Last week, National Security Advisor Steven Hadley gave a
press briefing. In it, he suggested this in response to a question:
MR. HADLEY: I think people have to look at the record, look at how we got the intelligence, and look the judgments of the -- the statements that people made at the time on that intelligence. And that's to -- needs to inform the judgment we make about some of the things we're hearing said now.
That's a great (if garbled) idea, Mr. Hadley! Let's begin to do that just below the fold...
Actually, first, let me point out and dispense with a blatant lie from Hadley yesterday:
I will say on the specific intelligence, this, as you know, is something that was looked at very hard in a number of the studies I've talked about. And their judgment is that intelligence that came from the INC had a minimal impact on any judgments of the intelligence community in preparing the intelligence that went forward to the President and to others.
Really??? One word: CURVEBALL
'Nuff said. Now, on to the examination of intelligence, doubts about that intelligence expressed by our own and other intelligence and world agencies, and our own leader's statements:
Starting Point: Iraq Has No Ability to Develop WMD's
We begin our review with a starting point that was first put forward by Secretary of State Colin Powell at the very beginning of George W. Bush's presidency. The talking point that "everyone thought he had WMD's, even Clinton," has been thrown around ever since we realized that there were none in Iraq. But, in reality, there was a consensus in government by the time Bush became President that Saddam was effectively "in a box." This sentiment was expressed on February 24, 2001, during press remarks by Powell that noted that sanctions against Iraq had prevented him from developing any WMD's. Specifically, "Saddam Hussein has not developed any significant capacity with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors." [link courtesy The Memory Hole since the original page was removed]
But, several events in 2001 lead to a quick change in that assessment: (1) the appointment of Neoconservatives and "PNACers" in the White House and Pentagon, (2) the interceptions of aluminum tubes ordered by Iraq through Jordan from China, and (3) 9/11.
In Part I of this review takes up one of the first issues used to support the conclusion that Iraq was a threat and had WMD's and WMD-related programs:
The Aluminum Tubes
The story of the aluminum tubes that were ordered by Iraq from China through a Jordanian businessman reads more like a tale from an Robert Ludlum novel. However, for our purposes, we will concentrate on how the U.S. intelligence community viewed those tubes.
There was hardly an initial consensus on what the tubes were for. On April 10, 2001, the CIA published its first official assessment of the Iraqi purchase of the aluminum tubes, and claimed that they "have little use other than for uranium enrichment programs." However, the next day the Department of Energy (DoE) published their own assessment of the aluminum tubes, and concluded something much different: that the size of the tubes themselves and the large size of the order suggested that they were for a different application than uranium enrichment, such as conventional ordinance production.
Later, on May 9, 2001, DoE published a Daily Intelligence Highlight that noted that Iraq had purchased similar aluminum tubes for building rocket launchers. CIA, though, apparently didn't notice or take much credence in the DoE analysis, and continued to conclude that the tubes were meant for a uranium enrichment program in their June 14, 2001, Senior Publish When Ready (SPWR), and other publications through July 2002.
By August of 2001, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had become more convinced that CIA was right. But, the debate was not over, and on August 17, 2001, DoE published a Technical Intelligence Note that concluded that the aluminum tubes could be used for a centrifuge program, but were not well suited for that purpose and would provide a "performance roughly half that of the materials Iraq previously pursued" for enrichment purposes.
It is clear from these documents that a debate was occurring within the halls of government, but the public face of the executive branch never reflected that debate. The CIA was adamant about their conclusion, and the White House jumped all over it because it supported their own claims about the Iraq regime: Iraq is trying to go nuclear. This focus on only one side of the debate can be seen in a January 30, 2002 CIA unclassified report to Congress that stated, "Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials that could aid in reconstituting its nuclear-weapons program."
The alarm was being sounded in Congress, but the Administration was attempting to curtail the amount of classified information that the legislative branch could as evidenced by a memorandum signed by Bush on October 5, 2001 that directed that only eight members of Congress could be briefed on classified or "sensitive law enforcement" information. It was clear that the Administration wanted to be able to striclty control what Congress saw and heard and, in cases such as the aluminum tubes, that was only the worst case scenario.
The same dissemination of worst case scenario information occurred in the press, as well, likely as part of the efforts of the White House Iraq Group (WHIG). For example, Judy Miller got in on the act on September 8, 2002, when she and Michael Gordon reported in the NY Times about the interception of the aluminum tubes. Her front page story quoted unnamed "American officials" and "American intelligence experts" who said the tubes were intended to be used to enrich nuclear material, and cited unnamed "Bush administration officials" who claimed that in recent months, Iraq had "stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb." That very day, Cheney told Tim Russert on Meet the Press, "We do know, with absolute certainty, that he is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon."
Other Administration officials that day supported Miller's article:
- National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice, during a CNN interview: "We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud." However, she did admit that there is uncertainty about how quickly Iraq could acquire nuclear weapons, but added, "We do know that [Saddam] is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon." The first reason she gives for this assertion is "aluminum tubes that really are only suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs."
- On FOX News Sunday, Powell said about Saddam, "We saw in reporting just this morning, he is still trying to acquire, for example, some of the specialized aluminum tubing one needs to develop centrifuges."
With the groundwork laid by his underlings,
Bush told the UN General Assembly on September 12, 2002, that "Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon...Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year." The allegation was repeated two days later in
his weekly radio address: "Saddam Hussein has the scientists and infrastructure for a nuclear-weapons program, and has illicitly sought to purchase the equipment needed to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon."
There was no hint in the public case regarding the aluminum tubes that there was a completely different analysis being made by the DoE. It would be foolish to assume or conclude that the Administration was completely unaware that not everyone within their administration agreed with the CIA's assessment. There is even some evidence in mid-September 2002 that the CIA, certainly aware that the Administration was running wild with visions of mushroom clouds, wanted to be absolutely sure of their analyses. On September 16, 2002, they provided a private contractor with a stack of intelligence data on the aluminum tubes. Unfortunately (or conveniently?), CIA left out the contrarian DoE analysis that concluded that they were for rocket parts. Sure enough, the next day the private contractor produced a paper concluding that the aluminum tubes were consistent with design requirements for a gas centrifuge, and less likely to be meant for rocket motor casings.
What followed in late September 2002 can only be described as "tube mania" within the intelligence community:
- The DIA published an assessment of Iraq's Reemerging Nuclear Weapons Program, which concluded that the Iraq aluminum tubes were more likely to be used for a gas centrifuge than rocket motor cases.
- The CIA published an analysis of the tubes titled Iraq's Hunt for Aluminum Tubes: Evidence of a Renewed Uranium Enrichment Program.
However, it is absolutely not true what the Administration apologists repeat: "everyone had the same intelligence." For example, the Institute for Science and International Security was aware of the differing analyses from not only DoE, but also the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on the tubes and publicized this fact, forcing the Administration in September 2002 to admit to the debate. However, they responded by doing what they always do: they
attacked the messenger, and attempted to discredit the other analyses.
By October 2002, the aluminum tubes were nothing short of "fact" in the eyes of the White House, as confirmed by the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). The CIA conclusion was adopted, but the State Department and DoE dissented. This did nothing to dampen the Bush Administration's enthusiasm for the allegations.
Further evidence that the Administration simply ignored any dissenting opinions on the tubes ran all the way up to the start of the war. For example, on January 27, 2003, the day before the State of the Union Address in which Bush uttered the famous "16 words," Mohammed El Baradei of the IAEA briefed the UN Security Council on the status of nuclear inspections in Iraq and said that the "specifications of the aluminum tubes recently sought by Iraq appear to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets." He added that although the tubes could be modified for use in a centrifuge, "they are not directly suitable for such use." This, of course, did not stop Bush from mentioning the tubes the very next day. And, Colin Powell made the aluminum tube case during his February 5, 2003 address to the UN.
The IAEA repeated their conclusion on the tubes on March 7, 2003 stating that "Iraq's efforts to import these aluminium tubes were not likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuges and, moreover, that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable re-design needed to use them in a revived centrifuge programme." But, by this time it was too late. The U.S. had not back down from their claims, and the war began a little over a week later.
In the end, we all know that no evidence of a centrifuge program was discovered after the invasion. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence even concluded in their much-vaunted report "that the information available to the Intelligence Community indicated that these tubes were intended to be used for an Iraq conventional rocket program and not a nuclear program." Also, there was not even enough evidence in general for the Intelligence Community to conclude that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
But that was exactly what the Bush Administration did, raising specters of mushroom clouds, and preventing the tubes and the Niger claim as definitive evidence. In other words, as the infamous Downing Street Memo concluded, "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."
I would suggest that Mr. Hadley refrain from further suggesting that we all do this sort of review, but, since he has, I will continue tomorrow with a review of the claims made by INC-provided defectors and the statements made by Bush Administration officials that relayed their known deceptions as facts.