It’s another Saturday, so for those who tune in, welcome to a Saturday diary of Nuts & Bolts of a Democratic Campaign. If you’ve missed out, you can catch up anytime: Just visit our group or follow Nuts & Bolts Guide.
As I noted a few weeks ago, in the new year, we’re moving on to our next project with this series, but to close out the year, I’m going through the email I receive about Nuts & Bolts, and what topics readers want addressed. This week is a subject that I have been asked frequently: we did well in 2018, but what were some of the mistakes we’ve made so we could do even better?
Even in huge wins, there are always things to learn where after the fact we think: ugh, there could have been a better way to do this—you live and learn, in good elections and bad, and you hope to constantly improve. Some mistakes are avoidable, and some are just from making a bad calculation. There are no campaigns that are mistake free. While I may pick on a few campaigns, the point isn’t to bash them, but to hopefully learn from calculations that turned out to be incorrect.
Everyone has their own lists of mistakes—but here are a few I thought were pretty significant during the 2018 election cycle.
The bet against Nancy Pelosi
Numerous campaigns started off with an idea of how they would succeed—they would denounce Nancy Pelosi at the very beginning of the race, and as a result, they would inoculate themselves from attacks regarding the Democratic leadership races.
More than 30 candidates nationally took this advice, which was flogged by several DC consultants. The problem is that for some candidates it never factored in—they said it, it didn’t come up enough in their race to matter, and it boxed them in. For a large number of other candidates, though, it meant that instead of inoculating themselves, it resulted in both sides talking continuously about Democratic leadership races, which was bad for their campaigns. Candidates put out ads noting they were different—and as a result, they took away their own airtime from discussing issues that voters did care about.
In post-election data, the only voters who voted on leadership race issues were voters who were already pre-decided. They were unlikely to ever be influenced, either way. Candidates were most effective by simply saying: “I don’t even know if she’s running, but what does that matter for our district?” Other candidates turned the question around: “Well, I know I won’t be backing someone who supports Trump” in bluer districts.
Either way, they didn’t continuously talk about a leadership race that they weren’t yet a part of.
Unelected legislator
Few mistakes stand out in data I’ve seen like the mistake of Phil Bredesen in the Tennessee Senate, making pronouncements of how he would vote in the Brett Kavanaugh nomination. Bredesen wasn’t alone in making announcements of how he would vote on the USSC pick, or how he would legislate if already elected. Candidates in numerous races thought they could show who they were by talking about how they would vote on pending legislation, often to make themselves seem more “moderate.” The decision to do so was an absolute disaster.
Within 48 hours of Bredesen’s announcement he would support Kavanaugh, you could sit back and watch the reductions of people who were willing to volunteer time and effort to work on behalf of that campaign. Outside groups, who provide a lot of the energy to campaigns by offering volunteers, canvassers, phone bankers, etc. sat back and watched as the number of people interested in helping took a giant nosedive.
This is something that happens every cycle, people believe that they can triangulate their way into office by making grand statements. It might help (a little) but the consequence is continuously damning: it sucks all the energy out of the most active volunteers you need most in order to succeed.
Candidates who take this tact, or get advice to do so, whether it is a USSC nomination or a piece of legislation, should pretty well fire their consultants. There is a much simpler way to handle this, and in the case of the USSC nomination, a much safer, respectable way. For Bredesen the answer should have been: “The role of the Senate is to advise and consent. I don’t have access to the FBI report. So I don’t know what it says. I don’t know how I’d vote, and I think it is irresponsible to say much either way when I don’t have all the facts.” And then you move on.
For House candidates who also debated budget legislation, including the Farm Bill, by saying they would vote for or against pending legislation, the answer is still simple: “I can’t speak to current legislation because I’m not there, and it could be amended or changed. I know what I do want and...” talk about what you intend to do or how you intend to govern. Don’t talk about a process you aren’t currently involved in.
Running our own show
It is impossible in the modern era for a campaign to address all of the issues that come at them. Outside spending, outside advocacy organizations and on the ground organizing efforts by party organizations are crucial in how your campaign functions. Despite decades worth of data on this point, several campaigns at the state and local level run every cycle that haven’t modernized their thinking on how to win.
As a result, some campaigns continue to run “their own shop.” These efforts shut out outside voices from the campaign and make it very difficult for people to help. Campaigns that cut themselves off from party resources or from local groups often find they can’t muster the resources needed reliably to compete. Your strongest volunteers and advocates aren’t only associated with your campaign, they are also the volunteers and organizers who want to help any and every Democratic campaign near them.
When we get reports that a campaign is going to opt out of state or local efforts to turn out the vote or reach voters at the door, it is a good sign that that campaign is going to struggle.
Next week on Nuts & Bolts: Some of the best ideas of 2018