So it was a last minute, night time mission. The car wouldn't stop after it had been warned. Too bad, so sad.
Looking at the Army report on the Segrina shooting ends up showing what we already knew, that the troops aren't adequately trained, and no one seems to know what's going on over there. This is just a quick reading, and I've not included any of the redacted classified information.
A clusterfuck in the making below the fold
So did the soldiers assigned the mission know what they were supposed to be doing? It seems doubtful given that:
(U) There is no written SOP or TTP in 3ID, 2/10 MTN, or 1-69 IN for the execution of the blocking mission and establishing a blocking position. (Annexes 1F, 2F, 3F). The procedure was passed on from the departing unit (4-5 ADA) to the incoming unit (1-69 IN) during the Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority, where leaders observed the execution of the mission one week, and executed the mission the following week under the supervision of the outgoing unit (Right Seat/Left Side Ride). The only training received by 1-69 IN Soldiers on blocking positions was that employed along Route Irish during after-curfew Rhino Bus Runs, and occurred during the Left Seat Right Seat Ride process with 4-5 ADA. (Annexes 72C, 96C, 97C, 98C, 9G). It is clear that these BPs were not established as TCPs.
Could you tell when you came up on a blocking position? Hard to say:
(U) There is no clear guidance in these units on what equipment is required for establishing a blocking position (e.g., different road signs). (Annexes 1F, 2F, 3F).
Was there any more justification, other than the daily car bombs and drive by shootings, that make make the soldiers jumpy? They didn't get much information, and what they did get didn't help:
(U) While on patrol, Captain Drew received two VBIED BOLO reports via radio, one for a black car, another for a white car. (Annexes 74C, 13E, 14E). He passed that information via radio to his subordinate leaders, including Second Lieutenant Acosta, who passed it on to his troops. (Annexes 74C, 77C).
What mission were they on? The aforementioned, undefined "blocking position":
(U) The instructions given to Second Lieutenant Acosta by Captain Drew were to set up a blocking position to facilitate the movement of a VIP down Route Irish. (Annex 77C). Captain Drew also issued guidance on the importance of force protection. (Annex 74C). He expected to maintain the blocking position no more than 15 minutes. (Annexes 74C, 77C).
So hey, the VIP is past us, what do we do now? Stay there and be willing to shoot anyone who tries to pass you:
(U) At approximately 2045 hours the Soldiers at BP 541 were in the positions that they had been occupying since 1930 hours.
When the reportedly couldn't get the car to stop a mounted M-240 (30 caliber machine gun) fired 40 rounds, with 11 of them striking the car.
To be honest the reaction after the incident, getting aid to the victims and ceasing fire fairly quickly, speaks well of the soldiers on the ground. The circumstances they were in to begin with doesn't reflect as well on their leadership.
The great kicker is the last paragraph:
Iraq is still a hostile environment, i.e, a combat zone, and the more coordination that can be done to increase situational awareness of those operating within the battlespace, the better it is for all involved.
So much for "Mission Accomplished" + 2 years