When it comes to the economy, the white house has apparently hunkered down in do-nothing mode. Other than the belief that somehow "patent reform," and so-called trade deals that actually cost jobs, are political and policy winners. And a rather underwhelming call for some sort of infrastructure bank. Which would be fine if there was actually a sustained call for it by the administration.
They apparently have bought into the notion that the public cares more about the deficit than jobs, even though polls show consistently, by a 2 to 1 margin, that it's the other way around. As stated by David Plouffe, they seem to view the unemployment rate as not particularly important for the prospects for re-election.
And they continue to operate under the assumption that there is no point putting forth a proposal for the economy, or for anything else for that matter, unless it has a decent chance of passing. And they show no inclination of taking some executive action, such as with housing, that doesn't need approval of congress. Why? Who knows? Maybe the view it as some sort of abuse of power.
However, another president, confronted with a hostile congress, and entering an election year, took a different tack. That president was Harry Truman. Granted, the economy was not as much of a problem in 1947-48 than it is now, but that did not make Truman's sense of urgency any less. He and his advisors understood that in the voters' mind trying to do something even without a chance of success is better than doing nothing. A lesson Obama and his advisors need to learn.
First, Truman used the executive order to great effect.
Although a conservative Congress thwarted Truman's desire to achieve significant civil rights legislation, he was able to use his presidential powers to accomplish some societal and policy important changes. Truman issued executive orders desegregating the armed forces and forbidding racial discrimination in Federal employment.
But the big strategic move was in confronting congress directly.
Truman then sent Congress a Rooseveltian package of legislation on housing, aid to education, a higher minimum wage, development and reclamation programs for the South and West, increased Social Security, and expanded public power, knowing that it stood little chance in the present Congress. Truman biographer Alonzo Hamby writes, “The objective was not to achieve compromise legislation that all sides would probably consider flawed. It was to underscore ideological differences for a presidential campaign. In achieving this goal, Truman was extraordinarily effective. The dozen or so significant vetoes he issued in 1947 and 1948 underscored differences between Democrats and Republicans on issues such as income equity, labor-management relations, regulation of business, and the New Deal welfare state.”
The observation bears repeating. Truman’s strategy was not to achieve flawed compromise legislation but to underscore differences—differences that would play to Democrats’ latent strength as the party of the common people.
http://prospect.org/...
I guess you could call Truman, at least the 1947-48 version, the un-Obama. But if Obama wants to win a second term, he needs to become a lot more like Truman.
Oh, and in addition to winning a second term in 1948, Truman helped the Democrats to re-take control of congress.