Matiullah Khan, powerful in Uruzgan province north of Kandahar, has been reported assassinated in Kabul.
The provincial police chief for central Uruzgan province of Afghanistan was killed following the suicide attack in capital Kabul late on Wednesday night.
Gen. Matiullah Khan was one of the prominent security officials who was serving as provincial police chief for Uruzgan since 2011.
Uruzgan police chief killed in Kabul suicide attack, Khaama Press
Though the police chief’s list of enemies was long, the Taliban claimed responsibility for Wednesday’s attack.
Powerful Afghan police chief killed by Taliban suicide bomber, Guardian
The Interior Ministry said the bomber was "dressed in women's clothes and a burqa."
The Taliban claimed responsibility for the killing, which comes as Afghanistan prepares to celebrate Norouz, the Persian New Year, on March 21.
Taliban Suicide Bomber Kills Afghan Regional Police Chief, Voice of America
Australian soldiers praised him publicly, and genuinely admired him, while privately admitting he might have been guilty of gruesome acts.
When Australian and other coalition troops left Uruzgan province at the end of more than a decade of war against the Taliban, it was hoped that Mr Matiullah would provide stability and keep the Taliban at bay.
Matiullah Khan, ally to Australia in Afghanistan, reportedly killed in Taliban suicide bombing, ABC News (Australia)
He became a classic symbol of the American-backed strongman turned government official, a hallmark of the long war in Afghanistan. Like his counterpart in Kandahar Province, Lt. Gen. Abdul Raziq, who is widely accused of human rights abuses and running illicit businesses, Mr. Khan enjoyed the support of coalition military officials, who found him an indispensable ally in their fight against the Taliban.
“He was representative of a new breed of warlords,” said Anand Gopal, the author of the book “No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War Through Afghan Eyes.” “These are people entirely created by the international presence.”
Powerful Afghan Police Chief Killed in Kabul, New York Times
In 2009, VICE News reported on the classic symbol of the weekly security convoy in Uruzgan. Supplies for the international bases supporting the power of Matiullah Khan, would travel up the highway, protected by Matiullah Khan for the day, with a payment to Matiullah Khan for the protection.
Security Day falls on a different day each week, but when it arrives, it is unmistakable. Dust clouds hovering over the sun-baked hills of Uruzgan herald its coming, stirred up by the seemingly endless platoons of 40-ton trucks, heavily laden pickups, and taxis, all crossing in convoys of up to 100 vehicles, in both directions.
The Warlord Of The Highway, VICE News
Reuters reports, from senior U.S. officials, that with the delayed withdraw of U.S. forces, U.S. bases in Kandahar and Jalalabad will stay open.
The U.S. military bases in Kandahar and Jalalabad are likely to remain open beyond the end of 2015, a senior U.S. official said, as Washington considers slowing its military pull-out from Afghanistan to help the new government fight the Taliban.
The anticipated policy reversal reflects the U.S. embrace of Afghanistan's new and more cooperative president, Ashraf Ghani, and a desire to avoid the kind of collapse of local security forces that occurred in Iraq after the U.S. pull-out there.
Exclusive: U.S. likely to delay planned closure of two Afghanistan bases, Reuters
The New York Times, yesterday, reported on the struggles of First Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum, in finding his place in the American-negotiated deal of two presidents and four vice presidents of Afghanistan. (The two presidents will be visiting the United States this week. Dostum is the First Vice President of the first one.)
The security meeting was almost at a close when the first vice president of Afghanistan, the former warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, began crying.
It was a jarring ending to the typically somber weekly gathering of the National Security Council. But Mr. Dostum, who has been accused in the mass killing of hundreds of Taliban prisoners, was distraught. He was tired of being ignored by the roomful of powerful people, he said, including President Ashraf Ghani and his national security adviser, Hanif Atmar.
“No one returns my calls!” he blurted out to the gathering several weeks ago, according to two people there. “I just want to help this country. The people made me a general, but no one even asks for my advice.”
The scene highlighted the odd transformation of Mr. Dostum from a “quintessential warlord,” in the words of American diplomats, into one of the most powerful men in the Afghan government — at least on paper.
Afghan First Vice President, an Ex-Warlord, Fumes on the Sidelines, New York Times
The first First Vice President is unhappy with the coverage in the
Times.
The full Times report is a rather amazing, bizarre piece of journalism.
Dostum to NYT: This Warlord Doesn’t Cry. Foreign Policy
Dostum has posted an open letter on his public Facebook page angrily rebuking the Times' profile of him, which ran on Monday. The story, which was critical of Dostum, noted both that he is accused of war crimes such as "mass killing hundreds of Taliban prisoners" and that he cried at a recent Afghan security council meeting because other officials weren't returning his calls. See if you can guess which of those two tidbits offended the 60-something-year-old vice president.
Afghanistan's vice president is very angry the New York Times reported that he cried once, Vox
Defense One reports on a cruel paradox in Afghan security. Violence is more likely to occur in pro-U.S. villages.
The United States’ efforts to “win hearts and minds” as it fought the Taliban in Afghanistan seem to have created a cruel and fatal paradox.
When political scientist Jason Lyall of Yale University in the United States surveyed the mood of villages strewn across the country’s southern provinces he found that those with the most pro-US feeling were the most likely to draw punishment attacks from the Taliban. Worse, the US was no more likely to find improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in those supportive villages.¹
The dynamics behind this are not totally clear. But the implication is that US efforts to win villagers’ hearts and minds were successful enough to render their villages Taliban targets, but not enough to convince them to provide useful intelligence about IEDs. If true, the military is thwarting its own aim, stated in the US Army Field Manual, of “creating safe spaces for the population by reducing insurgent attacks.”
It’s a suggestion so controversial that Lyall and his team are still working to convince themselves—and their paper’s peer-reviewers—that civilian attitudes could influence attack predictions so strongly.
Violence Is More Likely To Occur in Pro-US Villages in Afghanistan, Defense One
The Center for American Progress has a series of reports on how to fix Afghanistan. One essential part is dealing with the problem of corruption.
This issue brief surveys the key factors driving corruption in Afghanistan and their harmful impact on Afghanistan’s security and economic development. It also offers a set of recommendations and tools for combating corruption that should be prioritized by Afghan officials and supported by the United States and other donors.
Tackling Corruption in Afghanistan: It’s Now or Never, Center for American Progress
Matiullah Khan, of course, had thought the same.
Secondly, he intended to re-train all district and local police officials and replace the corrupt ones.
Uruzgan’s New Chief of Police: Matiullah’s Dream Come True, Afghanistan Analysts Network
Another essential part is establishing security.
On the other hand, the worsening security situation is exacerbating existing weaknesses within the ANSF.
Security in Afghanistan: 5 Key Areas for U.S. Action, Center for American Progress
Matiullah Khan had been down with that too.
During those years Matiullah’s security responsibilities had increased, as had his power and influence within the province. He played an important role in retaking Gizab in 2010 and clearing roads in Char China (Shahidi Hassas). His close links to Australian and US Special Forces, who coordinate their activities with him and recently flew some of his men to Australia for training, was locally interpreted that he also had international support for his quest.
Uruzgan’s New Chief of Police: Matiullah’s Dream Come True, Afghanistan Analysts Network
Center for American Progress says that a way to fix corruption and other problems in Afghanistan, to turn the tide, is for us to bribe them.
Incentivizing change
In 2016, the Obama administration requested $1.5 billion for developmental assistance to Afghanistan, an increase linked to the “new reform-minded government”and their “comprehensive reform plan.” This request can form the basis for a new U.S.-Afghanistan compact that can spur additional international support. It can also form the basis for accountability of the new Afghan government.
Turning the Tide on Afghanistan, Center for American Progress
A latest report on electricity in Kabul, from someone with Physicians for Human Rights, says a few hours per day. Electricity has been reported out since avalanches north of the city, wrecking power line towers, some three weeks ago. The story, for a city of four or five million, is not much in the newspapers.