United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued September 24, 2013 Decided November 1, 2013
No. 13-5069
FRANCIS A. GILARDI, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:13-cv-00104)
Pro se
Amicus curiae
per estelle v gambrill
Claim the right to redress grievance
and rule 46 ERROR of the Court
Failure to uphold stare decisis
IV
The query is simple: do corporations enjoy the shelter of
the Free Exercise Clause?
No!
Dec 1862 act W.V. Cssr. VI . -An Act for the Admission of State of West Viginia" into the Union, Dec. 31,1882. {the effect of which puts the Constitution under Art 6 of the U.S. Constitution }
{{to wit:: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding}}
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
All men are, by nature, equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society,
they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest
their posterity, namely: The enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
means of acquiring and possessing property, and of pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety
{natural persons have rights Governments and Corporations are only Endowed with certain authorities and powers and these are nowhere near a right!}
1914 Northern Securities
By MR. JUSTICE BREWER concurring with Majority
A corporation, while by fiction of law recognized for some purposes as a person and for purposes of jurisdiction as a citizen, is not endowed with the inalienable rights of a natural person, but it is an artificial person, created and existing only for the convenient transaction of business.
in a republican government nothing
can be more impolitic
than to give to wealth superior encouragement,
and facility in obtaining office.
Story, Joseph A. Familiar Exposition of the Constitution
A.J. of the SUPREME COURT W/ C.J. Marshall
1st amendment ban Amendment 1 - . Ratified 12/15/1791.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof;
the law does not respect and establishment of religion nor does it prohibit the free exercise thereof
The plaintiff is acting under color of law in violation of title 42 sec 1983
page 12
Citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
this citation show the gross incompetence or willful neglect of both this court and the Supreme Courts Majority, and the total lack of impartiality {in adhering the the policies practices and principles of the Republican party
((Mon 28, 2013
Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.)
“"I want to see that quote. Where'd he say that?" Sessions asked, jumping out of an elevator he'd just hopped into. When HuffPost cited the April 5 report,
Sessions grumbled about Roberts not being a real Republican.
"He's always advocating the court. He wants pay raises for staff," he said. "Otherwise, he's supposed to be conservative."”))
By rule 46 this motion shows the errors of the court and I only have a high school diploma.
Ya all bunch of idiots and have destroyed you own good behavior.
P.S. To save you from further embarrassment I have stopped at page 12 of your ruling.
If forced to defend myself from a contempt of court change your gonna wish the spanking came from your mom.
Circuit Judge BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge RANDOLPH
Addendum
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4).
‘‘SEC. 2713. COVERAGE OF PREVENTIVE HEALTH SERVICES.
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a health insurance
issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall,
at a minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose any
cost sharing requirements for—
‘‘(1) evidence-based items or services that have in effect
a rating of ‘A’ or ‘B’ in the current recommendations of the
United States Preventive Services Task Force;
‘‘(2) immunizations that have in effect a recommendation
from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention with respect
to the individual involved; and
‘‘(3) with respect to infants, children, and adolescents, evidence-
informed preventive care and screenings provided for
in the comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health
Resources and Services Administration.
‘‘(4) with respect to women, such additional preventive
care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided
for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health
Resources and Services Administration for purposes of this
paragraph.
‘‘(5) for the purposes of this Act, and for the purposes
of any other provision of law, the current recommendations
of the United States Preventive Service Task Force regarding
breast cancer screening, mammography, and prevention shall
be considered the most current other than those issued in
or around November 2009.
There is an appeal to this simple reasoning; after all, the free-exercise
and free-speech rights are enshrined in the same constitutional provision,
separated only by a semicolon.
I am at a loss that you went there!
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.
Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.
Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.
The court
From (No. 1:13-cv-00104) pdf page 12
But we must be mindful that Citizens United represents the culmination of decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizing that all corporations speak. A1
WHILE ignoring the 99 YR OLD Supreme Court Ruling in 1904
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904)
HARLAN, BROWN, McKENNA and DAY, BREWER for the Majority
“The constitutional guarantee of liberty of contract does not prevent Congress from prescribing the rule of free competition for those engaged in interstate and international commerce.”
If, in the judgment of Congress, the public convenience or the general welfare will be best subserved when the natural laws of competition are left undisturbed by those engaged in interstate commerce, that must be, for all, the end of the matter if this is to remain a government of laws, and not of men.
Congress in the PPACA said to cover this matter.
U.S. Supreme Court GERMAN ALLIANCE INS. CO. v. LEWIS, 233 U.S. 389 (1914)
Whether the enactment is wise or unwise,
whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result,
whether, in short, the legislative discretion
within its prescribed limits should be exercised
in a particular manner,
are matters for the judgment of the legislature,
AND THE EARNEST CONFLICT OF SERIOUS OPINION
DOES NOT SUFFICE TO BRING THEM WITHIN
THE RANGE OF JUDICIAL COGNIZANCE.'
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire,
219 U.S. 540, 569
Viewed in that light, the act, if within the powers of Congress, must be respected; for, by the explicit words of the Constitution, that instrument and the laws enacted by Congress in pursuance of its provisions are the supreme law of the land, "anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding" -- supreme over the States, over the courts, and even over the people of the United States, the source of all power under our governmental system in respect of the objects for which the National Government was ordained. An act of Congress constitutionally passed under its power to regulate commerce among the States and with foreign nations is binding upon all; as much so as if it were embodied, in terms, in the Constitution itself. Every judicial officer, whether of a national or a state court, is under the obligation of an oath so to regard a lawful enactment of Congress. Not even a State, still less one of its artificial creatures, can stand in the way of its enforcement.
Page 14
Admittedly, there is a certain theological congruence to Townley’s characterization. The Bible says “faith without works is dead.” James 2:26 (King James). As amici point out, not only are Catholic employers morally responsible for the management of their companies, “instructing or encouraging someone else to commit a wrongful act is itself a grave moral wrong—i.e., ‘scandal’—under Catholic
doctrine.” Br. of Catholic Theologians at 3. A2
Thus, amici reason, “the Mandate thrusts Catholic employers into a ‘perfect storm’ of moral complicity in the forbidden actions.” Br. of Catholic Theologians at 5; see also Br. of the Archdiocese of Cincinnati at 16–17 nn. 6, 7. When even attenuated participation may be construed as a sin, see, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 n.12 (1982), it is not for courts to decide that the corporate veil severs the owner’s moral responsibility
page 18
Equally uncontroverted is the nature of the Gilardis’ religious exercise: they operate their corporate enterprises in accordance with the tenets of their Catholic faith.
Are you kidding me!!!!OKAY YA ASKED FOR IT!!!!
Title 42 sec 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,
except that in any action brought against a judicial officer
for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
BY JESUS
MATTHEW 5:25 Agree with thine adversary quickly,
whiles thou art in the way with him;
lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge,
and the judge deliver thee to the officer,
and thou be cast into prison.
26 Verily I say unto thee,
Thou shalt by no means come out thence,
till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing
ROMANS 14: 2 For one believeth that he may eat all things: another, who is weak, eateth herbs.
3 Let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not; and let not him which eateth not judge him that eateth: for God hath received him.
13 Let us not therefore judge one another any more: but judge this rather, that no man put a stumblingblock or an occasion to fall in his brother’s way.
14 I know, and am persuaded by the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself: but to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean.
15 But if thy brother be grieved with thy meat, now walkest thou not charitably. Destroy not him with thy meat, for whom Christ died.
A3
Page 18
In other words, the Gilardis are burdened
when they are pressured to choose between violating their
religious beliefs in managing their selected plan or paying
onerous penalties. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717–18;
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972)
the court swallowed this hook line and sinker
The Framers of the Constitution clearly embraced the philosophical insight that government coercion of moral agency is odious. Penalties are impertinent, according to Locke, if they are used to compel men
“to quit the light of their own reason, and oppose the dictates of their own consciences.”
JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 13–14 (J. Brook ed., 1792) (1689).
YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE GONE TO LOCKE AND TAKEN HIM
COMPLETELY OUT OF CONTEXT!!!
before I reply with Locke I remind the Court of “the people versus LARRY FLINT”
For there being but one truth, one way to heaven,
what hope is there that more men would be led into
it if they had no rule but the religion of the court
and were put under the necessity
“to quit the light of their own reason, and oppose the dictates of their own consciences,”
and blindly to resign themselves up to the will
of their governors and to the religion
which either ignorance, ambition, or superstition
had chanced to establish in the countries where they were born?
Locke, John
my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection; from which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no man is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1. Sect. 6.
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions:
the taking away false foundations is not to the prejudice
but advantage of truth,
which is never injured or endangered so much as when mixed with, or built on, falsehood.
Locke, John The Work of John Locke
A4
From thence sprang the idea that the right to free exercise necessarily prohibits the government from “compel[ling] a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE VIRGINIA ACT FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
(1786).
I know this of Jefferson without having to look it up;
CERTAIN CHURCHES WERE GETTING PUBLIC MONIES FOR SUPPORT.
pg 19/20
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), put it well: “Government may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, nor penalize or discriminate against individuals
because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities.” Id. at 402 (citations omitted).
Again obscenity laws!!!!
The contraceptive mandate demands that owners like the Gilardis meaningfully approve and endorse the inclusion of contraceptive coverage in their companies’ employer provided plans, over whatever objections they may have.
‘‘(2) PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY EDUCATION PROGRAMS.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—In this section, the term ‘personal responsibility education program’ means a program that is designed to educate adolescents on— ‘‘(i) both abstinence and contraception for the prevention of pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS, consistent with the
requirements of subparagraph (B); and ‘‘(ii) at least 3 of the adulthood preparation subjects described in subparagraph (C).
‘‘(B) REQUIREMENTS.—The requirements of this subparagraph are the following:
‘‘(i) The program replicates evidence-based effective programs or substantially incorporates elements of effective programs that have been proven on the basis of rigorous scientific research to change behavior, which means delaying sexual activity, increasing condom or contraceptive use for sexually active youth, or reducing pregnancy among youth
THE WORD CONTRACEPTIVE APPEARS ONLY ONCE IN THE PPACA
on page 124 stat. 349 {contraceptive(s) appears 45 times in ruling!!!(false and misleading apply)}
Contraception appears 3 times on page 124 stat. 349 and once on page 124 stat. 350
search for Birth Control returned no results in the law
{contraception appears 29 times in the ruling (fire in a crowed theater applies)}
http://www.nytimes.com/...
Pope Francis told the interviewer, a fellow Jesuit: “It is not necessary to talk about these issues all the time. The dogmatic and moral teachings of the church are not all equivalent. The church’s pastoral ministry cannot be obsessed with the transmission of a disjointed multitude of doctrines to be imposed insistently.
“We have to find a new balance,” the pope continued, “otherwise even the moral edifice of the church is likely to fall like a house of cards, losing the freshness and fragrance of the Gospel.”
they are not even obeying the head of the catholic church!!! A5
page 20
True, it is an elementary principle of corporate law that “incorporation’s basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the
natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs.” Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001). And as part of that fiction, shareholders forgo certain rights pertaining to the corporation. See Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 858 (7th Cir. 2013)
see 1914 Northern Securities
By MR. JUSTICE BREWER concurring with Majority
A corporation, while by fiction... this Amicus.
Also that the individual can not grant to the corporation that which it does not have.
So this “different from those of the natural individuals who created it,” FAILS
And as the government must remain in the frame of the Constitution;
so must the Corporation remain within it's charter.
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:
Why limit the free-exercise right to religious organizations when many business corporations adhere to religious dogma?
See Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious
Liberty for Money-Makers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV.
(manuscript at 11-24) (forthcoming fall 2013)If non-religious organizations do not have free-exercise rights, why do non-religious natural persons (athiests, for example) possess them?
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 & n.11 (1961).
A similar result was reached in Paul v. Virginia,[153] but by a different course of reasoning. The Court there held that a corporation--in this instance, an insurance company--was "the mere creation of local law" and could "have no legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty"[154] which created it; even recognition of its existence by other States rested exclusively in their discretion. More recent cases have held that this discretion is qualified by other provisions of the Constitution, notably the commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.[155]
In the case of the Brigantine William Judge Davis answered: "It will be admitted that partial prohibitions are authorized by this expression; and how shall the degree, or extent, of the prohibition be adjusted, but by the discretion of the National Government, to whom the subject appears to have been committed? * * * The power to regulate commerce is not to be confined to the adoption of measures, exclusively beneficial to commerce itself, or tending to its advancement; but, in our national system, as in all modern sovereignties, it is also to be considered as an instrument for other purposes of general policy and interest. * * * the national right, or power, under the Constitution, to adapt regulations of commerce to other purposes, than the mere advancement of commerce, appears to be unquestionable. * * * A6
“Nor in fact, the argument continued, does it make any difference, by approved principles of statutory construction, what purposes the framers of the Constitution may have immediately in mind when they gave Congress power to regulate commerce among the States;”
the governing consideration is that they gave Congress the power, to be exercised in accordance with its judgment of what are proper occasions for its use. "The reasons which may have caused the framers of the Constitution to repose the power to regulate interstate commerce in Congress do not, however, affect or limit the extent of the power itself."
Justice Peckham for the Court
in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 228 (1899).
References
See especially the arguments of counsel In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892); Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); 3 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law, 103, 138, 165, 295, 314, 336. Indeed, regulation of interstate commerce by Congress may take the form of a positive adoption by it of a regime of State regulation in the form of statutes (e.g., pilotage) or of administrative regulations in some degree (as in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935); or Congress may "regulate" through the device of divestment of a subject matter of its interstate character, thus indirectly causing State laws to apply, as was done by the Wilson Act of 1890 in respect to intoxicating liquors, or by the McCarran Act of 1945 following the United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), in respect to the insurance business.
The State Freight tax case
[539] Headnotes. Said the Court: "The rule has been asserted with great clearness, that whenever the subjects over which a power to regulate commerce is asserted are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.
Surely transportation of passengers or merchandise through a State, or from one State to another, is of this nature. It is of national importance that over that subject there should be but one regulating power, for if one State can directly tax persons or property passing through it, or tax them indirectly by levying a tax upon their transportation, every other may, and thus commercial intercourse between States remote from each other may be destroyed." 15 Wall. at 279-280, citing Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851); Gilman. v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 (1866); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 42 (1868). The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation Annotations of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 30, 1952
Edward S. Corwin. A7
Quite different is it with the distinction pointed out in the cases between the franchises and privileges which a corporation derives from its charter and the rights of property and contract which accrue to it in the course of its existence. Even the outright repeal of the former does not wipe out the latter or cause them to escheat to the State. The primary heirs of the defunct organization are its creditors; but whatever of value remains after their valid claims are met goes to the former shareholders. [1653] By the earlier weight of authority, on the other hand, persons who contract with companies whose charters are subject to legislative amendment or repeal do so at their own risk: any "such contracts made between individuals and the corporation do not vary or in any manner change or modify the relation between the State and the corporation in respect to the right of the State to alter, modify, or amend such a charter, *" [1654] But later holdings becloud this rule. [1655]
Corporations As Persons Subject To The Law.—But suppose the State neglects to reserve the right to amend, alter, or repeal—is it, then, without power to control its corporate creatures?
By no means. Private corporations, like other private persons, are always presumed to be subject to the legislative power of the State; from which it follows that immunities conferred by charter are to be treated as exceptions to an otherwise controlling rule.
This principle was recognized by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Providence Bank v. Billings, [1656] in which he held that in the absence of express stipulation or reasonable implication to the contrary in its charter, the bank was subject to the taxing power of the State, notwithstanding that the power to tax is the power to destroy.
Corporations and the Police Power.—And of course the same principle is equally applicable to the exercise by the State of its police powers. Thus, in what was perhaps the leading case before the Civil War, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the legislature of that State had the right, in furtherance of the public safety, to require chartered companies operating railways to fence in their tracks and provide cattle yards. In a matter of this nature, said the Court, corporations are on a level with individuals engaged in the same business, unless, from their charter, they can prove the contrary. [1657]
[1653] Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304 (1853); Shields v. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319 (1877); Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Co., 105 U.S. 13 (1882); Adirondack R. Co. v. New York, 176 U.S. 335 (1900); Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1900); Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491 (1915); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932).
A8
cont'd
[1654] Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 190, 218 (1872). See also Calder v. Michigan, 218 U.S. 591 (1910).
[1655] Lakeshore & M.S.R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 690 (1899); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932). Both these decisions cite Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Co., 105 U.S. 13, 17 (1882), but without apparent justification.
[1656] 4 Pet. 514 (1830).
[1657] Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 140 (1854).
The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation Annotations of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 30, 1952
Edward S. Corwin.
Another decision marking a clear departure from the logic of Collector v. Day was Flint v. Stone Tracy Company, [233] where the Court sustained an act of Congress taxing the privilege of doing business as a corporation, the tax being measured by the income. The argument that the tax imposed an unconstitutional burden on the exercise by a State of its reserved power to create corporate franchises was rejected, partly in consideration of the principle of national supremacy, and partly on the ground that the corporate franchises were private property.
[233] 220 U.S. 107 (1911). Corwin ibid
THE McCARRAN ACT: REGULATION OF INSURANCE
Less than a year after the ruling in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association [764] that insurance transactions across State lines constituted interstate commerce, thereby logically establishing their immunity from discriminatory State taxation,
Congress passed the McCarran Act [765] authorizing State regulation and taxation of the insurance business; and in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, [766] a statute of South Carolina which imposed on foreign insurance companies, as a condition of their doing business in the State, an annual tax of three per cent of premiums from business done in South Carolina, while imposing no similar tax on local corporations, was sustained. "Obviously," said Justice Rutledge for the Court, "Congress' purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and future State systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance.
A9
This was done in two ways.
One was by removing obstructions which might be thought to flow from its own power, whether dormant or exercised, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act itself or in future legislation. The other was by declaring expressly and affirmatively that continued State regulation and taxation of this business is in the public interest and that the business and all who engage in it 'shall be subject to' the laws of the several States in these respects. *
The power of Congress over commerce exercised entirely without reference to coordinated action of the States is not restricted, except as the Constitution expressly provides, by any limitation which forbids it to discriminate against interstate commerce and in favor of local trade. Its plenary scope enables Congress not only to promote but also to prohibit interstate commerce, as it has done frequently and for a great variety of reasons. * This broad authority Congress may exercise alone, subject to those limitations, or in conjunction with coordinated action by the States, in which case limitations imposed for the preservation of their powers become inoperative and only those designed to forbid action altogether by any power or combination of powers in our governmental system remain effective." [767] The generality of this language enforces again the sweeping nature of Congress's power to prohibit interstate commerce. [768]
[764] 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
[765] 59 Stat. 33 (1945).
[766] 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
[767] Ibid. 429-430, 434-435.
[768] See pp. 163-172.
Corwin ibid
"COMMERCE" TODAY
Later in his opinion Marshall qualified the word "intercourse" with the word "commercial." [310] Today "commerce" in the sense of the Constitution, and hence "interstate commerce" when it is carried on across State lines, covers every species of movement of persons and things, whether for profit or not; [311] every species of communication, every species of transmission of intelligence, whether for commercial purposes or otherwise; [312] every species of commercial negotiation which, as shown "by the established course of the business," will involve sooner or later an act of transportation of persons or things, or the flow of services or power across State lines. [313] From time to time the Court has said that certain things were not interstate commerce, such as mining or manufacturing undertaken
sent to meritsbriefs@supremecourt.gov ATT C.J., aclu@aclu-md.org, askdoj@usdoj.gov ATT A.G,
ECFHelp@cadc.uscourts.gov with excerpt to President Obama at White house.gov