It’s that time again. This is the third in a series that includes 4th Qtr 2023 and 1st Qtr 2024. Those who are curious can go back to those two by following the links provided. Those who remember them can skip much of the next couple of paragraphs since the Purpose and Method remained pretty much unchanged from 1st Qtr. For those new to this series:
PURPOSE:
With the to-and-fro of the war, it is easy to lose sight of the overall progress of battle on the ground itself and to lose a sense of scale. This area changes hands and that field gets taken and, what does it mean? How good or bad is it? There are not many maps on DKos anymore.
There are many ways to measure what is happening: equipment, casualties, major events, this plane, that air defense piece, … All of these are discussed in detail elsewhere on DKos. The data on these are often unreliable and the analyses are open to opinion and bias, so who you wish to believe is your choice. Meanwhile, reporting of the back-and-forth on the ground itself is uneven and incomplete possibly because the ground war is, with some notable exceptions, pretty boring.
This is a presentation of who has attacked where and who has captured what ground. It is not an attempt to pass any sort of judgement. It is simply a listing of results. Anything that is opinion here is pretty obvious and often presented with a heavy dose of snark. (Who, me???) I also try to separate opinion from fact if there is any doubt.
Before someone says, “What about xxxxxx?” This also intentionally ignores the fairly successful long-range attacks going on and other one-off factors that are amply covered elsewhere, e.g. Black Sea, Crimea, oil facilities, glide bombs, dirigibles, amphibious assaults, Putin’s cancer, the continuously “about to collapse” morale of the Russian army, etc. This is the ground war only.
METHOD:
As with equipment and casualties, there are various sources for what happens on the ground, e.g. the mappers. However, with some exceptions, many of these mappers pretty closely agree with each other within a few hundred meters with the main difference between them being WHEN each mapper makes a change in the location of the “front lines.” For this effort, I regularly follow three mappers and, since they largely agree, use one as the baseline for the details. That baseline map is the Ukraine Control Map by Project Owl OSINT. Note that this source has moved and this is a slightly different link from last quarter.
Daily, I download the Ukraine Control Map and other updates to my GoogleEarth manually (the automatic download hasn’t been functioning well for me recently). On 30 March, I saved the location of the front line. Over the course of the last three months, each day, I compared this front line with the previous day’s line noting movements. On 30 June, I again saved the front line. In the map photos below, the PURPLE line is 30 March and the GREEN line is 30 June. The difference is recorded as RED (Russian advance) or BLUE (Ukrainian advance). I will show these in segments and discuss from N to S. I have stuck the northernmost Kharkiv events at the end since that area is active and it is disconnected from the traditional “front.”
All map photos below are the same scale except AVDIIVKA, which would not fit at the scale the rest are shown. I’ve done this to make rough visual comparisons between sections possible.
Finally, there are a number of minor (less than 2 sq km with one exception) isolated movements that I won’t bother showing since they amount to almost nothing and may even represent adjustments by the mappers rather than actual movement. They are included in the totals presented at the end, though.
Again this quarter, I saved the front line every week, so WHEN things happened is trackable. The short version is as follows:
- The first three weeks were a continuation of the previous quarter’s slow 3 sq km per day pace. The only notable advance was westward from Bakhmut finally securing Ivanivske after weeks of trying.
- Weeks 4 and 5 (21 Apr-4 May) is when the REALLY poor defense at Ochertyne west of Avdiivka caused a huge problem (see below in the Avdiivka section). Mostly due to that section, Russia captured about 70 sq km in two weeks, a more respectable pace.
- The next two weeks (5-18 May) was the meat of the Russian attack in the N toward Kharkiv. In two sectors (see the Kharkiv section for more) in those two weeks, Russia captured over 210 sq km or 15 sq km per day, over 10 times the pace of 4th Qtr 2023. However, what they were taking was largely unoccupied or lightly defended farmland and a couple of sacrificial/ undefendable small border towns while freshly supplied and ready to go.
- After about two weeks, the defense up N stiffened and Russia’s pace again slowed to a crawl. Weeks 8-10 (19 May-8 June), Russia netted less than 45 sq km total or back down to about 2 sq km per day. Russia had committed everything to that N attack and it stalled. Only small chunks happened elsewhere as a result.
- For the rest of June’s three weeks, Russia was able to restart some of the other action along the front and may have started a “Summer Offensive” according to some. They netted a bit over 100 sq km in this period or about 5 sq km per day. This isn’t fast, but it is noticeably more than they were able to achieve in the second quarter. About double. A big chunk of the last three weeks was gains in the middle Donetsk area, specifically Ochertyne, Marinka, and Novomykhailivka. More on each below.
Philosophical Question of the Day: Can something really be called a “Summer Offensive” if no one is really sure if it’s started? Just sayin’.
So, here we go:
KUP’YANS’K AND VICINITY:
There was much less activity at the N end of the line than in previous periods. That’s not to say it was quiet. The Russians pretty regularly attacked up there, but it seemed smaller and less urgent. That small BLUE patch there (about 1.4 sq km) has gone back and forth a couple of times over the last nine months. The wide red patch to its east is an attack by the Russians just last week so maybe things are getting ready to heat back up. Total in this sector, Russia took about 14 sq km and Ukraine took a little over one. Hopefully, Ukraine has prepared defenses behind the areas they had to leave.
TABAIVKA:
Again, not very active compared to previous periods, but some movement. As you can see, Russia did nothing in the center towards Tabaivka itself, but did advance on the left and right flanks capturing just under 25 sq km which includes most or all of the tiny town of Berestove, Ivanivka, Kyslivka, and Kotlyarivka. There’s another 4-5 sq km of empty field not shown just south of this area that Russia took, also.
NOVOVODIANE:
This is a new sector that has seen little sustained activity in the six months before this period. Russia pushed out from the town making a 1-½ km deep 5 sq km bulge of farmland in late-May.
AREA W OF KREMINNA and BILOHORIVKA:
Ukraine successfully pushed back against the Russia’s previous advances towards Terny retaking about 7 sq km total. Those fields there have passed back and forth several times over the past year. You couldn’t pay me enough to plow them once this is all over. They are littered with dead tanks and other armor of all varieties and who knows how many mines and duds. This has been one of the more active, attacked areas in previous quarters. It was relatively quiet this quarter.
That blue square down to the SE is a section of forest that Ukraine recaptured to much fanfare (3-4 sq km). Further SW (you can barely see a sliver of red there by the word Google) is Bilohorivka. I have it shown only because a) it has been shown in previous editions of this series as a place where there was a lot of fighting and b) there was a fair amount of fighting this time as well. However, nothing was really accomplished. Various tiny little patches went back and forth and everyone ended up very close to where they started. It’s a pock-marked moonscape, now.
VESELE:
Those who have read previous additions of this may recall me showing the six month effort by a Russian commander to attack 2 km up a narrow railroad track at that white arrow there. Well, he finally managed this time to accomplish a bit more with a wide 2 km advance along an 11 km wide front capturing a bit over 22 sq km. It’s almost all farm and marsh, though he now threatens to take the small town of Rozdolivka on the NW corner of that red patch. That last bit happened just last week.
BAKHMUT, CHASIV YAR, AND VICINITY:
This area has been discussed a fair amount here. In particular, the importance of Chasiv Yar because of the terrain and its location on high ground.
Many people believe this is Russia’s main effort. Russia has been continuing its slow grind toward the town taking that N red swath of about 18 sq km, this effort has been both painful and painfully slow. They did manage finally to take Ivaniske on the S tip of that red blob. They worked on that for 2-3 months before Ukraine finally had to back out.
Making it much harder for them are two small “suburbs” to the west of the main town they have to take and clear and the irrigation canal that runs N — S just to the E of town they have to cross. Then, they get to attack uphill. There is now fighting on the outskirts of Chasiv Yar itself, though.
Additionally, Russia has been attacking toward Klishchiivka capturing 4-5 sq km. This is another area that has passed back and forth over the past year. Russia is in the N end of town and Ukraine has the S end. Russia is actively attacking in this town now.
TORETSK:
This is a recent addition to the list of places Russia is pushing. The mappers disagree a bit here on how much success Russia has seen. The red patch you see here is 7-8 sq km. One other mapper has Russia seeing success in an additional area where you see that southern red arrow. This sometimes happens when an attack is very recent. This all happened in the past 10 days or so. It will take a few days to settle out.
Some theorize that this attack toward Toretsk is an attempt to flank Chasiv Yar from the S or perhaps an attempt to approach Kostyantynivka (and eventually perhaps even Kramatorsk) from the S. However, Chasiv Yar is 20 km N of here and Kostyantynivka is 20 km NW with a ton of tough territory in between. At Russia’s rate of advance, it would take probably a year to cover that distance.
AVDIIVKA AND VICINITY:
This continues to be by far the most successful sector for Russia. This map is at a different scale from the others so it will fit in. That big red blotch is 147 sq km. Added to the ground Russia took in the previous two quarters inn Avdiivka and you have 290 sq km (Crater Lake Park in Oregon).
I had previously stated the Russia would not see a “breakout” here as some folks feared. I stand by this as advancing 5-7 km in three months, as is the case for most of the sector, ain’t a breakout. However, as most of you know (and can see), they DID see a notable success in the N part of this sector with a 12-15 km advance including the town of Ocheretyne (written about here). Some might count this as a “breakout,” though it since seems to have been controlled, though at significant cost. In my defense, I did not have “Ukrainian unit stomps on its dingus with golf shoes” on my Bingo card. A Ukrainian unit apparently screwed up perdy bigly. Some say that the side that wins a war is the side that makes the fewest mistakes. This was a mistake by Ukraine, but Russia makes a bunch more.
MAR’INKA:
That red blotch in the S kinda joins two sectors, so it will be seen twice. The N blotch is Russia attacking Krasnohorivka. There’s a pocket there to the SE of town that Ukraine is gonna need to get out of or they are going to be surrounded soon, so expect this front line to change in the next couple of days. Additionally, Russia took Mar’inka itself last quarter and is continuing that attack further W toward Maksymil’yanivka, but they are doing so incredibly slowly. Those three N red blobs are about 17 sq km total.
NOVOMYKHAILIVKA , VOLODYMYRIVKA, VUHLEDAR:
This one is a bit interesting. First, the N end of that top big red blob is shown on the last map, for those that are curious. Next, I believe the key to this whole thing is the “fortress” of Vuhledar and its eastern flank “guardian.” Russia has been banging its head against that town for something like a year, now. The fields around it look like a parking lot of dead Russian vehicles. Unable to capture it by repeated direct assault, Russia seems to be trying to flank Vuhledar by heading towards it from the E and NE.
However, there is that white thing near the bottom, its “guardian.” That is a stone quarry. Apparently, it is a very well-defended stone quarry. The Russians are stopped about 1,000 meters away (nice machinegun range) and have been stuck there for a while. However, the attack further N puts the quarry at risk of being surrounded. So flanking the quarry to the N collapses the E flank which then allows Russia to approach Vuhledar from the E and N.
This is a fluid situation and one mapper has this quarry already in Russian hands. Hopefully he is wrong (he does tend to move earlier). Regardless, I do not expect it to hold out much longer. Its supply line is already in direct fire range from the N and S.
Overall, Russia is up 45-50 sq km in this sector and is likely to take more in the next week or two. Keep your eyes on this one.
STAROMAIORS’KE AREA:
This is Russia continuing to “undo” the Ukrainian offensive of last year (opinion). They took 10 sq km that includes most of Staromaiors’ke and Urozhaine.
ROBOTYNE ENCLAVE:
And ditto that here. Russia took most of Robotyne back (9 sq km) after having pushed Ukraine back from Verbove last quarter. Ukraine took 8-9 sq km of fields, in mid-late June, too.
DNIPRO LEFT BANK:
I get the feeling (opinion) that the two sides have decided pretty much to back off to the Dnipro banks with the sole exception to that being Krynky. Ukraine left two minor pockets on the left bank (red) and also withdrew some forces from the marshy areas along the river itself.
Krynky has been fairly quiet as well. The only reason to maintain a position on the left bank is to be able to say to the world that you still have a position on the left bank (opinion).
KHARKIV:
Now the new one to the N. I hesitate to call this one “Kharkiv” since the city was never at risk and was never going to be at risk given the relatively small-sized force Russia assembled up there (opinion). However, Russia attacked in two places, advanced a bit, got stopped, withdrew some, and lost its ass doing so. The start of things is detailed in previous writings here and here.
This is where we are now.
In the E, Russia attacked and took most of Vovchans’k. Ukraine has put great effort into taking that town back and has somewhat succeeded. Much of the town is back under Ukrainian control, though we are waiting to see what happens with the Russian troops holed up in the aggregate factory. Reports vary, but it is likely they will either withdraw or surrender within a few days. That is what has been said for … a few days, now. That position is being squeezed hard. Total area now occupied by Russia in the E is 90-95 sq km.
In the west, it’s mainly farmland, so Ukraine is putting less resources into this area and there is less movement. For a while, it seemed Lyptsi would be threatened, but Ukraine stopped the advance before this became a problem. Total area now occupied is 80-85 sq km.
Russia has chewed up multiple units trying this N offensive stunt and its main accomplishment is likely in the western press reaction. That may be enough, though, to make it worthwhile since much of what matters in this war is not anywhere near a battlefield or gun or plane (opinion).
SO WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE US?
- Overall, since 30 Mar, Russia has captured about 511 sq km and Ukraine has captured about 25 sq km for a net change of about 486 sq km.
- Russia’s overall pace once more picked up from 2.7 sq km per day to about 5.1 sq km per day. In previous quarters, I have used the word “trivial” to describe the rate at which Russia is advancing. That is in military terms, not human terms. I don’t think 5 clicks a day is trivial, but it is still quite small in relation to the overall task at hand.
- Again, many of these advances are of little to no value militarily. There are exceptions to this. The snail-like advance toward Chasiv Yar could be useful if they finally succeed in taking that town. Vuhledar is a useful objective. The attack in the N, had it been successful (Hint: It was NEVER going to be successful), could have been useful as well. In particular, the temporary breach at Ocheretyne was a minor success. Just imagine what could have happened if Russia, instead of moving troops up N for that failed offensive, had 10K troops available in Donetsk to throw into that penetration at Ocheretyne. THAT could have been a breakthrough. Until their logistics crap out like they always do.
- Once more (opinion), the main effect is likely political and the affect this has on public opinion. “Russia advances.” What doesn’t get mentioned often in those headlines is that these advances are at close to a crawl, and they seem to get their asses shot off while crawling.
- Opinion: With Avdiivka captured, Russia seems to have once more become more aggressive. However, unlike before, they seem to be concentrating a bit more: Chasiv Yar, Vuhledar, and west of Avdiivka. The exception to that was the attack up toward Kharkiv.
- While they are doing a bit in places like Robotyne, Staromaiors’ke, Dnipro left bank, Kup’yans’k, Keminna, and similar places, they don’t seem to be pouring lots of resources into those areas. Russia not attacking EVERYWHERE and gaining the ability to concentrate instead of “SQUIRREL!!” is not a good thing for Ukraine.
- The other explanation for this new ability to concentrate is that they don’t HAVE the resources to spend on all of those places. And that would be a very GOOD thing for Ukraine.
- As I said at the outset, this does not seek to examine what this is doing to the two forces (men, equipment, supply, etc.).
- This comment is a repeat of last quarter and applies only to the first few weeks. At the very time when Ukraine seemed the most vulnerable due to lack of western ammunition supply, Russia lacked the ability to press the advantage.
- All of this could change tomorrow. This is looking backwards at the past three months only along with some comparisons and references to the previous three.
How Big is This?
Last quarter I illustrated the small size of Russia’s accomplishments with the “Ukrainian Eye Test.” This quarter, I will show scale a different way. In 9 months of me doing this, Russia has netted about 825 sq km. This is what 825 sq km looks like:
NINE MONTHS!!!
That’s Brooke, Ohio, and Hancock Counties plus a bit of Marshall County, West Virginia. Now, let’s compare that to what it has cost Russia. In those 9 months, Ukraine lists Russia’s losses as follows:
|
Total |
Per Sq Km |
Casualties |
264,570 |
320.7 |
Equipment |
|
|
Tanks |
3,389 |
4.1 |
APCs/IFVs |
6,540 |
7.9 |
Artillery |
8,086 |
9.8 |
MLRS, Air Defense, Special |
2,166 |
2.6 |
Planes, Helos, Ships |
63 |
0.1 |
Trucks |
10,789 |
13.1 |
Total Equipment |
31,033 |
37.6 |
Almost 38 dead pieces of equipment in every square kilometer!
The population of that area of WV is about 95K. Using a ratio of 2.2:1 wounded to deaths (opinion), that means 82,700 dead. That would mean about 7 out of every 8 people in those counties would be dead. And another almost twice that population would be wounded. Russia would have lost one and a half casualties taking my yard.
That’s ludicrous.