Regarding this:
I'm going to try not to take sides here.
This is such a difficult subject and a difficult point to make, because it's so difficult to articulate the difference between criticizing the religion itself, criticizing the people who are "members" (for lack of a better term) of that religion as a category, and criticizing the particular, identifiable people who say and do terrible things in the name of, or because of their "belief" in, that religion. These things are tied together so intimately and there's so much overlap between them that it's hardly possible, and almost seems pointless, to try to differentiate them. But the differences are so important that anyone who does try to talk about this finds himself in a catch-22.
The point Maher has always made about Islam -- in the context of coming from a man who is essentially opposed to any and all religion, religious belief, practice, ritual, and religiously-motivated political activities of all kinds -- is that because Islam appears to have driven so many people to do, say and believe such terrible things that maybe, just maybe, we should consider whether perhaps there is something wrong with the religion itself that makes it "worse" than other religions in this regard. That, of course, is a far cry from the unexamined, knee-jerk, wholly illiberal position that Islam is, and all Muslims are, inherently, invariably, indisputably evilwrongbad doubleplusungood period full stop.
There may be some validity to the idea that "liberals" suffer from a little hypocrisy on this point, since some are apparently willing to entertain the notion that there may be something wrong with Christianity but resist the idea that there may be something wrong with Islam. They're willing to blame the religion itself for the rhetorical and behavioral excesses of some of its adherents in the former case but not the latter. Maybe that's the debate we should have.
Liberals are almost always uncomfortable with attributing thoughts, feelings, words, actions, behaviors, wants, desires, intentions, characteristics, &c. to whole categories of people. We don't like it when conservatives do it, we don't like it when other liberals do it, we try to be careful not to do it and we always find ourselves having to backtrack and qualify everything we say with a whole list of caveats in order to avoid being accused of doing it. [I just did that myself; I edited "they're willing to entertain the notion..." to "some are apparently willing..."] Yet we do it. Especially if the category is, inter alia, "conservatives," "Republicans," "right-wingers," "Tea Partiers," or "Christians."
It can be frustrating at times to try to talk about a particular behavior observed in people of a certain category, in a way that purports to describe, analyze or criticize the behavior without being perceived as, and accused of, describing, analyzing or criticizing the category of people in which that behavior was observed and attributing that behavior to the entire category. We neither give nor receive the benefit of the doubt that we're only talking about those who actually exhibit the behavior; that never, ever "goes without saying."
My liberal friends are especially unforgiving in this regard. One in particular will absolutely not let me get away with uttering any sentence whose subject is a whole category of people -- especially if that category is "conservatives," "Republicans," "right-wingers," "Tea Partiers," or "Christians," or even worse, the phrase "these people" as a pronoun for any of the foregoing. Even if my point is to analyze what I'm observing or describing, he always reflexively and myopically reacts to and focuses on who I'm purportedly observing or describing. Thus I'm always painting with too broad a brush, unfairly attacking too many people, wrongly assuming that the entire category is guilty of the behavior, not giving enough credit or deference to "the other side," not "agreeing with" "the other side" enough or not being sufficiently willing to "agree with" them, etc. The behavior I'm trying to discuss is ignored and rendered irrelevant, and my observation and analysis thereof preemptively deemed invalid.
Of course, when the shoe is on the other foot, he also uses categories of people as the subject of sentences describing or analyzing observed behavior. No one is immune to this. No one.
Affleck did what liberals always do, which is reflexively recoil at the idea that a whole category of people could be guilty of the same behavior or the same psychology just by virtue of being in that category. Maher and Harris postulated that we should at least examine the root characteristic of that category to see if maybe there's something wrong with that root characteristic, and that there is evidence to suggest that there is. In other words, that while liberals may correctly recoil at that idea, they should not end their inquiry, debate, or understanding at that point.
It's easy to observe the behavior of discrete individuals and then leap to the conclusion that everyone belonging to the same category is of similar inclination, or that there is something wrong with that category. It's much, much harder to observe the behavior of discrete individuals, resist the conclusion that "they're all like that," and then examine the root characteristics of that category in a way that could, that might, lead to that conclusion. The former means we want to reach that conclusion; the latter means we don't, but it shouldn't mean that we can't.
It's only natural for liberals to resist illiberal conclusions, be they leapt to or reached via inquiry and examination. I think Maher's point is that that's fine, but sometimes inquiry and examination can lead us there, and we should not be afraid of that possibility.