!50 years ago on May 8, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia commenced a two-week engagement at Spotsylvania Courthouse. Casualties at Spotsylvania were appalling even by Civil War standards: up to 18,000 Union dead, wounded, and missing; somewhere between 9-13,000 Confederates. While history regards Spotsylvania as a tactical draw, the fighting was part of an eventual decisive strategic triumph for the Union army led by Ulysses S. Grant.
Spotsylvania was the second of the four battles that comprised what is now called the Overland Campaign. Along with Spotsylvania, the Battles of the Wilderness and the North Anna were tactical draws. Cold Harbor was a clear, but not decisive, victory for the Confederates led by Robert E. Lee. Despite this, after six weeks of fighting, Grant's Army reduced the effective strength of the Confederates by half and successfully invested the Army of Northern Virginia at Petersburg.
Though nearly a year of protracted siege warfare lay ahead, the surrender of Lee's army and the fall of Richmond was largely a foregone conclusion. In the eastern theater of the Civil War, all roads now led inexorably to Appomattox.
Civil War military histories are generally studies in tactics, leadership, and individual heroism (of which there was no shortage on either side). This informed my understanding of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania as inconclusive, disconnected, and often blundering encounters famous mostly for their cost in blood. Shortly after moving to Richmond two years, I visited Petersburg National Battlefield -- the map of the Overland Campaign at one of the visitor's centers changed my thinking.
A marvel of design, the map signified the southward movement of armies from the Wilderness to Petersburg with bold arrows. Exploding yellow and pale blue emphasized the the engagements over Central Virginia's complex geography. And then there were the dates, which told a story that the historical welter of tactical details had managed to obscure: That in six weeks (May 5-June 18, 1864) Grant brought the Army of Northern Virginia to heel -- a feat that had eluded his predecessors for three years.
Above all, it showed the reality of a general who knew that he held the strategic initiative and refused to relinquish it.
Robert E. Lee began the Overland Campaign with high hopes tempered by a realistic grasp of his position. While Gettysburg had finished his army as an offensive force, he had repelled Union advances before and expected to do so again. On the other hand, Lee now faced a proven opponent with a reputation for relentlessness and tenacity. Moreover, he commanded an army that -- for all of its considerable prowess in the field -- suffered from a lack of discipline and down-level leadership.
(When Lee assumed command in 1862, he thought that only Stonewall Jackson and James Longstreet had the capacity to command a corps. Jackson was now dead, and no one had emerged as his equal. Moreover, the South had not developed the skills of its generals as the North had. By 1864, Union general officers were arguably superior to their Confederate counterparts.)
Moreover, Lee's vaunted audacity may have worked against him in the Overland battles. While the valor of his men fought a larger army to a tactical standstill, Lee's insistence on continuous engagement played into Grant's hands and contributed to the decimation of his army. Worse, on May 6, Longstreet was severely wounded directing a successful counterattack on the second day of the Wilderness (Winfield Scott Hancock later told Longstreet that "you rolled me up like a wet blanket.")
On the other hand, as Lee's strategic position worsened, its hard to imagine what he might have done differently. In the end, Lee had no viable response in the face of an adversary who knew and trusted his advantages.
The Overland Campaign campaign represents a triumph of strategy over tactics. Although the losses on both sides were horrific, one wonders how much less blood would have been spilled had George McClellan been able to combine his logistical skills with Grant's strategic understanding and willingness to fight. What historian Drew Gilpin Faust calls This Republic of Suffering might never have come to pass.
Sources:
Faust, This Republic of Suffering
Glatthaar, General Lee's Army
Glatthaar, Partners In Command
Stoker, The Grand Design
Personal visits to the National Battlefields at Cold Harbor, Petersburg, Spotsylvania Court House, and the Wilderness