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U.S. Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s
Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013

The United States Government assesses with high confidence that the Syrian government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013. We further assess that the regime used a nerve agent in the attack. These all-source assessments are based on human, signals, and geospatial intelligence as well as a significant body of open source reporting. Our classified assessments have been shared with the U.S. Congress and key international partners. To protect sources and methods, we cannot publicly release all available intelligence – but what follows is an unclassified summary of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s analysis of what took place.

Syrian Government Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21

A large body of independent sources indicates that a chemical weapons attack took place in the Damascus suburbs on August 21. In addition to U.S. intelligence information, there are accounts from international and Syrian medical personnel; videos; witness accounts; thousands of social media reports from at least 12 different locations in the Damascus area; journalist accounts; and reports from highly credible nongovernmental organizations.

A preliminary U.S. government assessment determined that 1,429 people were killed in the chemical weapons attack, including at least 426 children, though this assessment will certainly evolve as we obtain more information.

We assess with high confidence that the Syrian government carried out the chemical weapons attack against opposition elements in the Damascus suburbs on August 21. We assess that the scenario in which the opposition executed the attack on August 21 is highly unlikely. The body of information used to make this assessment includes intelligence pertaining to the regime’s preparations for this attack and its means of delivery, multiple streams of intelligence about the attack itself and its effect, our post-attack observations, and the differences between the capabilities of the regime and the opposition. Our high confidence assessment is the strongest position that the U.S. Intelligence Community can take short of confirmation. We will continue to seek additional information to close gaps in our understanding of what took place.

Background:

The Syrian regime maintains a stockpile of numerous chemical agents, including mustard, sarin, and VX and has thousands of munitions that can be used to deliver chemical warfare agents.

Syrian President Bashar al-Asad is the ultimate decision maker for the chemical weapons program and members of the program are carefully vetted to ensure security and loyalty. The Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) – which is subordinate to the Syrian Ministry of Defense – manages Syria’s chemical weapons program.

We assess with high confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year, including in the Damascus suburbs. This assessment is based on multiple streams of information including reporting of Syrian officials planning and executing chemical weapons attacks and laboratory analysis of physiological samples obtained from a number of individuals, which revealed exposure to sarin. We assess that the opposition has not used chemical weapons.

The Syrian regime has the types of munitions that we assess were used to carry out the attack on August 21, and has the ability to strike simultaneously in multiple locations. We have seen no indication that the opposition has carried out a large-scale, coordinated rocket and artillery attack like the one that occurred on August 21.

We assess that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons over the last year primarily to gain the upper hand or break a stalemate in areas where it has struggled to seize and hold strategically valuable territory. In this regard, we continue to judge that the Syrian regime views chemical weapons as one of many tools in its arsenal, including air power and ballistic missiles, which they indiscriminately use against the opposition.

The Syrian regime has initiated an effort to rid the Damascus suburbs of opposition forces using the area as a base to stage attacks against regime targets in the capital. The regime has failed to clear dozens of Damascus neighborhoods of opposition elements, including neighborhoods targeted on August 21, despite employing nearly all of its conventional weapons systems. We assess that the regime’s frustration with its inability to secure large portions of Damascus may have contributed to its decision to use chemical weapons on August 21.

Preparation:

We have intelligence that leads us to assess that Syrian chemical weapons personnel – including personnel assessed to be associated with the SSRC – were preparing chemical munitions prior to the attack. In the three days prior to the attack, we collected streams of human, signals and geospatial intelligence that reveal regime activities that we assess were associated with preparations for a chemical weapons attack.

Syrian chemical weapons personnel were operating in the Damascus suburb of ‘Adra from Sunday, August 18 until early in the morning on Wednesday, August 21 near an area that the regime uses to mix chemical weapons, including sarin. On August 21, a Syrian regime element prepared for a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus area, including through the utilization of gas masks. Our intelligence sources in the Damascus area did not detect any indications in the days prior to the attack that opposition affiliates were planning to use chemical weapons.

The Attack:

Multiple streams of intelligence indicate that the regime executed a rocket and artillery attack against the Damascus suburbs in the early hours of August 21. Satellite detections corroborate that attacks from a regime-controlled area struck neighborhoods where the chemical attacks reportedly occurred – including Kafr Batna, Jawbar, ‘Ayn Tarma, Darayya, and Mu’addamiyah. This includes the detection of rocket launches from regime controlled territory early in the morning, approximately 90 minutes before the first report of a chemical attack appeared in social media. The lack of flight activity or missile launches also leads us to conclude that the regime used rockets in the attack.

Local social media reports of a chemical attack in the Damascus suburbs began at 2:30 a.m. local time on August 21. Within the next four hours there were thousands of social media reports on this attack from at least 12 different locations in the Damascus area. Multiple accounts described chemical-filled rockets impacting opposition-controlled areas.

Three hospitals in the Damascus area received approximately 3,600 patients displaying symptoms consistent with nerve agent exposure in less than three hours on the morning of August 21, according to a highly credible international humanitarian organization. The reported symptoms, and the epidemiological pattern of events – characterized by the massive influx of patients in a short period of time, the origin of the patients, and the contamination of medical and first aid workers – were consistent with mass exposure to a nerve agent. We also received reports from international and Syrian medical personnel on the ground.

We have identified one hundred videos attributed to the attack, many of which show large numbers of bodies exhibiting physical signs consistent with, but not unique to, nerve agent exposure. The reported symptoms of victims included unconsciousness, foaming from the nose and mouth, constricted pupils, rapid heartbeat, and difficulty breathing. Several of the videos show what appear to be numerous fatalities with no visible injuries, which is consistent with death from chemical weapons, and inconsistent with death from small-arms, high-explosive munitions or blister agents. At least 12 locations are portrayed in the publicly available videos, and a sampling of those videos confirmed that some were shot at the general times and locations described in the footage.

We assess the Syrian opposition does not have the capability to fabricate all of the videos, physical symptoms verified by medical personnel and NGOs, and other information associated with this chemical attack.

We have a body of information, including past Syrian practice, that leads us to conclude that regime officials were witting of and directed the attack on August 21. We intercepted communications involving a senior official intimately familiar with the offensive who confirmed that chemical weapons were used by the regime on August 21 and was concerned with the U.N. inspectors obtaining evidence. On the afternoon of August 21, we have intelligence that Syrian chemical weapons personnel were directed to cease operations. At the same time, the regime intensified the artillery barrage targeting many of the neighborhoods where chemical attacks occurred. In the 24 hour period after the attack, we detected indications of artillery and rocket fire at a rate approximately four times higher than the ten preceding days. We continued to see indications of sustained shelling in the neighborhoods up until the morning of August 26.

To conclude, there is a substantial body of information that implicates the Syrian government’s responsibility in the chemical weapons attack that took place on August 21. As indicated, there is additional intelligence that remains classified because of sources and methods concerns that is being provided to Congress and international partners.

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Comment Preferences

  •  The first things that caught me eye... (0+ / 0-)
    Background:

    The Syrian regime maintains a stockpile of numerous chemical agents, including mustard, sarin, and VX and has thousands of munitions that can be used to deliver chemical warfare agents.

    So do we.  Many, many times more.
    Syrian President Bashar al-Asad is the ultimate decision maker for the chemical weapons program.
    But he is not a target.

    Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

    by Bisbonian on Fri Aug 30, 2013 at 10:29:55 AM PDT

    •  Th4e first thing that caught my eye (1+ / 0-)
      Recommended by:
      wilderness voice

      ...was this post doesn't link to any original source document. Isn't blockquoted. And doesn't appear to contain any information that is, was, or should be classified.

      Are Transcript Editors members of the WH press staff? Did they write this? WTF is this supposed to be.

  •  So do the Rebels, and Saudi Arabia.. Israel (5+ / 0-)

    And US, and many other players in the area.

    There never was a doubt SOMEONE used them, but this smells of Iraq.  And Vietnam.  

    How many times do we have to see a false flag?  Sickening.

    I'm already against the NEXT war.

    Agreeing with John Boehner makes me sick, but Make them Vote.

  •  Trust us. We've got overhwhelming proof none (6+ / 0-)

    of which we can show you. Sorry, not good enough for me anymore.

    If work was a good thing, the rich would have it all and not let you do it. -- Elmore Leonard

    by voroki on Fri Aug 30, 2013 at 10:41:02 AM PDT

    •  Could at least release these satellite photos. (4+ / 0-)

      This is going to be a first though.  Going to war on Facebook evidence.

      •  I just said (0+ / 0-)

        in MB's diary that any time I hear the words "social media" and "intelligence" used in conjunction with each other, I'm concerned.

        I'll believe corporations are people when one comes home from Afghanistan in a body bag.

        by mojo11 on Fri Aug 30, 2013 at 11:25:07 AM PDT

        [ Parent ]

      •  Even that can be twisted (1+ / 0-)
        Recommended by:
        TJ

        both sides are using the same equipment now, the rebels have captured tanks etc. No one "knows" what anyone's position was at the time, it's a multi-factional guerilla civil war FFS.

        Forcing, yes forcing the UN team out smells like  coverup to me. It doesn't mke any sense, at all.

        And then the official statements by both Kerry and Obama about the UN not being able to tell them an ything they "didn't know already", and "failing" in their mission. Complete bullshit scenario, and everyone on the planet who's been following the developments of the past few years knows it.

  •  Prefacing that I, we, don't KNOW who did what,... (1+ / 0-)
    Recommended by:
    protectspice
    Our high confidence assessment is the strongest position that the U.S. Intelligence Community can take short of confirmation.
    Is high confidence, not confirmation,  all that one needs to act unilaterally, militarily, aggressively, against a sovereign nation with whom one is not at war, with no declaration from Congress, with no resolution from the UN?  This statement makes that claim.

    And then, almost as afterthought,...

    We assess the Syrian opposition does not have the capability to fabricate all of the videos, physical symptoms verified by medical personnel and NGOs, and other information associated with this chemical attack.
    Has anybody said that no chemicals were dispersed there?  When you decide to try to push back on an argument that people aren't making, you're hiding the argument that does conflict with your version.

    Again, the Assad govt may have done this with cold premeditation and cruel intent, but this statement sends off all kinds of alarm bells that everything is not as the Administration is claiming.

    •  When it first happened there were theories (0+ / 0-)

      floated on this website and many others that CW were not used at all. In fact, the UN team was sent in only to established if they were used, not by whome. Why would the UN go in with that mandate if everyone agreed that they were used?

      •  As for the UN, identifying the agent used. (1+ / 0-)
        Recommended by:
        wilderness voice

        For even the most obvious violations, and especially of one that constitutes a war crime, investigators need to collect evidence.

        As for theories floated on this site disputing CW, I did not see those and cannot remark on them.

      •  I don't know but I wonder (0+ / 0-)

        whether, like biological agents, CW's carry a signature that can identify their source of manufacture, their age, etc in order to pinpoint the stockpile from which they came?

        Just a question...I've got the serious jitters about what may be in store.  I keep thinking that with all the billions we sink into "intelligence" that we ought to be able to use a great deal more subtlety to much greater effect.

        Government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth - Abraham Lincoln

        by Gustogirl on Fri Aug 30, 2013 at 07:35:09 PM PDT

        [ Parent ]

  •  My Conclusions (3+ / 0-)

    1.  Little doubt to my mind attack occurred and Assad regime was responsible.  While I think there is more detail they can provide to support the above summary (i.e. cite some dates/locations of previous attacks, and a much more thorough debunking of claims rebels have used or are in possession of CW.  While I do find Obama, Kerry, Hagel more credible than the Bushies, they need to understand, as Cameron has come to understand, the threshold of "actionable" intelligence is a lot higher now.  This evidence is more than enough to convene a grand jury, not beyond reasonable doubt enough for a death sentence.

    2. I particularly want a more satisfying answer on why we did not come out with louder complaints prior if we knew Syria was preparing for this attack.  It may have spooked them off of it, and would have cost the US nothing to make such statements.  I get that connecting the dots may have occurred post-facto, but for the money we dump into the intelligence programs, we have to expect better.

    3.  Further consultation - the Congress should be immediately recalled to debate this issue and the General Assembly and Security Counsel should be summoned to debate this issue immediately.  I can support a multilateral coalition R2P response without the approval of either on a moral basis - Assad may be motivated to act even more desperately now - but we must go through the accelerated motions.

    4.  Begin drone flights over Syria now.  Let them know they are being watched closely 24/7.  Prep for military action is appropriate at this time, but firing a shot should not be done prior to #3 above unless another attack appears to be being prepared or underway.

    5.  Cease the rhetoric about a single punitive strike.  It is clearly bullshit.  The US and the nations that may join us are going all in, and removing Assad from power.  Per KOS's thread, Mid-East neighbors air assets MUST be used as part of a coalition response.  

    6.  Give Russia/China/Iran a final warning, opportunity to remove Assad themselves prior to a strike.  Prepare transition plan and secure rebel agreement as to posture in a post-Assad interim period.  

    These conditions can be executed in a "rapid-fire" way and need not take months.  The results are not guaranteed.  I do agree that Assad has to be removed and that things will go from intolerable to intolerably worse if he is not.   It will be a mess with unintended consequences, but I believe we (a coalition) do have a moral imperative to protect the people of Syria and the region, end this atrocious civil war.

    I am not all that comfortable with these conclusions.  I will not support this action unless it's fully vetted through the Congress (debate and vote) and the UN, prior to a shot being fired.

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