the end of 2014. Was it to thwart the Taliban's ability to retake control of the central government? That was one of President Obama's stated objectives in his speech earlier tonight. But the Taliban has re-established itself in rural areas of the country and, only two years ago, was believed to control up to 80 percent of Afghanistan.
Was it to secure a stable Afghanistan government that could ensure security and democracy for its citizens? President Hamid Karzai's government has been steeped in corruption, whether by fixing elections or running interference for financial criminals. Was it to eliminate the threat of terrorism and ensure the safety of Americans? More than 1,600 U.S. soldiers have died since the war began; thousands more suffered life-altering injuries; and while the United States government is still funding billions of dollars to fight the War on Drugs both at home and in Afghanistan, thousands upon thousands of Americans continue to be locked up in prison and see their rights stripped away for drug crimes.
The answer that is offered to the question of victory in Afghanistan usually involves some or all of those elements listed above. Such is the nature of an incredibly complex foreign policy problem that has been boiling for a long time. I've come to the conclusion that "winning" in Afghanistan is not a nebulous concept with many different answers, but a question without an answer. I no longer ask what is the definition of victory in Afghanistan because it has no definition.
President Obama's plan to withdraw 10,000 troops by the end of 2011 and an additional 20,000 troops by the summer of 2012 is a positive development, at least to the extent that the raw number of troops that would remain there by that time is less than what it is now. Unfortunately, 70,000 troops is still a substantial military presence to maintain in Afghanistan for an additional two years, bringing us back to where we were when Obama's second escalation of troops was announced -- double where we were when Obama was inaugurated. The President's drawdown plan also does not take into account the 18,971 private Department of Defense security contractors in the country, nor does it give any indication of how these private firms will be used beyond 2014. Given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent pronouncement that American companies -- including Halliburton and Lockheed Martin -- should make an effort to invest in business opportunities in Iraq, it is quite pertinent then to question the degree to which private firms will be used in a similar capacity in Afghanistan.
To make matters worse, the President's current plan for an Afghanistan War drawdown does not exist in a foreign policy or economic vacuum. Just as Obama announces that 30,000 troops will be withdrawn by next year, the U.S. is continuing to lend material support to the growing intervention in Libya, an operation that has cost American taxpayers more than $750 million dollars to date, kills several civilians each day, was never authorized by Congress, and currently has no end in sight. The U.S. is also continuing drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, an operation for which the DOD does not compile statistics on civilian casualties. And all of this is occurring at a time when the American economy is still showing little signs of recovery, unemployment among the middle class is still incredibly high, and more and more Americans are finding their jobless benefits slashed.
Leaving aside the economic consequences of our foreign wars, the human toll in Afghanistan has been enormous. Untold numbers of civilians have been killed, permanently injured, and displaced from their homes. But the death and destruction that has been wrought upon Afghan civilians by our actions cannot simply be measured by statistics alone. There are many relevant questions that we should be asking: How many new terrorists have we created from bombing and occupying a foreign nation for almost ten years? How long will it take for the country to be rebuilt? Should the U.S. have any role in its rebuilding, and if so, what should that role be, and how could the government work to ensure that it could be carried out successfully?
Most importantly, can we still call it a victory whenever our role in this quagmire finally ends? I don't think we can. Whatever strategic, economic, or political gains have been made since October of 2001, the destruction of this War has been greatly devastating to both countries and it cannot be undone. Even if President Obama's drawdown plan proceeded much more quickly than is currently designed, that still does not answer the question of whether this war has been worth the blood and treasure that has been spent.
No politician -- for historical and political purposes -- wants to be associated with losing a war. In our political discourse and cultural mythology, the American President must portray himself and must be portrayed his supporters as a symbol of resolute, unwavering strength in the face of America's enemies. An American President who admits that a war cannot be won while on his watch would probably be committing career suicide. But that's the paradigm that needs to change if we are to really rethink our foreign policy and avoid getting involved in another war like this again. The belief that the U.S. must fight all of its wars until they reach a victorious conclusion is a form of American exceptionalism that ignores the human, economic, political, cultural, and moral carnage that they have wrought in our name. When discussing cause and effect in the Afghanistan War, we should not be asking which side is winning or who will be declared victorious, but instead, why does it matter which side is considered "victorious" when its impact has been so destructive?
I have little doubt that some will read this essay as a rant wallowing in defeatism. I don't see it that way. To me, defeatism is not the mindset that acknowledges that American military victory in Afghanistan is impossible, but rather the mindset that justifies military occupation of a foreign country and continued destruction of several others as absolutely necessary measures to keep America safe; that bows before the fear that perpetual war must be waged abroad to forge a stable peace. I think of my view as much more positive than that -- the one that believes that we can achieve a lasting, sustainable peace without maintaining a substantial, indefinitely long military footprint abroad; and that we don't have to pretend that victory in warfare is the only outcome that we will accept, regardless of the consequences.
No matter how the Afghanistan War's mission has been justified, retooled, and fought, the results of the last ten years are unmistakable. Victory is not an answer in Afghanistan. There isn't one and there never will be.