The news has seen a good deal of speculation and hand-wringing regarding the ongoing crisis in the Ukraine. The destruction of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, apparently by the pro-Russian militants in the Donbass (as discussed at length here, and here, and here) reignited interest in a region that had rather fallen off the radar for the last few months since the Russian annexation of Crimea. Subsequent efforts by the Ukrainian military to re-exert control over the region, the efforts by German Chancellor Angela Merkel to broker some sort of truce, and the ongoing conflict over what Russia claims to be a humanitarian convoy and permeable border with the Ukraine, had kept the crisis in the news, if only as something of a half forgotten sibling of the much more frequently discussed crises in the Middle East. And now, today, I woke to find Russia had invaded the Ukraine outright, as noted here by Timaeus.
But, as the title of the diary suggests, I'm not writing here to discuss the situation in Ukraine, though it is what inspired me to write with regard to the topic I've decided to address here. Rather, I'm far more interested in Russo-American relations in general, rather than this latest round of conflict. Various news columns have been published within the last month in which the authors, full of dark foreboding, have expressed their fear that these events herald the beginning of a new Cold War, even as the President struggles to present the conflict as local and temporary (as you might find here, here, and here). Roger Cohen, writing over at The Atlantic, even penned a column regarding a hypothetical Third World War, inspired – presumably – as much by the recent contests in the Middle East and between Russia and the Ukraine as by the centenary commemorations of the First World War taking place this year. But, though some of this may appear a bit histrionic the fear underlying it all is quite real – August 3rd saw Igor Ivanov and Malcom Rifkind, the former foreign ministers of Russia and the United Kingdom, respectively, and men who presumably know what they’re talking about, publishing an op-ed in the pages of the New York Times entitled “The Risk of a New Cold War.”
But to suggest we are at risk of stumbling into a new Cold War is naïve. Not because it can’t happen but because it has already happened. Indeed, the most puzzling aspect of the last few weeks hasn’t been the ineptitude with which the Russian government has attempted to manage the fallout from the destruction of Flight 17 by a Russian missile battery or it’s somehow even less impressive efforts to hide its cross-border support of the “People’s Republics” operating out of Donetsk and Luhansk, or even the rather rapid collapse of organized resistance by the rebels, some of whom, we are told, are supposed to have trained in Russia (as reported by Reuters and The Guardian).
Rather, the most puzzling aspect of the last few weeks has been the commentary suggesting that this represents such a dramatic new low in relations between Russia and the United States along with its European allies that we risk touching off a new Cold War. David Remnick noted as an aside in a recent article for The New Yorker, that relations between the US and Russia were, at the start of Ambassador Michael McFaul’s 2011 tenure, “hardly amorous [though] a businesslike atmosphere usually prevailed.” But, this is an overgenerous sentiment and, if we’re to be honest, relations between the US and Russia have been generally miserable since 1991, and had deteriorated over the latter half of the 2000s such that they were essentially hostile by 2011. Please, join me below the fold for my admittedly non-expert opinion on where things were, where things are, and where they might be headed in the world of Russian-American relations.
I.
Relations in the 90s were marked by America’s ascendancy to temporary hyperpower status; support for Yeltsin’s coup of ’93, Yeltsin being a man who was polling in the single digits by 1996 with the Russian public and managed little better in ’93; and constant expressions of outrage by the Russian government and people over American-led intervention in Yugoslavia, a country Russia had long considered to be part of its own sphere of influence.
The early 2000s were little better, being marked by the US intervention in Iraq, which Russia vociferously opposed, and the beginning of still ongoing efforts (as detailed here and here) by the US to stabilize the region and gain access to the oil, natural gas, and mineral reserves of the various Central Asian states, which sit right in Russia’s backyard. [Incidentally, with the unveiling of the “New Silk Road” initiative by then-Secretary of State Clinton in 2011, US policymakers have also indicated their desire to direct Central Asian trade south towards Pakistan and India and away from Russia and China.] The first half of the 2000s also witnessed the eastward expansion of NATO and the EU and gave rise to the palpable sense in the halls of the Kremlin that parts of Russia’s sphere of influence were simply falling away. Indeed, a sort of Dolchstoßlegende (stab-in-the-back myth) seems to have developed around the steady eastward grind of NATO and the EU within Russia and Russians, to this day, feel like their government was duped in 1990 when it was at its weakest. The 2002 unilateral US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the subsequent proposal by the Bush Administration in 2006 proposed plan to check the threat of Iranian ICBMs via the installation of missile batteries in Poland and the Czech Republic alarmed Russian officials, who saw the move as an effort to further militarize NATO’s newest, nearest members (as discussed here and here).
If, however, ’91-’06 was marked by US provocation of Russia, intentional or otherwise, the years since 2006 have been years in which the US has reapt the whirlwind. The occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the summer of 2008 was complemented by Russian naval maneuvers with the Venezuelan fleet in December that same year. These maneuvers have, in turn, recently been followed up upon by something of a charm offensive on the part of the Russians, which began shortly after the collapse of Yanukovych’s government in Ukraine, the offensive being designed to ensure basing rights in multiple states worldwide including Venezuela and Cuba.
Since 2011, pundits and analysts have worried over Russian efforts to prop up the Assad regime, a major arms buyer, and secure their naval base at Tartus. Since 2012 there have been increasing concerns over Russian violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987. Last year, the Russian government granted Edward Snowden a recently extended asylum, a blow to relations between both states regardless of what you think of Snowden himself. And right now, we are confronting the fallout from Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support for the “Donetsk People’s Republic.”
And this ignores the “minor” incidents which have littered the last few years. Two years ago, Russia objected to the new NATO missile defense plan put forward by the Obama administration, with the Chief of the Russian General Staff threatening pre-emptive strikes on any missile defense sites that might be constructed in Poland. The year following, Putin suggested that expansion of the NATO missile shield in Eastern Europe would be met by the installation of Russian missile batteries in Kaliningrad.
In August of 2012 an Akula-class submarine was discovered to have been patrolling in the Gulf of Mexico, but only after the vessel had completed its patrol and left the area. A month earlier, Russian bombers were intercepted in the air defense zone off Alaska in July and now routinely skirt the edge of US airspace, penetrating the air defense zone around Alaska, though not the territorial waters around Alaska itself, at least 16 times in the last month. This, in addition to an incident in the last month where Russian bombers advanced to within 50 miles of the California coast, a follow-up effort at saber-rattling after 2013 saw two potentially nuclear-armed Russian bombers circle Guam only a few hours before the State of the Union Address.
II.
True, there have been some bright spots – the 90s were marked by US aid to the Yeltsin government, and by Russian co-operation with the US and the West, assenting to the terms of START II in 1996, joining the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the G8 in 1997. The US and Russia signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2003, and the 2000s were generally marked by US and Russian co-operation in anti-terrorism operations – both states possessing a vested interest in stamping down Islamic terrorists. Indeed, Russia is still supportive of the US mission in Afghanistan, fearing that any subsequent civil war would see terrorist organizations spilling out of the country like a ruptured beanbag. Russia offered to support the US mission to Afghanistan after 9/11 in 2001, opening a hospital there in December that same year (as discussed here and here) and, since 2002, Russia and NATO have maintained a standing cooperative council, though NATO unilaterally suspended operation of the organization on March 31st. 2009 saw Obama begin his, at the time, much vaunted initiative to “reset” relations with Russia in 2009, which resulted in the ratification of the 2009 new START treaty. And, most recently, 2011 saw then-President Medvedev approve NATO intervention in Libya in the UN Security Council. And even as late as last week the Russian government made clear that the US and Russia would, despite the current state of relations, continue to cooperate in space.
But these momentary instances of cooperation prove nothing. The US and the USSR had détente during the Cold War, but their interests weren’t any less opposed to one another’s for the occasional instance of cooperation. Still, 2014 has proven very different from 1991 and it would be foolish to deny that American-Russian relations are different than American-Soviet relations used to be. The question is how are they different? And do those differences somehow preclude the development of a new Cold War?
At this particular moment there would appear to be two major differences between 1991 and the present that preclude the start of a new Cold War. These are as follows:
1) Russia lacks the economic base and military strength to challenge the US and the West, relying mostly on European energy dependence and self-imposed economic woes and American war-weariness to make gains in a style that makes one feel that Putin could come out in favor of annexing the Sudetenland any moment now. According to the World Bank, The USSR spent 23% of its annual GDP on its armed forces in 1989. Russia, meanwhile spent 4% in 2013. (For comparison the US spent 3.8% in 2013 and 4.6% beforehand, though 3.8% amounts to $640 billion US, as compared to the Russian military budget, which amounts to approximately $87.8 billion US.) Furthermore, the Russian economy is now intertwined with the global economy and dependent on the export of raw materials – oil and gas constituting almost two-thirds of all exports. Indeed, Russian government budgets of the last several years have relied upon oil revenues in order to remain balanced and, as this Reuters article notes, every dollar decrease in the price per barrel will shave an average of $1.4 billion off of the Russian state budget. All this means the Russian economy is capable of rapid growth but only so long as demand for oil is high, or supply low. This economic dependence upon a single class of product ensures that the Russian economy is ultimately just as capable of rapid contraction as it is of rapid growth. During the 2008 financial crisis Russian exports dropped by 166.2 billion dollars or, approximately one third, whilst the national GDP contracted by 7.8%, more than 5% faster than the global average, and industrial output fell by approximately 17%, though these losses in productivity were quickly reversed. In short, Russia cannot, for the foreseeable future, buck global norms, at least not on a major scale and in an overt fashion – its military is too weak, it’s economy too fragile.
2) Russia lacks a strong, universal ideological message like communism to challenge the United States with on a global scale. As Remnick’s recent New Yorker article notes Putin has cultivated an extremely nationalist strain of thought and rhetoric amongst the Russian people and, perhaps, even believes his own hype, if events in Ukraine and the Russian Far East are to be considered. But a revanchist message aimed at Russians can only ever appeal to Russians. Russia may still oppose the US but it can’t seriously claim to oppose capitalism, even if Putin has sidelined the oligarchs who dominated during the Yeltsin era and replaced them with his own patrimonial clients. Russia is obviously resistant to perceived Western economic hegemony and, arguably, to perceived Western cultural hegemony, despite the McDonald’s on Red Square (though those are now being harassed as well), but it’s difficult to see how, without some alternative ideological formula, one might turn resisting the United States and its allies into a viable and attractive ideology in and of itself. After all, you can’t fight capitalism with capitalism – world governments don’t strive to replace one economic hegemon with another and playing world powers off against one another is always a risky proposition. Nor can Russia really afford to project itself, and its conspicuous non-ideology on the global stage, the occasional Venezuelan venture excepted – not when the entire national budget amounts to roughly 1.27 trillion rubles, or $412 billion dollars.
III.
The problem, however, is that Russian opposition to the US is rooted in geopolitical fears – fears that don’t cease to exist as a consequence of statistical or ideological concerns. Putin’s position today feels not entirely dissimilar to that of Thatcher at the start of the 1990s. Putin fears a united Europe, particularly one that seems to find itself increasingly in thrall to Germany. To quote Geoffrey Howe’s resignation speech before Parliament in November of 1990 (the full video of which is available on Vimeo) Putin, like Thatcher, sees Europe as, “a static entity, to be resisted, instead of an active process, to be shaped.” In short, Putin does not believe that his interests, or those of Russia, lie with a united Europe or with membership in the same. To Putin, Russia is a great nation and joining a united Europe would compel him to surrender some measure of the nation’s sovereignty and place the country in a metaphorical straightjacket.
Russia would rather contend with equals and forge its own path in a struggle to break the perceived dominion of the West over world affairs. This is why, since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the old Sino-Soviet split, always an unnatural ideological divide, has slowly managed to heal over, resulting in the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and more recent movement, such as the June 6th announcement of a $400 billion deal by which Russia agreed to export natural gas to China. To draw another European parallel, the situation for Russia and China is not unlike that faced by Germany in 1914: relatively new great powers on the world stage attempting to place themselves at the center of an international order already dominated by someone else – Great Britain in 1914 and the United States in 2014.
Now, to be fair, Sino-Russian relations are far from perfect, both countries being united by what they both perceive as common geopolitical obstacles, such as the United States, rather than by common geopolitical goals – Russia being focused on European affairs, China on Southeast Asia, and both expressing common aims only in their desire to develop the economies and exploit the material resources of Central Asia. As such, no one would seriously argue that China would go to bat for Russia over Donetsk or Russia over the Diayou/Senkaku Islands for China. Nor are China and Russia particularly anxious for a fight with the United States and its European partners. After all, roughly 50% of all Russian exports are destined for Europe. And 20% of Chinese exports are destined for the United States, with roughly another 25% destined for Europe. Russia and its natural allies can only afford so much in the way of sanctions. Indeed, we’ve seen evidence enough of that already with Putin’s perplexing decision to attempt to damage Western agriculture by banning food imports from the EU and the US at a time when roughly 40% of all food consumed in Russia is imported. Processed meat is up 6% in Moscow, pork and chicken up by roughly 25% apiece in St. Petersburg. Particularly worrisome, at least from a Russian perspective, is the apparent speed with which prices have risen in the Russian Far East, with fish going up by 40% in Primorye. Admittedly, the United States and its European allies can only afford to impose so much in the way of sanctions, but they appear to be able, or at least of the opinion that they will be able, to weather a trade war better than Russia, and careful observation tends to suggest that opinion is justified.
IV.
So, are we in the midst of a new Cold War? Even if Russia lacks the resources to engage the US on a global scale its interest largely run counter to those of the United States. If this is the only criteria to classify a conflict as a “Cold War” then, yes, the Cold War has begun anew. If we consider the changes which have taken place since 1991, however, and the resources at the disposal of Russia, we realize very quickly that this is not our father’s Cold War. Unlike the Cold War of Kennan, Kennedy, Nixon, and Reagan, this is not a contest of ideologies, it is not a global contest, and, despite flashpoints like the Ukraine, and a return to missile-based brinksmanship, it is not liable to long-term escalation. This is a conflict confined to Eurasia between powers that have grown to possess deep economic ties not easily severed – Putin’s recent decision to ban agricultural imports and Western sanctions against Russia notwithstanding.
Marx once wrote that, “History repeats itself – the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.” In this case, it seems safe to conclude, based on the available evidence, that we are now witnessing the opening moves of a new, farcical Cold War. It’s not funny. In fact, it’s deadly serious. But, at the risk of romanticizing a very dangerous and terrifying time in human history, this new Cold War is far less impressive than its predecessor – the equivalent of a bar fight between two barely-conscious drunks just after last call as compared to the Ali-Frazier match that was the first Cold War.
V.
So, where do we go from here? What are the moves Russia and America shall make in the opening to this new Great Game? To be frank, I have no idea as to how things will proceed moving forward. The situation in Ukraine can still blow up in everyone's faces, as Putin has now essentially invaded the country, but unless he aims his tanks at Kiev, which seems improbable given the fact that his actions have all been predicated on the argument that he is protecting the ethnically Russian population within the Ukraine, a population which lies largely in the country's east, it seems unlikely he will face anything except more sanctions. European governments, and the government of the United States, playing the part of Neville Chamberlin in this particular piece, are both entirely willing to trade chunks of Ukraine away for the promise of peace in our time, or at least peace for their constituents.
Right now, Russia has two major concerns: the relatively rapid encroachment on its European border by the West, in the form of NATO and the EU, and a lack of resources and power with which to confront the problem. Putin has thrown a lot of cards on the table in order to keep Ukraine friendly, or at least neutral, and it seems, for the moment, that Merkel and the Germans, and thus, by extension, the EU, are willing to deal. No one is in the mood to jeopardize long-term access to Russian oil supplies by starting a war. The majority of the Eurozone economies show growth and unemployment rates that range between unfunny joke and tragicomedy (with projections for 2014 and beyond contained here, in the statistical tables appended to a press release by the European Commission in late February). Any political party which deepened that crisis by reducing oil supplies and dragging their country into war with Russia would be hounded out of every office in the land.
But this isn’t a viable long-term strategy for Russia and the Russians know it. Renewable energy is on the rise in Europe, already constituting 14% of the total electrical supply for the EU, and economic forecasts, while gloomy, still predict growth, however anemic. Oil and natural gas supplies can only be used to squeeze Europe for so long before the dependence vanishes, along with the need to negotiate. Therefore, Russia must look to grow and diversify its economy. Medvedev attempted to address this in 2009 with the announcement of the “Go Russia!” modernization program, aimed at developing profitable high-technology industries in Russia – nuclear power, telecommunications, information technology, and pharmaceuticals. This was good and wise but insufficient, for three reasons:
1) Russia has little difficulty nursing these industries to health at home – inasmuch as it can throw up protective trade barriers to put foreign products at a disadvantage and give domestic production breathing room – but, even under the best of circumstances, it would be difficult for these firms to break into Russia’s primary export markets right now. The majority of Russian exports right now are destined for Europe and Europe already has well-established and extremely powerful high-tech firms entrenched in the economic landscape. And for the foreseeable future the European Union will continue to impose increasingly tough rounds of sanctions on Russia for its intervention in Crimea and the Donbass.
2) Because post-industrial economies are overrated. It behooves any government concerned about the security of the nation to maintain a reasonably large manufacturing sector. It has uses in wartime and keeps the economy diverse and flexible in peacetime. Trying to skip straight from an economic system which results in 39% of all exports consisting of crude oil to global high-tech juggernaut isn’t realistic and would leave the Russian economic landscape deficient.
3) Because there is no sign that Putin is in a position to support Medvedev’s program of economic modernization. Putin’s program in the early 2000s which ousted the oligarchs of the 90s did not end oligarchy in Russia. Instead, Putin replaced the unreliable oligarchs who had attempted to dominate Yeltsin, and thus the Russian state, with numerous siloviki, politicians and businessmen from the armed forces and security services. These men, who, incidentally, likely formed a locus of resistance to Medvedev’s modernization program during his time in office, are from a world Putin is familiar with and understands and they have proven more than happy keep the country stable and to take their marching orders from the Kremlin so long as they get a slice of the action. Putin, therefore, is likely not terribly keen on the idea of exerting pressure on the men whom he relies upon to control the nation’s industry to engage in a substantial program of modernization. And while Putin may be amenable to the creation of new corporate ventures in Russia they would almost inevitably fall under the control of the state – a state which prizes control more than it does efficiency.
Despite the issues presented by the patrimonial and inefficient system of operation of key sectors within the Russian economy, however, that doesn’t mean that the manufacturing sector is incapable of expanding or that Putin is either unaware of the need or unwilling to commit to economic diversification and growth in principle – he knows that he effectively runs little more than a larger, colder Saudi Arabia at the moment. It merely means that growth will be more limited and sporadic than it might otherwise have proven had Putin not depended on major firms as sources of patronage and to closely control the flow of capital within the country. After all, he did authorize the 2007 creation of the policy document not-at-all verbosely titled as, “Concept for Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation to 2020,” which, as the hyperlinked CSIS report notes, shares the goal of creating the sort of high-tech economy championed by Medvedev. And, as Mark Smith noted in a paper, now several years old, for the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, failure to modernize and grow the Russian economy would almost certainly result in economic stagnation, if not outright systemic collapse, and Putin knows that – his political power, as noted elsewhere, has rested upon his capacity to improve the general standard of living, something only possible through economic growth.
However, assuming Putin has the political will to engage in a sustained, if likely irregular, program of economic expansion, Russia still needs new markets for its infant high-tech industry, and is still well-served by the development of a manufacturing base. As such it must, therefore, gain access to the resources and emerging markets of the Third World – the last place left for it to go, especially now that Putin seems intent on thoroughly alienating the West. This means that Russia will turn to two regions – Africa (particularly the Congo) and Central Asia. Now, Central Asia would concern the Russians regardless of its economic benefits, given its proximity to Russia itself and the possibility that the US-NATO mission in Afghanistan will ultimately fail and destabilize the region. In an economic context, however, both regions, Central Asia and Africa, are home to relatively large populations, massive quantities of precious and nonprecious but vital raw materials (the Democratic Congo is estimated to contain $24 trillion in untapped mineral resources, Afghanistan $1 trillion), and possess little in the way of extractive infrastructure, as illustrated when a strike at a single Kyrgyz gold mine threatened roughly 12% of that country’s annual GDP. So long as the Russian government can encourage the development of at least partially Russian-owned mining, drilling, and other resource gathering firms in both regions it can begin a cycle of economic growth by refining extracted resources into goods resalable in those new markets created by their resource-gathering operations and the new wage-earners employed there.
The focus will undoubtedly be on Central Asia. Russia doesn’t have to work hard to establish a presence there – it already has one. Most of the Central Asian states are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the Commonwealth of Independent States and all were part of the Soviet Union at one point, so it’s not as if the terrain is unfamiliar or uninviting to the Russians. Africa is a trifle more complicated, however. Mention of the Soviet Union holds fond memories for many Africans, who appreciated the anti-Imperialist rhetoric emanating from Moscow, and the anti-Imperialist AK-47s emanating from Sevastopol. And many high offices in Africa continue to be held by Moscow-educated African leaders, so Russia is not without friends on the continent. However, the Soviet Union was not nearly as involved in Africa as it was in Central Asia, which was a constituent part of the Soviet empire, and the 90s were characterized by deteriorating relations, as Moscow’s sphere of influence contracted and the idea of socialist fraternity was viciously beaten to death. The Russian government clearly recognizes the importance of Africa, with a “Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy” prepared in 2006 stating that, in Africa:
“4. Along with strengthening political engagement with the continent, a priority task is the intensification of economic and commercial ties, the present level of which so far does not match the considerable potential available. The need for bringing the Russian-African partnership to a new level is dictated by the raw material requirements of the momentum-gaining Russian economy. In addition, Africa is a promising sales market for Russian goods and attractive from the viewpoint of developing investment cooperation and involving Russian entrepreneurial entities in the implementation of various projects and programs on the continent.”
And while some, such as Alexandra Arkhangelskaya and Vladimir Shubin, writing for the London School of Economics’
Ideas Journal “
Emerging Powers in Africa” are quick to point out that Africa is far from the center of Russian considerations and even signed agreements can go unfulfilled they still note that Africa is under some measure of scrutiny by Russia, with more than thirty Russian firms operating projects in Africa as of 2013, though the majority of these were in Angola, Guinea, South Africa, Namibia and Nigeria – all countries with reasonably well-established civil and physical infrastructures and possessed of mineral resources capable of making up for deficiencies in the post-Soviet Russian economy.
But, if these are the most reasonable long-term moves Russia can make then how will the US respond? Well, it depends on the answer to a question and the question is this: if Russia is able to achieve a modicum of economic parity with the West what will it do with that wealth? Or, rather, what do we think it will do with that wealth? If Washington were under the impression that Russia would integrate peaceably into NATO and the EU then there would be no reason for it to prevent Russia from accessing new markets and securing closer ties with African and Central Asian governments. But no one in Washington is under that impression. Russian efforts to expand access to African and Central Asian goods and markets would be at least partially, if not largely, driven by a desire to increase Russian prestige and power on the world stage in order that the country could push back against the NATO/EU tide crashing against its European border. The economic expansion of Russia would thus be treated as hostile by definition and Washington would respond in kind, and attempt to counteract Russian efforts in Central Asia and Africa with their own. This, of course, would confirm Russian suspicions as to American intentions towards Russia and merely compel the Russians to redouble their efforts. In other words, if Moscow follows the long-term strategy I have laid out here, as I believe they will, then Washington will react with no small degree of hostility towards it, and that is without factoring in the continued efforts of the Russian government to expand fleet basing rights and the capacity of their military to project power globally, or their continued aerial probing off the US coastline. It is unfortunate, and an outcome I should rather like to avoid but, for the moment, I can see no scenario in which any action by Russia or the United States with relation to one another will be viewed as anything but hostile.