Perhaps, more crucially, however, is this: The TPP represents but another attempt to undermine the democratic principles of this nation. Corporations (despite what many on the Right would have us believe), are not people. Thus, they cannot be citizens, and should not be treated as such. But even if one assumes that corporations are entitled to the same constitutionally protected rights as you or I (as the Supreme Court has), corporations are largely unaccountable and undemocratic entities (save perhaps to corporate shareholders). Their sole vested interest is revenue and profit, not the public good. To give corporations the same status as sovereign states (as the TPP would in many trade instances) is a dangerous assault on the very civil institutions which enabled the United States to become so prosperous in the first place.
The much maligned Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) is receiving fresh scrutiny, this time after leaked documents seemingly highlight President Obama continued instance that any trade deal between the United States and other Pacific nations include several controversial provisions. Few provisions within the treaty have proved as damning to its passage as the "new corporate empowerment language insisted upon by the U.S. government, which would allow foreign companies to challenge laws or regulations in a privately run international court." As Zach Carter continues reporting, "[u]nder World Trade Organization treaties, this political power to contest government law is reserved for sovereign nations. The U.S. has endorsed some corporate political powers in prior trade agreements, including the North American Free Trade Agreement, but the scope of what laws can be challenged appears to be much broader in TPP negotiations."
Yet despite Obama's insistence on the inclusion of this language, so far, only Japan has joined Obama in expressing support for the measure. This leaves 10 of the 12 nations negotiating the TPP opposed to this provision. Given the disastrous fiscal implications this measure would have on the management of public heath systems in countries such as Australia and New Zealand, as well as renewed congressional criticism back here at home (fellow Kos writer Tasini has provided some great material here), it is doubtful that TPP will be adopted in its present form.
For so many reasons, this much is a relief.
Perhaps, more crucially, however, is this: The TPP represents but another attempt to undermine the democratic principles of this nation. Corporations (despite what many on the Right would have us believe), are not people. Thus, they cannot be citizens, and should not be treated as such. Further still, even if one assumes that corporations are entitled to the same constitutionally protected rights as you or I (as the Supreme Court has), corporations are largely unaccountable and undemocratic entities (save perhaps to corporate shareholders). Their sole vested interest is revenue and profit, and not the public good. To give corporations the same status as sovereign states (as the TPP would in many trade instances) is a dangerous assault on the very civil institutions which enabled the United States to become so prosperous in the first place.
To better explain my reasoning, I have included portions from a separate research project I wrote earlier in the year (hence the citations), which I believe is nonetheless useful here.
Reclaiming Civil Society: Why Nations Fail Without It
Few publications have garnered as much attention in recent years as Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson’s, Why Nations Fail (2012). In it, the authors ask what one might think is a rather simple question: namely, why are some nation’s poor and others are not? Over the years, a number of leading economists and social observers have sought to provide greater clarity to this question by advancing various theories, which among other things have identified colonialism, environmental degradation, geographical disparities, and divergent culture attitudes as possible culprits. Dissatisfied with these explanations, however, Acemoglu and Robinson began investigating this question for themselves and in the course of their research discovered a striking pattern. Notably, the authors identified a direct and cyclical causation, or what they characterize as a “strong synergy” tying the political and economic institutions of a country with its overall level of prosperity. “Extractive political institutions,” (those that are less free and less democratic), concentrate political power “in the hands of a narrow elite,” and place few constraints on their exercise of said power. Under these political regimes, economic institutions are, unsurprisingly, much more likely to be “extractive.” Conversely, so-called “inclusive political institutions” (countries that are more free and more democratic), vest power “broadly,” which in turn has the tendency of uprooting “economic institutions that expropriate the resources of the many,” for the benefit of a few (2012: 81). As Acemoglu and Robinson detail further:
“Economic growth is not just a process of more and better machines, and more and better educated people, but also a transformative and destabilizing process associated with widespread creative destruction. Growth thus moves forward only if not blocked by the economic losers who anticipate that their economic privileges will be lost and by the political losers who fear that their political power will erode (2012: 86).”
This phenomenon, according to Acemoglu and Robinson, helps to explain why many dictators and political tyrants are often so diametrically opposed to market innovations and technological advancements which could otherwise improve the overall economic conditions of the people they rule over. After all, even in the most dire economic nations (such as North Korea for instance) the political leadership enjoy rich and prosperous lives. The risk then of loosening their economic grip is perceived by many in positions of power as being too great irrespective of how lofty the potential monetary gain might be. Acemoglu and Robinson dub this the “vicious circle” as it is itself the result of “negative feedback (2012).” Predictably then, societies governed by open and democratic means experience the opposite of negative feedback.
In what Acemoglu and Robinson label the “virtuous circle,” (consequently the result of positive feedback), citizens enjoy a “more equal distribution of income (2012: 313),” broad political empowerment, and a more or less level playing field. Technological advancements and improved market innovations are much more common under inclusive institutions as not only is education encouraged, but perhaps more critically, the fruits of the economy are shared by a wider swath of the population, thus serving as a strong impediment to minority opposition with a vested interest in older, less efficient technology and means of production. Underlying Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis of inclusive and extractive political and economic institutions (and the mechanism found within) are a number of important ideas which the authors seem to take for granted. Among these ideas are the roles media and civil society (social capital) play in serving as a crucial balance and much needed check against the ever present danger of encroaching extractive regimes.
With regards to media, the authors note (however briefly) that “independent media” is more likely to “flourish” under inclusive institutions, thereby “making it easier for groups that have an interest in the continuation of inclusive institutions to become aware and organize against threats to these institutions (2012: 309) .” At the same time, Acemoglu and Robinson are careful to note:
"Free media and new communications technologies can help only on the margins, by providing information and coordinating the demands and actions of those vying for more inclusive institutions. Their help will translate into meaningful change only when a broad segment of society mobilizes and organizes in order to effect political change, and does so not for sectarian reasons or to take control of extractive institutions, but to transform extractive institutions into more inclusive ones (462).”