That’s the Real Clear Politics electoral map above, they recently moved Texas to the toss-up category. Here are RCP average poll spreads and 538 win probabilities for the Toss-Up states:
Last year, I discussed how Texas could go blue this cycle. What struck me this week is that if HRC wins the first five states in the list above, Republicans will have lost each and every state with more than 11 Electoral Votes. Indiana and Tennessee would be the sole 11 EV states in the Republican column. Democrats will have swept every state with a population over 7 million.
This is, in some ways, to be expected. States with large populations tend to have large cities. These urban environments are generally more diverse. If identity drives voters’ decisions, diverse urban populations will naturally align with the more inclusive politics of Democrats. Confronted by an openly white-nationalist candidate, identity politics automatically jumps to the top of most voters’ decision matrix. If you’re Black, Latino, Asian, Native American, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim or have family and friends who are part of some minority, you are likely to feel threatened by Trump in some way. In a palpable sense, you don’t have an option in this election, the choice has been made for you.
Clearly, this is destructive for the Republican party and its future prospects. We inhabit a country shaped by demographic trends that LBJ’s administration set in motion with the immigration act of 1965. And this demographic trend has impacted his home state of Texas as much as any other. The chart on the right depicts the density of immigrants in each state. Texas (16%) trails only California (27%), New York (22%), New Jersey (21%), Florida (20%) and Nevada (19%) when it comes to immigrant population. An anti-immigrant, white nationalist party is aiming for self-destruction in such terrain. In a very real way, this radical shift in immigration policy during the 1960s ensured Democrats would win the culture wars in almost all respects. This is undoubtedly a good thing. As an immigrant who is part of a diverse family and community, it hits home.
In sharp contrast, Democrats have not won the battle when it comes to economic policies. The right has won, decisively. This is apparent in the language we all use to discuss economic issues. We talk about entrepreneurship and entitlement programs. Those are highly charged code-words created by fiscal conservatives. The implication is that entrepreneurs (alternatively “small business owners”) are deserving of state support and favorable policies. “Entitlements” carry a negative connotation, suggesting those relying on them are less deserving, they aren’t pulling on their bootstraps hard enough. We do not talk about guaranteed income, working classes or safety nets in our political discourse. We never talk about poverty. That word is anathema, though a fifth of our children live in poverty. We only talk about the middle class. Against all evidence we treat poverty as a temporary, self-inflicted experience.
The right’s victory is also reflected in Democrats’ fear of nominating anyone offering left of center economic policies. This is a mirror-image of the Republican elite’s fear of nominating an openly nativist, misogynist, racist candidate.
These changes did not happen overnight. The language we use to describe and discuss New Deal and Great Society programs did not change in a decade. It dates back to the last great re-alignment of American parties, when Democrats decisively incorporated the issue of Civil Rights and Republicans countered by adopting the Southern strategy. Matt Stoller writes about some of this eloquently in the new Atlantic article: How Democrats Killed Their Populist Soul.
Indeed, a revolution had occurred. But the contours of that revolution would not be clear for decades. In 1974, young liberals did not perceive financial power as a threat, having grown up in a world where banks and big business were largely kept under control. It was the government—through Vietnam, Nixon, and executive power—that organized the political spectrum. By 1975, liberalism meant, as Carr put it, “where you were on issues like civil rights and the war in Vietnam.” With the exception of a few new members, like Miller and Waxman, suspicion of finance as a part of liberalism had vanished.
Trump’s likely impending electoral loss might deliver a revolution in Congress, giving Democrats majorities in both houses. But the focus on identity in this cycle will deliver a victory that is a double-edged sword. If Clinton wins handily, it would re-affirm the vision of a diverse country, a clear mandate for equal rights and inclusion across the spectrum of race, gender, sexual orientation, national origin and more.
But, make no mistake, it would not provide a mandate for left-leaning economic policy. It will not deliver support for a rethink of how our political institutions interact with our business institutions. It will not re-affirm a vision of a Great Society. And that does not bode well for those among us who are hoping to see such policies enacted or hoping to see Democrats carry the torch for such policies. That work will remain to be done after the election is over.