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July 31st 1914, Berlin
“If the iron dice must roll, may God help us.” – German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg
The Kaiser was in a stormy mood. Despite increasing evidence to the contrary, he had stubbornly believed that England would remain neutral. He wrongly assumed that George V’s informal remarks on nonintervention reflected settled British policy. Only now did Wilhelm appreciate that Britain would stand with France.
As the oldest grandson of Queen Victoria, Wilhelm’s relationship with Britain was complicated. His opinions oscillated from admiration to jealous hatred. Repeatedly, Wilhelm found that his grandiose ambitions conflicted with established British Imperial interests. He attempted bully Britain into friendship through an aggressive naval program, which only alienated the British and pushed them closer to France. Then, he tried to split the nascent Anglo-French entente through provocative actions that only deepened the impression of Germany as a militaristic menace. In his diplomacy, he resorted to a bizarre mix of intimidation and flattery, on full display in a disastrous 1908 Daily Telegraph interview. Rather than recognizing that his bellicose foreign policy had caused the rift with Britain, Wilhelm blamed his uncle, King Edward VII, lashing out with personal attacks.
Infuriated by Britain’s “perfidy,” Wilhelm launched into a virulent and conspiratorial rant, blasting the English as “that filthy nation of grocers.” He claimed that the Triple Entente was using Germany’s alliance with Austria-Hungary “as the pretext for launching a war of annihilation against us.” Then, Wilhelm moved from self-pity to malice, threatening that if war came, he would whip up the Muslim subjects of the British Empire in a revolutionary jihad. The Kaiser swore, “if we are to bleed to death, then England must at least lose India.”
For the Fatherland
On the evening of July 30th, Army Chief Moltke and War Minister Falkenhayn had finally convinced Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to announce a state of imminent war. Mobilization would automatically follow. German mobilization meant an invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium, so Bethmann-Hollweg’s order would begin the final cascade to European War. Bethmann-Hollweg had previously resisted the military’s calls for mobilization due not only to the awesome gravity of the decision but also because of the domestic implications. Left-wing politicians had criticized the German government’s handling of the crisis. If Germany moved first against Russia, the anti-war Social Democrats (the Reichstag’s largest party), might dig in their heels. Then, Germany would enter the conflict divided.
Thus, Russian mobilization was a godsend to Bethmann-Hollweg. On July 31st, moments before the Chancellor announced the state of imminent war, news of the Russian decision reached Berlin. Bethmann-Hollweg argued that Germany sought peace, but the sword had been forced into her hands. However, his private comments belie his pacifism. He explained that Russian “mobilization measures cannot be compared with those of the West European states” and by these measures “Russia does not intend to wage war.” Regardless, the propaganda value of Russian mobilization could not be overstated. Germany would unite to defend the fatherland.
Resistance melted away. Protests and rallies against war were canceled. Plans for a general strike were quashed by newly patriotic of labor leaders and socialist deputies. In the Reichstag, the Social Democrats voted overwhelmingly to approve war credits. They pledged “in the hour of danger, we shall not leave the Fatherland in the lurch.” The new political reality delighted the Kaiser. From his palace balcony, he declared: “I no longer think in terms of parties or confessions; today we are all German brothers and only German brothers.” The fear of Russian hordes sweeping into Germany turned the most cultured intellectuals into flag-waving nationalists.
A Flurry of Ultimatums
Vindicated by Russia’s mobilization, Bethmann-Hollweg dispatched a telegram to his ambassador in St. Petersburg. “We are compelled to declare imminent danger of war, which is not yet mobilization. But [mobilization] will follow if Russia does not tell us within 12 hours that [her] mobilization has stopped.” Ambassador Pourtalès headed to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov, for another contentious meeting. Reviewing the ultimatum, Sazonov stood firm. He explained that Russian mobilization was “technically impossible to suspend.” However, he stressed that unlike German mobilization, Russian mobilization did not mean war. Pourtalès tactfully tried to drive home the gravity of Sazonov’s choice. If Russia did not stop mobilization, “a European war could scarcely be prevented.”
In Paris, German Ambassador Schoen had also received instructions from Berlin. Like his colleague in St. Petersburg, Schoen faced an unenviable task. Germany’s ultimatum demanded that France renounce her alliance with Russia and remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Additionally, to guarantee her neutrality, France must hand over to Germany her major fortresses at Toul and Verdun for the duration of the war. Berlin knew Paris would never accept these demands. Germany’s bullying tone again revealed her ham-handed diplomacy and strengthened French resolve. Army Chief Joseph Joffre’s had previously been denied permission to mobilize by the civilian government. However, given the German threat, French mobilization was approved on August 1st.
A third European capital received a German ultimatum. This ultimatum came not from Bethmann-Hollweg, but Moltke, who had sent a sealed envelope to Brussels. The German embassy in Brussels was under strict orders not to open the envelope until informed by Berlin. Inside, the note declared that Germany was compelled by French actions to violate Belgian sovereignty. It demanded that the German army pass through Belgium unmolested. Nearly one-million Germans were expected to funnel through Belgium. Belgian resistance at the well-defended forts of Liege and Namur could choke off the German advance. For Moltke’s plans, speed was essential. Belgium would soon face a daunting choice.
Choosing the Great War
Moltke’s focus on Belgium reveals a shift in the German leadership’s strategic thinking. Previously, Germany had tried to localize the conflict. Now, the Balkans became a sideshow.
For the past two days, Bethmann-Hollweg had been urging Austria-Hungary to negotiate with Serbia and Russia. Yet, with the announcement of Russian mobilization, the Chancellor abruptly changed course. Berlin would cease all efforts to restrain Vienna or mediate. Henceforth, military logistics would replace diplomatic proposals in Berlin and Vienna’s communications.
Once Germany had decided on war with Russia, she would need the Austria-Hungary’s assistance in the East. To this end, Moltke called his opposite number, General Conrad, to ask Austria-Hungary to redeploy her forces against Russia. Writing to Franz Josef, the Kaiser captured the new German view: “Serbia plays quite a secondary role.” Although Conrad agreed to mobilize against Russia, he refused to cancel his campaign against the Serbs. His dual strategy would prove a disaster. By splitting her armies, Austria-Hungary would lack adequate troops to defend against the Russians or attack successfully against Serbia.
Why did German leaders commit to a European War at this juncture? For Moltke, the racial war between “Teuton and Slav” was “bound to come sooner or later.” Bethmann-Hollweg had a similarly fatalistic view on the coming “racial struggle”. If war was inevitable, July 1914 was Germany’s best chance. Britain was on the verge of Civil War over the Irish question. France had been preoccupied by unceasing scandals. Russia remained a few years away from completing her army modernization program. As Moltke declared, “we shall never hit it again so well as we do now.” In a few years, the power of the Entente would make German victory unthinkable.
Austria-Hungary’s involvement also increased the chances that Germany would pursue a wider war. Not only could Germany ill-afford to lose her only reliable ally, but a European conflict, Austro-Hungarian forces would be essential in the East. Recent crises had shown Austria-Hungary unwilling to back Germany against the Entente. In a Russo-German War, would Austria-Hungary come to Germany’s aid? German leaders worried that if they did not fight alongside Austria-Hungary now, Germany might fight alone later.
Over the last week of July, it became apparent that Russia would not allow Austria-Hungary to destroy Serbia. To Germany, Russia’s military preparations demonstrated her malevolent intentions towards the Central Powers. If Germany would fight, the diplomats must give way to the generals. Always critical and contemptuous of the civilian leadership, Moltke and Falkenhayn began bypassing Bethmann-Hollweg in their communications with Austria-Hungary. As the militarists took control in Berlin, the gears of war turned ever-faster.
Read More
Fair or not, the ultimatums to France, Russia, and Belgium cast Germany as the aggressor. The pretext of Russian belligerence, so effective in spurring German patriotism, looked particularly flimsy outside the Reich.
While scholars argue about German intentions in early July, by July 30th, German leadership had decided that a European War was inevitable. For the remainder of the crisis, Germany’s actions would reflect that reality. Once again, Fritz Fischer’ Germany’s Aims in the First World War paints a dark picture of Germany’s aggressive and dishonest actions she prepared for war. The Last Kaiser by Giles MacDonogh explores the Kaiser’s turbulent personality. His bombast has often been confused with belligerence, but to understand his role in 1914, a more nuanced view is necessary.