Firstly, brethren and sisteren and otheren, let us pry open the mouth of Jeffrey A. Eisenbach and examine closely his twisted tongue.
Statement before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary On “Why Net Neutrality Matters: Protecting Consumers and Competition Through Meaningful Open Internet Rules”
Testimony of Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Ph.D.
Visiting Scholar
American Enterprise Institute
September 17, 2014
My testimony today advances three main points. First, net neutrality regulation cannot be justified on grounds of enhancing consumer welfare or protecting the public interest. Rather, it is best understood as an effort by one set of private interests to enrich itself by using the power of the state to obtain free services from another – a classic example of what economists term “rent seeking.”
Second, the potential costs of net neutrality regulation are both sweeping and severe, and extend far beyond a simple transfer of wealth from one group to another.
Third, legitimate policy concerns about the potential use of market power to disadvantage rivals or harm consumers can best be addressed through existing antitrust and consumer protection laws and regulations.
To begin, net neutrality regulation cannot be justified as a means of enhancing consumer welfare or advancing or protecting the public interest, and instead is best understood as a classic example of rent seeking. This is particularly true of the more extreme flavors of net neutrality regulation advanced by companies like Netflix, which would ban payments from companies like Netflix to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) like AT&T.
Secondly, let it be known that Herr Professor Eisenach has exquisite right wing free market bona fides:
Economist Jeffrey Eisenach has served in senior positions at the Federal Trade Commission and the Office of Management and Budget. As a visiting scholar at AEI, he will focus on policies affecting the information technology sector, innovation and entrepreneurship. Eisenach is also a managing director and a principal at Navigant Economics and an adjunct professor at the George Mason University School of Law, where he teaches Regulated Industries. He writes on a wide range of issues, including industrial organization, communications policy and the Internet, government regulations, labor economics and public finance. He has also taught at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute.
. . . . Among his other previous affiliations, Dr. Eisenach has served as President and Senior Fellow at The Progress & Freedom Foundation; as a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation and the Hudson Institute; as a consultant to the U.S. Sentencing Commission (on corporate sentencing guidelines); and, as a member of the 1980-81 Reagan-Bush Transition Team on the Federal Trade Commission, the 2000-2001 Bush-Cheney Transition Team on the Federal Communications Commission, the Virginia Governor's Commission on E-Communities, and the Virginia Attorney General's Task Force on Identity Theft. He is currently Vice President, Education and Member of the Audit Committee of the Economic Club of Washington and serves on the advisory boards of Intelligent Grid Solutions, the Pew Project on the Internet and American Life, and Washington Mutual Investors Fund.
Thirdly, let us take a look at the three significant statements of Professor Eisenbach:
Rather, it is best understood as an effort by one set of private interests to enrich itself by using the power of the state to obtain free services from another – a classic example of what economists term “rent seeking.”
Question: Are We The People a "private interest"?
Harrumph! Professor Einsenach! We The People are a Public Interest:
the welfare or well-being of the general public; the commonwealth
Therefore, Professor, I must hurl a little Pigou at you:
Public interest theory is an economic theory first developed by Arthur Cecil Pigou that holds that regulation is supplied in response to the demand of the public for the correction of inefficient or inequitable market practices. Regulation is assumed initially to benefit society as a whole rather than particular vested interests. The regulatory body is considered to represent the interest of the society in which it operates rather than the private interests of the regulators.
Assumptions
This theory assumes that markets are extremely fragile and apt to operate very inefficiently (or inequitably) if left alone. The government is assumed to be a neutral arbiter.
The public interest view holds that governments regulate banks to facilitate the efficient functioning of banks by ameliorating market failures, for the benefit of broader civil society. In banking, the public interest would be served if the banking system allocated resources in a socially efficient manner (i.e. “maximizing output and minimizing variance”) and performed well other functions of finance.
Eisenach's second point:
Second, the potential costs of net neutrality regulation are both sweeping and severe, and extend far beyond a simple transfer of wealth from one group to another.
Whoah! Where did this "transfer of wealth" occur within net neutrality? Methinks that that is an outright lie.
His third:
Third, legitimate policy concerns about the potential use of market power to disadvantage rivals or harm consumers can best be addressed through existing antitrust and consumer protection laws and regulations.
If there are "existing" antitrust laws, they sure as hell are not enforced. And, speaking of consumer protection laws, did you see what the F*ing Republicans did to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau? Where is the protection after they rip through it?
And, did not Washington Mutual go bust?