A 2004 estimate had two million casualties in the first 24 hours of an exchange between DPRK and ROK forces.
We could see similar numbers soon if media images of the range of a possible DPRK nuclear missile strike on the continental US are any indication of ‘provocation’. Casual talk of preemptive military action is far too routine and reminiscent of previous GWOT ‘wars’.
Given his pathology, Trump may be willing to accept the historical ignominy simply because its notoriety might distract from his status in the worst US presidency in modern(sic) times.
Even worse, Trump might rationalize an attack in even more deranged terms, as it could be framed as both regime change and reunification of Korea.
Alternately, a denuclearization of North Korea could come from something Trump has decidedly little interest in, namely diplomacy. Trump’s concept of sovereignty is less than mutual, and his pretenses about strength and winning will make regional peace less viable. His issues with Iran’s denuclearization don’t offer any better insights.
Diplomatic solutions have been rendered less cooperative with Trump’s declaration of China’s competition in the National Security Strategy document. Then again, it’s been reported he hasn’t read it. By the time he does, #TrumpRussia may force him to wag a dog.
The US is ready to forcefully "denuclearise North Korea," Donald Trump's national security adviser has said, calling the state a "grave threat".
A strike against any or all North Korean nuclear facilities may trigger a DPRK response that will claim tens of thousands of Korean lives in the first moments. Short of regime decapitation, the real costs of a US strike on the DPRK will be incalculable.
North Korea is powerless to prevent a U.S. strike on its nuclear program, but retaliation is well within its means. The significant military capability that North Korea has built up against South Korea is not advanced by Western standards, but there are practical ways Pyongyang could respond to aggression.
The North Korean military's most powerful tool is artillery. It cannot level Seoul as some reports have claimed, but it could do significant damage. Pyongyang risks deteriorating its forces by exposing them to return fire, however, which significantly restricts their use. Less conventional methods of retaliation, such as sabotage or cyber warfare, are less risky but also limit the shock that North Korea would desire.
[...]
Aside from constraints on range and volume of fire, North Korea has to decide what targets to hit in South Korea. There are two realistic options: a counterforce attack or a countervalue attack. In a counterforce attack, North Korea would target South Korean and possibly even U.S. military facilities near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and north of Seoul. A countervalue attack, on the other hand, is intended to shock South Korea by causing significant civilian casualties and damage to economically critical infrastructure.
If North Korea opted for a countervalue attack, the lack of focus on South Korean and U.S. military targets would reduce Pyongyang's ability to limit any response. (Typically, the easiest way to counteract enemy artillery is to destroy it in place.) Engaging civilian targets and infrastructure would not only limit the effectiveness and sustainability of the North Korean artillery volley itself, but it would also open up Pyongyang to more significant counteraction targeting. A mix of both counterforce and countervalue responses may mitigate this risk but would in turn lower the overall effectiveness of the mission compared to full commitment.
Moreover, ballistic missiles could strike U.S. military positions beyond the Korean Peninsula, specifically in Japan. Whatever the targets, Pyongyang's existing ballistic missile stockpile could easily deliver approximately 1 kiloton (1,000 metric tons) of high explosives, as well as other nonconventional munitions — chemical, biological or even nuclear. Because of the inaccuracy of different North Korean missile systems, these strikes would most appropriately be used against urban centers or other wide-area targets. If employed against specific military facilities at longer ranges, a significant amount of misses would occur.
worldview.stratfor.com/…
While US can do the job, complete removal of the DPRK nuclear arsenal in a single air strike may not ever be possible, suggesting a protracted air/ground campaign.
In a world of perfect intelligence, the United States has the tools to dismantle the North Korean nuclear program, along with associated components, in a single, massive surprise strike.
Realistically, absent the use of nuclear weapons or the invasion and occupation of North Korea, the United States and its allies are already at a point where they cannot guarantee the complete removal of the threat of a North Korean nuclear attack.
It is important to consider the parameters of any operation; in this case, we are basing our assumptions on a scenario in which the United States conducts a limited, stealthy attack using a small number of specialized platforms and weapons systems. The United States has enormous force projection and deep-strike capabilities. In a surprise attack scenario, the primary tools for the task would be stealth aircraft and standoff cruise missiles launched from ships and submarines.
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With a force of 10 Massive Ordnance Penetrators and 80 900-kilogram GBU-31 JDAMs, the U.S. B-2 bombers alone are more than enough to dismantle or at least severely damage North Korea's known nuclear production infrastructure, as well as associated nuclear weapons storage sites.
The effectiveness of the B-2 first wave would enable the 24 F-22 fighters — and the wave of 600 or so cruise missiles sharing the skies — to focus on destroying North Korea's delivery vehicles. A single good hit from a JDAM or cruise missile is enough to knock out the nascent sea-based leg of North Korea's defensive triad. Hammering the Uiju and Changjin-up air bases, where North Korean H-5 bombers are based, would further reduce Pyongyang's most likely air delivery force for a nuclear weapon.
The most difficult target to eliminate when it comes to delivery vehicles is the missile forces. North Korea has a fleet of approximately 200 transporter erector launchers (TEL) of varying size and type spread out across the country, so the intelligence picture would have to be very accurate. With enough information, however, the United States still has more than enough firepower in a single strike to severely reduce North Korea's TEL inventory.
worldview.stratfor.com/..
(August 2017)
... Sen. Lindsey Graham said that President Trump is willing to go to war with North Korea to stop it from being able to hit the American mainland with a nuclear weapon.
“There is a military option: to destroy North Korea’s nuclear program and North Korea itself,” Graham told the Today show…
“He’s not going to allow — President Trump — the ability of this madman [Kim Jong Un] to have a missile that could hit America.
“If there’s going to be a war to stop him, it will be over there,” Graham continued. “If thousands die, they’re going to die over there. They’re not going to die over here — and he’s told me that to my face.”