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Tune-in next week for the latest episode of this seemingly endless saga: “Let Mueller Speak” ...
[...]
The demands for Mueller to testify before Congress reached a new level of urgency this week, after internal correspondence was revealed to show Mueller objected to Attorney General William Barr’s handling of his investigative findings in late March.
The revelations prompted Democrats to amplify their distrust of Barr over his disclosures about the Mueller report’s remarks on obstruction of justice while whetting the appetite for testimony from the special counsel that now appears likely in the House later this month.
House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) stressed that the testimony is vital, given Mueller’s evident frustrations with Barr's summary assessment of the 448-page report.
"I hope that he is desirous of testifying so that he can, from his perspective, talk to the American people, and to the representatives of the American people, on what his views are," Hoyer told reporters this week. "Clearly, this letter indicates that they are not being represented by Attorney General Barr."
[...]
Really? They have to hear Mueller, in person. Before they can act. OK.
But there really is another way to figure out what Mueller wants Congress to do:
Search the word “Congress” in the Mueller Report itself.
Eventually they would get to these Mueller “instructions” for them (recommendations, rights, responsibilities) …
It’s almost like Robert Mueller left us several Constitutional “Easter eggs” hiding in plain sight:
[pg 176] {emphasis added}
c. Congress Has Power to Protect Congressional, Grand Jury, and Judicial Proceedings Against Corrupt Acts from Any Source
Where a law imposes a burden on the President's performance of Article II functions, separation-of-powers analysis considers whether the statutory measure "is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress." Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443. Here, Congress enacted the obstruction-of-justice statutes to protect, among other things, the integrity of its own proceedings, grand jury investigations, and federal criminal trials. Those objectives are within Congress's authority and serve strong governmental interests.
i. Congress has Article I authority to define generally applicable criminal law and apply it to all persons—including the President. Congress clearly has authority to protect its own legislative functions against corrupt efforts designed to impede legitimate fact-gathering and lawmaking efforts. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 206-207 (1957); Chapman v. United States, 5 App. D.C. 122, 130 ( 1895). Congress also has authority to establish a system of federal courts, which includes the power to protect the judiciary against obstructive acts. See U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, els. 9, 18 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" and "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers"). The long lineage of the obstruction-of-justice statutes, which can be traced to at least 183 I , attests to the necessity for that protection. See An Act Declaratory of the Law Concerning Contempts of Court, 4 Stat. 487-488 § 2 (1831) (making it a crime if "any person or persons shall corruptly ... endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or officer, in any court of the United States, in the discharge of his duty, or shall, corruptly ... obstruct, or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice therein").
ii. The Article III courts have an equally strong interest in being protected against obstructive acts, whatever their source. [...]
[pg 177-8] {emphasis added}
* * *
The final step in the constitutional balancing process is to assess whether the separation-of-powers doctrine permits Congress to take action within its constitutional authority notwithstanding the potential impact on Article II functions. See Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691-693, 695-696; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711-712. In the case of the obstruction-of-justice statutes, our assessment of the weighing of interests leads us to conclude that Congress has the authority to impose the limited restrictions contained in those statutes on the President's official conduct to protect the integrity of important functions of other branches of government.
A general ban on corrupt action does not unduly intrude on the President's responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. ART IT, §§ 3.[1090] To the contrary, the concept of "faithful execution" connotes the use of power in the interest of the public, not in the office holder's personal interests. See 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 763 (1755) ("faithfully" def. 3: " [w]ith strict adherence to duty and allegiance"). And immunizing the President from the generally applicable criminal prohibition against corrupt obstruction of official proceedings would seriously impair Congress's power to enact laws "to promote objectives within [its] constitutional authority," Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 425—i.e., protecting the integrity of its own proceedings and the proceedings of Article III courts and grand juries.
Accordingly, based on the analysis above, we were not persuaded by the argument that the President has blanket constitutional immunity to engage in acts that would corruptly obstruct justice through the exercise of otherwise-valid Article II powers.[1091]
At the very least, Congress should read these Mueller takes on their “authorities and responsibilities” BEFORE he testifies on their political stage. (Concerned citizens should read them too. It’s only a functioning Democracy, that adheres to the Rule of Law and the Constitution, that hangs in the balance.)
The worst thing they can do is, NOT read the homework, before the “Professor” gives them a Pop-Quiz.
That’s a recipe for looking worst than Trump, Barr, and the band of “High Crimes” enablers.
Too much is at stake to just try and wing-it when the pivotal plot point arrives, on the big stage.
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Extra Credit:
One very important footnote:
[1091] A possible remedy through impeachment for abuses of power would not substitute for potential criminal liability after a President leaves office. Impeachment would remove a President from office, but would not address the underlying culpability of the conduct or serve the usual purposes of the criminal law. Indeed, the Impeachment Judgment Clause recognizes that criminal law plays an independent role in addressing an official's conduct, distinct from the political remedy of impeachment. See U.S. CONST. ART. l , § 3, cl. 7. Impeachment is also a drastic and rarely invoked remedy, and Congress is not restricted to relying only on impeachment, rather than making criminal law applicable to a former President, as OLC has recognized. A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 255 ("Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not preclude such prosecution once the President's term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by resignation or impeachment.").
{emphasis added}
Hmmm, seems like the Special Counsel Office had several “remedies” in mind, for addressing the outrageous conduct and corrupt intents of Individual-One.
Why else spell out these possible “remedies” in such excoriating detail.
I guess Robert Mueller has not learned the art of the sound-bite. Rather just the breadth and depth of applicable Constitutional Law.
We should all be so well versed ...
IF our Constitution is indeed something worth saving, something worth upholding.
Something worth following.
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