Growing up with Churchill's ringing condemnation of the Munich treaty, I have mostly seen Chamberlain as a fool at best, and a villain otherwise. Yet Chamberlain did achieve something at Munich : to get a treaty -- which Herr Hitler signed in person -- limiting future German actions. This treaty was disdained by the Nazis, who violated it when they invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia soon thereafter; and this disdain for laws and formal promises served to brand the Nazis as dangerous, from London to Milwaukee.
Before Munich, many fair-minded folk could argue that Germany needed some relief from the supposed harshness of the Versailles treaty, and that Adolf was just talking big so as to get Germany some more room to negotiate. After Munich--and its betrayal-- even actual Neo-Nazis (and there were more of these than we like to remember, even in the USA) were hard put to defend Germany's actions.
By seeming to be so naive, Chamberlain made Hitler's treachery all the more obvious and odious. Chamberlain's seeming willingness to reach out and trust may not have brought "peace in our time" but it did jump-start making the world see Hitler in the guise we now see him: a dangerous monster wishing world domination. Perhaps we should see Chamberlain as partly a scape-goat. We condemn him as a coward for his seeming an optimism -- and over-look the people around him with far worse motives who needed to have the Nazi lawlessness put under a spot-light before they could be shamed into joining in opposing it.
Certainly those who see Chamberlain as Hitler's favorite patsy might be surprised by how fiercely Adolf loathed this well-bred, well-educated and eminently sane fellow.
(extensive quote from Wikipedia entry on Munich treaty follows)
"A British diplomat in Berlin was informed by reliable sources that Hitler viewed Chamberlain as "an impertinent busybody who spoke the ridiculous jargon of an outmoded democracy. The umbrella, which to the ordinary German was the symbol of peace, was in Hitler's view only a subject of derision".[16] Also, Hitler had been heard saying: "If ever that silly old man comes interfering here again with his umbrella, I'll kick him downstairs and jump on his stomach in front of the photographers."[15] ".
In fact, in some ways Chamberlain had out-smarted Hitler; by getting him to sign in person, and with no legal weasel words to twist later, a strong promise not to use force whenever it seemed fruitful, Chamberlain had laid a trip-wire. In addition there may be even a bit of personal spite behind the speed with which Hitler betrayed his promises and gobbled up the rest of Czechoslovakia. Perhaps Adolf's insecurities, stirred by the contrast with Chamberlain, may have made drastic and arrogant action seem particularly attractive. Hitler may have been metaphorically trying to "kick him downstairs" by so flagrantly and rapidly violating Chamberlain's trust. There may have been a hint of vindictive pride as the Nazi tanks rolled ahead, a kind of "that will show Mr. Umbrella how the real world works". All this undermined any Nazi attempt at disguising their intentions.
(quote from Wikipedia entry on Munich treaty follows)
Chamberlain claimed the Prague annexation was a “completely different category”, moving beyond the legitimate Versailles grievances .Dray[a famous historian of this period] believes that "had war broken out up to and including Munich, then ... Hitler would not be the cause. But after Munich, Hitler alone becomes the cause".
Actually most people today would argue that Hitler would still have been the cause even if war had broken out before Munich, but this quote shows how important the trip-wire of the Munich treaty was in proving the Nazi character beyond reasonable doubt.
(quote from Wikipedia entry on Munich treaty follows)
Prime Minister Chamberlain felt betrayed by the Nazi seizure of Czechoslovakia, realizing his policy of appeasement towards Hitler had failed, and began to take a much harder line against the Nazis. Among other things he immediately began to mobilize the British Empire's armed forces on a war footing. France did the same.
In effect, although the Munich treaty was quite terrible, it led Hitler to tear off the thin mask of civilized behavior he laid claim to. Only a month before Munich, Henry Ford and Lindbergh had accepted the Nazi Grand Cross with only a little grumbling about the flaws of Nazi Germany, and most Americans had shrugged it off. At least on the surface, the betrayal of all their formal Munich promises made the Nazis outcasts, although both ESSO/Exxon and Ford motors were far from cutting off all secret ties :
(extensive quote from WALL STREET AND THE RISE OF HITLER)
A post-war Congressional subcommittee investigating American support for the Nazi military effort described the manner in which the Nazis succeeded in obtaining U.S. technical and financial assistance as "quite fantastic.11 Among other evidence the Committee was shown a memorandum prepared in the offices of Ford-Werke A.G. on November 25, 1941, written by Dr. H. F. Albert to R. H. Schmidt, then president of the board of Ford-Werke A.G. The memo cited the advantages of having a majority of the German firm held by Ford Motor Company in Detroit. German Ford had been able to exchange Ford parts for rubber and critical war materials needed in 1938 and 1939 "and they would not have been able to do that if Ford had not been owned by the United States." Further, with a majority American interest German Ford would "more easily be able to step in and dominate the Ford holdings throughout Europe." It was even reported to the Committee that two top German Ford officials had been in a bitter personal feud about who was to control Ford of England, such "that one of them finally got up and left the room in disgust."
Munich united peace-loving people in England and France to feel they had to confront what was now seen as the Nazi menace. A faster and more violent confrontation of Hitler, (setting aside the tantalizing but tenuous promises of a German army 'coup') would have left many more skeptics. England may have lost valuable time, but it settled pretty much beyond question who the real aggressor was. Unity in opposing the Nazis was not so much a given as we now think, and was never as complete as it seemed.