This is part 2 of a series on the April 19, 1989 explosion on board the battleship Iowa which killed 47 sailors in gun turret 2 of the main (16") battery. In this part I will briefly describe the explosion, but my primary emphasis will be the shoddy politically-motivated decisions of the Reagan Administration (1981-89) which led to the reactivation of the Iowa-class ships These decisions placed thousands of men into danger on obsolete museum pieces, and in my view, created the circumstances which were the likely cause of the explosion. (Prior installment: Part 1: An Obsolete Weapons System).
Image 1: Sinking of the General Belgrano by submarine-
launched torpedo, May 2, 1982. Like this WW2 ship,
the reactivated Iowa class battleships had no modern
antisubmarine defense such as ASROC.
Incomplete defensive systems
The ships had been originally equipped with a forest of anti-aircraft artillery to counter the propeller-driven aircraft of the early 1940s. All of this was useless against modern jet aircraft and anti-ship missiles, and it was completely removed and replaced with four high-speed electric gatling guns.
But these were only intended to be a final line of defense against aerial attack. The missing outer defense layer was the Sea Sparrow missile. No such missiles were placed on the Iowa-class because the blast from the discharge of the 16" guns damaged the missile housings.
Submarines and torpedoes had become much greater threats since the 1940s, yet the reactivated battleships were not fitted with anti-submarine defenses (ASROC), whereas the much newer Spruance class destroyers had been, in addition to carrying the Sea Sparrow.
As a result, the battleships were dependent on an escort of smaller vessels to protect them, much as in WW2. But, unlike WW2, these smaller modern vessels also deployed long range offensive systems which matched or exceeded the battleship's capabilities -- what then was the need for the expensive and vulnerable battleship?
Image 2: USS Stark on fire following hit by air-
launched Exocet missile.
Anti-ship missile threat.
With an effective range of 70 miles or so, a nation equipped with shore-based Harpoon missiles and an effective target system could engage an
Iowa-class battleship long before the ship's main gun armament could be brought into maximum range, about 24 miles.
Anti-ship missiles, such as the Russian-built Styx, had been used by the Indian Navy in 1971 to strike and destroy Pakistani ships at ranges of over 40 miles.
In 1982, several British ships were sunk or seriously damaged by Argentine forces using French-made Exocet missiles, launched both from air and from the ground. One of these hits was made on HMS Glamorgan by an Exocet missile launched from cheaply built launcher cobbled together on a trailer by some Argentine McGyver.
The 1980s battleship proponents argued the ships sunk by anti-shipping missiles had been lightly built vessels, whereas the battleship's armor would protect it from sinking should it be struck by a missile.
But this didn't match the reality of the battleship's "all or nothing" armor system, which was designed protect the machinery, armament and certain other critical structures of the ship from enemy battleship shells fired at ranges above 16,000 yards. Vast portions of the ship had no armor at all. Even the armor didn't give much protection against aerial bombardment, that was the job of the anti-aircraft artillery. The original anti-ship missile was the German Fritz X, basically an early smart bomb, which in 1943 sank the Italian battleship Roma, and caused serious damage to the British battleship Warspite.
Dubious offensive systems platform
Two modern offensive weapons systems were installed on the Iowa: the short-range (70 miles) Harpoon anti-ship missile and the long-range Tomahawk cruise missile, generally used for land attack, but also capable of anti-ship use. These missiles were prepacked into launching tubes. Once a missile was fired, the tubes could not be reloaded with another missile until the ship returned to port.
There were 16 Harpoon and 32 Tomahawks placed on Iowa. By comparison, the much smaller Spruance-class destroyers, built in the late 70s, carried 8 Harpoons and (some ships) 8 Tomahawks each.
The Harpoon anti-ship didn't require so expensive a launching platform as a battleship. It didn't even need a ship of any kind. It could be fired from an aircraft or a shore-based installation. The mounting tubes could be placed on a heavy truck and driven about on a nation's coastline as shore defense. The Tomahawk also could be launched from a wide variety of other platforms.
And this is not something that some goofy blogger has invented. From the testimony by the Frank C. Conahan, assistant Comptroller General, National Security division of the GAO, at the Congressional hearings following the explosion:
While the battleships' Tomahawk and Harpoon missile capability is
imposing, it is not unique within the Navy. Many other Navy vessels, submarines as well as surface ships, carry those same weapons. Also, the battleships' contribution to future amphibious warfare also may be limited. The current maximum range of just over 23 miles of the battleships' 16-inch guns (their only unique weapon system) impairs the ships' ability to provide effective naval surface fire support within the context of an "over the horizon" amphibious assault — one launched from 25 to 50 miles offshore and extending far inland.
.
Image 3: The Reagans on Iowa for "Liberty Weekend",
July 4, 1986. Despite the image of crisp belligerent
efficiency, this ship was then likely incapable of
engaging in modern naval combat.
Dodging inspections.
Iowa was formally accepted back into active service on April 28, 1984, ahead of schedule. Per the
the Wiki:
. . . to expedite the schedule, many necessary repairs to Iowa's engines and guns were not completed and the mandatory US Navy Board of Inspection and Survey (InSurv) inspection was skipped.
But of course 1984 was an
election year, and it was necessary to get the props out on the stage for the Great Communicator's greatest role.
Safely past the election, the InServ inspection could be done, and this began in March 1986. In charge was Rear Admiral John D. Bulkeley (1911-1995).
Bulkeley, who had been awarded the Medal of Honor for his achievements in PT boats during WW2, had probably the most prestige of any man in the Navy. He was notoriously tough as a ship inspector, and had access to the highest levels of the navy command despite his relatively low rank.
Bulkeley found the ship not capable of the design speed of 33 knots (38 mph). Other faults included hydraulic fluid leaks in the main gun turrets, electrical shorts, pump failures and defective valves in the firefighting system. Bulkeley made a personal recommendation to Secretary of the Navy Lehman that the ship be taken out of service immediately to address the issues.
This of course was not done, and the ship continued to be used as a backdrop for the Reagans -- literally so, as Nancy and Ronald boarded the ship on July 4, 1986 for a ceremonial naval review in the Hudson River. And what a grand patriotic affair that was -- the Statue of Liberty had recently been reconditioned, and July 3 to 5 was proclaimed Liberty Weekend!
Needless to say, who cared what a cranky old admiral might have thought about the machinery of the battleship when this splendid opportunity arose to show the nation what patriotism really meant -- a good looking photo-op!
Ship in search of a mission.
By 1988, it appears there was little for Iowa to do. A new commander, Fred Moosally took over on May 23, 1988. Moosally's primary achievements at the Naval Academy were in football rather than academics. This was no hindrance to his naval career. He was able to obtain a number of well-connected postings and eventually was in a position to ask for, and be granted, command of the Iowa, even though he had never even served on a battleship before.
Moosally could not properly maneuver the vessel in Chesapeake Bay, nearly colliding with three other ships, and then running the ship aground. In 1990 he missed a departure of the vessel for no good reason and had to be brought on board by a helicopter. And he allowed dubious experiments to be done with the ship's main guns in an effort to achieve longer range.
But Moosally was perceptive enough to realize that the Navy had no real plans for the use of the Iowa. From his Congressional testimony following the explosion:
I have felt like the battleship has been not — kind of out of it, no employment plan. The only employment I had on my schedule was this — of termination of August of this year, no concept of operations.
Moosally made it quite clear that he felt the Navy command, or at least some elements in it, regarded battleships as a waste of money and manpower. And in this Moosally had support from assistant GAO director Conahan, whose testimony was (pages 246-248):
We found that battleships, in comparison to other surface ships,
were not assigned an equal share of authorized enlisted supervisory personnel or personnel in ratings associated with gun turret operations. Additionally, the personnel assigned on battleships rated lower by several measures than those assigned to other ships.
The battleships, to include the Iowa, deployed with significant lower percentages of their authorized enlisted supervisors and turret-related journeymen. The other surface ships which we sampled deployed with an average of 101 percent of their authorization for supervisory enlisted personnel while the Iowa and the battle-
ships deployed with 92 and 93 percent respectively.
These differences are more pronounced with respect to gunners-mates and fire control men. The impact of manning for gunners-mates aboard the Iowa was highlighted at the time of the explosion. In turret II, two of the three journeymen-level gun captain positions normally manned by E-5s were filled by E-4 apprentices. The center gun captain was the only journeyman gun captain at
the time. All three of the gun captain positions in turret I were filled by E-4 apprentices.
We have been told repeatedly that the Navy has had difficulties in filling billets in battleships. Other surface ships that we sampled had excess gunnersmates and fire control at the journeyman and supervisory levels, primarily because personnel are promoted faster at these ships, or at higher rates.
We were also told that personnel who were assigned to the battleships and who reenlist frequently request duty elsewhere to enhance their promotion opportunities. Similarly, they prefer to go to schools other than the 16-inch gunnery school so as to get training in more technologically advanced areas to advance their prospects for future promotion and civilian employment.
We found that battleship personnel fare worse in advancement opportunities. This is true for both officers and enlisted personnel. * * *
Also, there is a higher rate of disciplinary actions among battleship personnel. * * *
The adequacy of training on the Iowa itself became an issue because the Navy's accident mvestigation report on the explosion said that unqualified personnel were
manning the turret. However, the former commanding officer of the Iowa said the crew was trained, just that the records were not up-to-date. Since the training records for the deceased crew were destroyed in the explosion, never existed, or have never been located, we were unable to reconcile this conflict.
We found, however, that oversight inspections which should have assessed the Iowa's personnel qualification standard program failed to do so during the 18 months preceding the explosion. Priorities were placed on other areas during the review, or the review team lacked the expertise to evaluate the 16-inch qualification program.
Also, weaknesses exist with the Navy's formal training program for 16-inch gun operations and maintenance. Our visits to the 16- inch school disclosed that limited hands-on training was being provided due to the lack of training aids. Training films being used at the school were basically 1940s vintage, and I might say that no
improvements were noted as recently as 2 weeks ago by our staff in the structure or available training aids since the time of the explosion.
While the Navy developed a draft training plan to improve the 16-inch training courses in September 1989, the plan still awaits final approval and implementation.
After reading this, the only possible conclusion I can come to is that the battleships were kept in service purely for political reasons, and the Navy did not regard them as effective weapon systems. What then was the point of exposing so many men to danger -- as I pointed out in the previous installment, there had been six previous turret fires on U.S. battleships, including two on the USS
Mississippi which killed over 40 men in each case. And certainly, if the ships were so important that the risk of such a fire had to be run for the sake of national defense, why was not a proper training program ever developed for the 16" battery?
Image 4: Discharge of a single 16" gun on USS Missouri,
showing the force of the explosion within Iowa's turret 2
The explosion
In early April 1989,
Iowa was ordered to participate as the flagship in a flight training exercise. Part of the exercise would include the firing of the guns from the forward two turrets while the fleet commander was on the bridge. In turret 2, the guns had been loaded with not with six but rather five bags of powder, with the idea of conducting a gunnery experiment.
None of the gun crews in Turret 2, who were used to placing six had any experience with how much further the hydraulic rammer, used to place both the shell and the powder into breech, would have to be extended, to properly load five bags.
The below video is the best I could find on Youtube of the explosion, which occurs at the 14:11. mark.
Leading up to the explosion, one of the guns (the left one) in Turret 1, the one closest to the bow, misfired. You can see it being raised and lowered several times as its crew struggles to fire the gun or clear the breach. That alone should have terminated the exercise, but it did not.
The two other guns on Turret 1 did fire during the exercise, I count twice per gun just from watching the video. No gun from turret 2 fired prior to the explosion.
The explosion endangered the entire ship, as it was possible that the fire would overcome the turret's protection systems and reach the powder magazine. Similar events had destroyed a number of battleships, both in and out of combat situations. Consequently, Moosally ordered that the turret 2 magazine to be flooded.
Names of the dead
Because this is Memorial Day, it's appropriate that the names of the dead be listed here (source).
TUNG THANH ADAMS, 25, fire controlman, Alexandria.
ROBERT WALLACE BACKHERMS, 30, gunner's mate, Ravenna, Ohio.
DWAYNE COLLIER BATTLE, 21, electrician's mate, fireman apprentice, Rocky Mount, N.C.
WALTER SCOT BLAKEY, 20, gunner's mate, Eaton Rapids, Mich.
PETE EDWARD BOPP, 21, gunner's mate, Levittown, N.Y.
RAMON JEREL BRADSHAW, 19, seaman recruit, Tampa, Fla.
PHILLIP EDWARD BUCH, 24, lieutenant junior grade, Las Cruces, N.M.
JOHN PETER CRAMER, 28, gunner's mate, Uniontown, Pa.
MILTON FRANCIS DEVAUL Jr., 21, gunner's mate, Solvay, N.Y.
LESLIE ALLEN EVERHART Jr., 31, seaman apprentice, Cary, N.C.
GARY JOHN FISK, 24, boatswain's mate, Oneida, N.Y.
TYRONE DWAYNE FOLEY, 27, seaman, Bullard, Texas.
ROBERT JAMES GEDEON III, 22, seaman apprentice, Lakewood, Ohio.
BRIAN WAYNE GENDRON, 20, seaman apprentice, Madera, Calif.
JOHN LEONARD GOINS, 20, seaman recruit, Columbus, Ohio.
DAVID L. HANSON, 23, electrician's mate, Perkins, S.D.
ERNEST EDWARD HANYECZ, 27, gunner's mate, Borenton, N.J.
CLAYTON MICHAEL HARTWIG, 25, gunner's mate, Cleveland, Ohio.
MICHAEL WILLIAM HELTON, 31, legalman, Louisville, Ky.
SCOTT ALAN HOLT, 20, seaman apprentice, Fort Myers, Fla.
REGINALD JOHNSON Jr., 20, seaman recruit, Warrensville Heights, Ohio.
BRIAN ROBERT JONES, 19, seaman, Kennesaw, Ga.
MICHAEL SHANNON JUSTICE, 21, seaman, Matewan, W.Va. (resident of Norfolk, Va.)
EDWARD J. KIMBLE, 23, seaman, Ft. Stockton, Texas
RICHARD E. LAWRENCE, 29, gunner's mate, Springfield, Ohio.
RICHARD JOHN LEWIS, 23, seaman apprentice, Northville, Mich.
JOSE LUIS MARTINEZ Jr., 21, seaman apprentice, Hidalgo, Texas.
TODD CHRISTOPHER McMULLEN, 20, boatswain's mate, Manheim, Pa.
TODD EDWARD MILLER, 25, seaman recruit, Ligonier, Pa.
ROBERT KENNETH MORRISON, 36, legalman, Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
OTIS LEVANCE MOSES, 23, seaman, Bridgeport, Conn.
DARIN ANDREW OGDEN, 24, gunner's mate, Shelbyville, Ind. (resident of Hampton, Va.)
RICKY RONALD PETERSON, 27, seaman, Houston, Minn.
MATTHEW RAY PRICE, 20, gunner's mate, Burnside, Pa.
HAROLD EARL ROMINE Jr., 19, gunner's mate, Bradenton, Fla.
GEOFFREY SCOTT SCHELIN, 20, seaman, Costa Mesa, Calif.
HEATH EUGENE STILLWAGON, 21, gunner's mate, Connellsville, Pa.
TODD THOMAS TATHAM, 19, seaman recruit, Wolcott, N.Y.
JACK ERNEST THOMPSON, 22, gunner's mate, Greeneville, Tenn.
STEPHEN J. WELDON, 24, gunner's mate, Yukon, Okla.
JAMES DARRELL WHITE, 22, gunner's mate, Norwalk, Calif.
RODNEY MAURICE WHITE, 19, seaman recruit, Louisville, Ky.
JOHN RODNEY YOUNG, 21, gunner's mate, Columbia, S.C.
REGINALD OWEN ZIEGLER, 39, gunner's mate, Port Gibson, N.Y.
Next in the series
In Part 3, I will cover the Navy's inadequate investigation and the Navy Command's irresponsible effort to pin the blame on one dead sailor, rather than acknowledge the strong likelihood that the Navy's own command was to blame for circumstances that led up to the explosion.