Russian forces conducted a limited series of strikes against Ukraine on April 29 and 30. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian ballistic missiles, likely Iskander-M missiles, struck Odesa City on April 29, injuring and killing civilians and damaging civilian infrastructure.[54] ... Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian forces struggle to down drones and missiles that Russian forces launch from occupied Crimea and Kherson Oblast and Belgorod and Kursk oblasts because Ukrainian air defenses have less time to react to the launches due to their physical proximity to their targets.[56]
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- Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances in the Avdiivka area on April 30 for the first time in several days, while Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted several more attacks in the Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar direction than near Avdiivka.
- Russian forces may decide to push from their salient north of Avdiivka towards the Toretsk area to complement Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, which would likely require Russian forces to conduct a tactical pause to concentrate forces for such a drive.
- Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a short-range MGM-140 ATACMS strike against targets in occupied Crimea on the night of April 29 to 30.
- Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin expressed outrage over Russian authorities’ treatment of Central Asian migrants, particularly Tajik citizens, indicating that increased Russian efforts to control migrants living in and entering Russia following the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack are continuing to strain Tajik-Russian relations.
- Former Georgian Prime Minister and founder of the Georgian Dream political party Bidzina Ivanishvili reiterated a series of standard Kremlin information operations during his first public speech since announcing his return to Georgian public politics in December 2023.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, and Robotyne.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on April 30 that Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov and First Deputy Defense Minister Ruslan Tsalikov inspected a drone testing ground in an unspecified area of occupied Ukraine.
- An investigation by Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii implicates Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova and her sister in the deportation of special needs Ukrainian adults to Russia.
Russian forces may decide to push from their salient north of Avdiivka towards the Toretsk area to complement Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, which would likely require Russian forces to conduct a tactical pause to concentrate forces for such a drive. Mashovets stated that Russian forces may focus their efforts on the Stara Mykolaivka-Sukha Balka line (north of the Ochertyne-Keramik line and southwest of Toretsk) instead of northwest of Ocheretyne as Russian forces are already struggling to defend the flanks of their salient near Ocheretyne.[8] ISW recently assessed that Russian forces may decide to advance north from their tactical penetration near Ocheretyne along the H-20 (Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka) highway to pressure Ukrainian forces defending in the Toretsk area and possibly threaten the operational rear of the Ukrainian defense in and west of Chasiv Yar.[9] Chasiv Yar is an operationally significant objective as it would provide Russian forces with a staging ground to launch offensive operations against Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka, which form the fortress belt of four major cities in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces would likely require a longer pause to reinforce existing units and redeploy additional forces to the Ocheretyne area should they choose to attempt to advance northward to the Toretsk area, however. Mashovets stated that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces (currently responsible for the Avdiivka area) has created a tactical reserve of three small infantry regiments in the Avdiivka direction, and ISW previously assessed that Russian forces have been establishing operational- and strategic-level reserves likely to support an anticipated spring-summer offensive effort.[10]
Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance near Chasiv Yar amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on April 30. Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Russian forces advanced up to the east side of the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal south Chasiv Yar in an area where the canal flows underground.[35] A Ukrainian reconnaissance platoon commander operating in the Chasiv Yar area reported on April 30 that Russian special operations forces (SSO) have started to operate more frequently at night and that Russian forces continue efforts to bypass Chasiv Yar from the flanks via Bodanivka from the northeast and Ivanivske from the east and are deploying reinforcements to reach the Siverskyi-Donetsk Donbas Canal.[36] The Ukrainian platoon commander stated that the Russian military first deploys Storm-Z and Storm-V convict units to conduct the first wave of assaults on Chasiv Yar followed by mechanized or airborne (VDV) assaults to consolidate new positions. Fighting continued near the Novyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar); east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, Niu York, Shumy, and Pivdenne.[37] Several milbloggers claimed that Russian aviation continued strikes against the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar).[38] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District) are operating south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar); elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating in northwestern Ivanivske; elements of 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR AC) and 1307th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are operating near Klishchiivka; elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade and 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating near Andriivka.[39]
Russian investigative opposition outlet Dossier Center reported on April 30 that high-ranking Russian military and political officials are personally investing in the rapid reconstruction of occupied Mariupol.[63] Dossier stated that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov, whom Russian authorities recently arrested on corruption charges, was supervising the state-owned “Military Construction Company” and its construction contracts in occupied Mariupol. Dossier noted that the Military Construction Company’s main Mariupol contractor was the “Olympsitistroy” company — an organization with alleged links to Ivanov — which built a residential complex, medical center, and school in occupied Mariupol by the spring of 2024.[64] Dossier suggested that following Ivanov’s arrest, construction contracts in Mariupol would transfer to the state-owned “Unified Customer” company, which is affiliated with Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported in October 2023 that Khusnullin played a key role in distributing construction contracts to projects throughout occupied Ukraine, and it appears that Khusnullin will be one of the largest beneficiaries of contract re-allocation following Ivanov’s arrest.[65] Russian officials are likely incentivized to become personally involved in the construction of occupied cities in Ukraine with the promise of lucrative contracts. The reconstruction of occupied cities (which Russia destroyed in the first place) by Russian actors further increases the Kremlin’s control over occupied Ukraine and makes occupied areas appear more attractive to Russian investors and those seeking to move.
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