Friday’s Voting Rights Roundup covered a development (end of the linked post) in the Florida re-enfranchisement lawsuit before US District Court — the judge asked for arguments about whether the original amendment was itself a poll tax and therefore in violation of the US Constitution. I have a pretty wild guess about that, and I invite comments from those who are better informed or more expert. **This is pure speculation: I haven’t read anything except the original VRR post. IANAL.**
Is it plausible that Judge Hinkle asked for this argumentation in order to bolster an eventual ruling that will direct re-enfranchisement to proceed regardless of court debts, and would block the legislature’s interfering law?
(Quick timeline refresher — Nov 2018, FL elected a GOP governor and GOP US Senator, but a super-majority approved a state-constitutional amendment to automatically restore voting rights to most felons upon completion of their sentence; June 2019 — FL Governor signed a law requiring that all fines and fees be fully paid before voting is restored, and voter advocates sued to block it as a poll tax. We thought we got rid of those with federal Amendment 24 in the 1960s.)
I have a gut instinct that says there is some rule, precedent, or principle, kinda analogous to Chevron deference, guiding courts to prefer a non-conflicting interpretation of laws over alternate readings that create conflict with other statutes. If I were the judge here, I would want to hear arguments about the possibility of conflict between the poll tax ban (US Const.) and the re-enfranchisement amendment (FL Const.). That might be the best way to actually tackle the original intent / plain text meaning of the amendment, and definitely the best bridge to ruling on the basis of non-conflicting interpretation.
There are essentially 3 possible readings of the amendment as written:
- It requires that court debts be counted among the terms of sentence (#1)
- It allows the legislature to determine whether court debts get counted (#2)
- It excludes court debts from counting among the terms of sentence (#3)
Now, let’s assume that counting court debts among the terms of sentence is in fact an unconstitutional poll tax (and assume I’m right above about preferring non-conflicting interpretations). So long as ‘exclude debts from counting’ is a reasonable interpretation, courts are basically required to read the amendment that way, because that’s the only reading that prevents conflict with the federal constitution. As a political calculation, this is also best for the integrity and efficacy of the re-enfranchisement, because it doesn’t allow the legislature to make further, more targeted attempts to chip away via poverty.
If I were the judge, and I saw this as the most secure footing for issuing a ruling, I would want the attorneys to squarely address the original intent and meaning of the amendment. There could be good reason to see this as the most secure footing — it evades comparing the reasonableness of reading #2 vs #3; there’s no question of deferring to the legislature in its understanding of the constitutional text, etc. Could this be why Judge Hinkle asked for that argumentation?
What other explanations are there? Obviously, the easiest explanation would be that Hinkle plans to strike the re-enfranchisement amendment entire by finding it non-severably enacts a poll tax. Is that likely?