I have long argued that Israel’s strategic position in the Middle East is fundamentally untenable. Its national policy of maintaining a tiny empire in Palestine evoked hostility among the populace in the Arab world and direct resistance in Palestine and Lebanon. This policy has only been sustained by Israeli military superiority over its neighbors, a fact that was in turn largely sustained by three things:
1) Massive American subsidies to Israel,
2) The weakness and corruption of Arab governments, and their willingness to toe the US (and hence the Israeli) line, and
3) The willingness of Arab autocrats to suppress their own people.
Item number 1 was generally considered to be the most important. However, those subsidies will continue (and likely increase) in the future, but Israel's strategic position will begin to collapse because of changes in points 2 and 3 (as part of changes across the Arab and wider world).
Israel’s national policy amounts to a decades-long game of king of the hill. As any child knows, you can’t stay on top forever. Unless your mom calls you in for supper (an unlikely event in international affairs), you will inevitably lose your place at the top no matter how strong you are.
My position is not particularly controversial (many informed observers hold the same position), nor is it particularly challenging to hold (since it will be generally proved “at some point in the future” without me needing to prove it today). Nonetheless, while Israel’s strategic position has not yet collapsed, a number of recent stories highlight the extent to which it is collapsing. This collapse will not be immediate, but it will be very real, and it should be cheered. It should be noted that the collapse of Israel’s strategic position does not mean Israel “will be destroyed” (any more than the collapse of the US position in Vietnam destroyed America or the collapse of Napoleon’s position in central Europe destroyed France). This is a boogeyman used to suggest any analyst not cheering Israel must be anti-semitic. However, the collapse of Israel’s strategic position will mean that Israel’s current policy of mini-empire will become untenable. Israel will be forced to choose a new path, one that involves better relations with the nations around it and the Palestinians currently living within it. Israel can choose to abandon its empire and allow a Palestinian state (which it officially supports) to form. Or it can grant Palestinians (the vast majority of whom were born under Israeli rule) civil rights. Either path will work but standing pat on the current strategy will not. Israel’s tiny empire in Palestine is simply becoming untenable.
Some Items to Consider
1. Egypt.
The biggest change is, of course, Egypt. I have long argued that Egypt was central to both the American and Israeli projects in the Middle East. This fact is now being shown. Israel’s relationship with Egypt is degrading slowly but significant. A recent Pew Poll showed that more than half of Egyptians would support cancelling the peace treaty with Israel. This does not mean, of course, that Egyptians desire war; plenty of nations don’t have peace treaties but don’t fight wars. Rather, it shows that Egyptians are seriously interested in separating themselves from aiding the Israeli mini-empire.
Additionally, the Egyptian gas pipeline to Israel was again blown up. This pipeline supplies 40% of Israel’s gas under a preferential contract signed by the pro-Israel Mubaraks. The pipeline was attacked previously, putting it out of action for 6 weeks. This attack will likely take it out for at least as long, but anyway it hardly matters. Egypt is investigating the ministers who pushed the deal for corruption, and this contract will soon be cancelled. Israel may get more Egyptian gas in the future, but not at preferential prices. During the last gas shutdown, Israel acknowledged spending an extra $1.5 – 2 million per day to burn dirtier fuels, and that was before the high-energy-usage summer season had hit. Israel is also losing any profits it makes from transshipping gas on to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.
Finally, and most significantly, Egyptian support for the Palestinians is growing. Egypt under Mubarak sponsored Palestinian unity talks for years with the goal of ensure unity is never reached. Mubarak’s goal was always to keep Hamas isolated and Israel strong. However, with the end of the Mubaraks, Egypt now sees an interest in a Palestinian unity government that can bring stability, and has helped Fatah and Hamas sign a new accord (more below). With this accord, Egyptian support for the Israeli siege of Gaza become basically impossible. The Gaza border will become more and more open, forcing a strategic choice on Israel.
2. Palestine.
The Palestinian ruling factions signed a major unity accord yesterday. While Hamas and Fatah still have no love for each other, they appear to be temporarily putting aside their differences to both avoid the wrath of their own people and to focus world attention on the occupation. I discussed some of the causes of this deal in my diary yesterday, but the most important point is that this is not an isolated even. It is part of a recent chain of diplomatic victories: Most of Latin America has recognized Palestine. Several countries in Europe have upgraded the status of the Palestinian Mission. The EU signed export agreements with the PA reducing tariffs. The World Bank and IMF recognized the PA as having the institutions of a functioning state. Most of the world supported a UN condemnation of the Israeli settlements, breaking with the US. And most of the world has signaled it was willing to support a declaration of a Palestinian state at the UN in September. According to a recent Palestinian Authority statement:
Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad Al-Malki said that 150 nations are expected recognize a Palestinian state by September. He claimed that 10 Caribbean countries are to declare recognition of the state over the coming month.
Israel is deeply threatened by Palestinian unity, and its clumsy and outraged propaganda demonstrates this. Netanyahu, Peres, Barak, Lieberman, and Shalom all denounced peace between Palestinians, as have several members of the US Congress. The fact that all of these parties are so vociferous against something they supposedly support (a single Palestinian entity, which is a necessary pre-requisite to deal with Israel), highlights how unbalanced Israel currently is.
Additionally, Palestinian resistance to the Occupation has been continuing, both violently and non-violently. Mass rallies have taken place in both the Gaza Strip and West Bank (against the wishes of the ruling parties), and anti-wall/anti-settlement protests are common in both East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Meanwhile, Palestinian factions have shown an ability to turn violent attacks on and off at will. These actions will also force a strategic choice on Israel.
3. Syria.
Israeli media is gloating about the bloody turmoil in Syria, but the reality is that this turmoil helps Israel not at all. The Syrian state has not been a military threat to Israel since 1982 (to be very generous). Whether the Assad line managed to crush the Syrian people once again or not, the results do not benefit Israel. The government (whatever it is) will need an outside enemy to confront, and worse, if chaos ensues the Golan border will be open to guerilla attacks. Any fantasy that Syria will become more pro-Israel, or that Hezbollah (which is supported by Syria but not dependant on it) will become substantially weakened is just that, fantasy. Israel will be forced to devote more energy to its northern border.
4. International support.
International support for Palestinian rights is growing. It’s growing in the Middle East (or rather, the people who have always supported Palestine are growing stronger against their own governments), it’s growing in the diplomatic community as more countries recognize Palestine, and its growing among international activists.
Unless massive US and Israeli pressure break the move, the PA will seek international recognition at the UN in September. And they will get it, not from the UN Security Council (where the US will, as always, veto Palestinian rights), but in the General Assembly (the PA is shooting for 150 votes). This move will not by itself force Israel to end its empire or abandon one inch of Palestinian land. But it will lay the groundwork for nations to begin taking diplomatic and economic action to isolate Israel, and the movement for boycotts, divestments, and sanctions (until now driven entirely by individuals and groups) will receive state support.
Additionally, more international activists are heading toward Palestine, with a new flotilla of up to 15 ships sailing for Gaza in June. This flotilla will again put the brutality of the Israeli siege on display. Finally, Israel’s pointless alienation from Turkey has cost it another key ally in the region.
5. US weakness.
The US ain’t what it once was. This is hard to hear, but it is reality. Like Israel, the US could never stay at the top of the heap forever. It had to fall at some point. The combination of a reorienting world after the Cold War, massive governmental mismanagement and overspending (primarily, but not solely, by Republicans), 2+ wars that were unendable and unaffordable, a loss of international support, and an economic collapse have brought the US’s sinking fortunes (not a collapse, but a descent) much sooner than many observers would have guessed. The best story to highlight this is the new report that China’s economy will likely surpass the US’s by 2016, decades before it was expected to do so.
As I said, the US is declining, not collapsing. In terms of Israel, the US can (and will) not only sustain but increase its military subsidies to Israel. But direct US subsidies to Israel were only one part of the package the US provided to Israel. It also provided diplomatic support in the UN and around the world. The weakness of that support was highlighted by the recent UNSC resolution condemning the Israeli settlements. The US successfully vetoed it, but at the price of basically the entire world breaking with the US and Israel. Such a break in the Security Council shows the outer limits of US diplomatic protection. That fact will further be shown in September when the General Assembly votes to recognize the Palestinian state.
Additionally, of course, the US was critical in protecting Israel by maintaining a string of pro-US (and hence pro-Israel) Arab states. But US protection could not save the most important government (Mubarak’s Egypt), and even if other governments survive, the balance of power has shifted. Saudi Arabia, consumed with annexing Bahrain and suppressing Yemen, will have little support to offer Israel. Likewise, Jordan is consumed with its own problems. The US chain of clients states in the Middle East is availing Israel less and less.
Israel’s Strategic Choices
Taken together, Israel’s strategic position is collapsing, and it will have to make some choice. Keeping the lid on Palestinians will become progressively more difficult. If Fatah and Hamas can truly end (or just control) their infighting, they can present Israel with a united front that can step up non-violent protest while being able to turn violent action on or off at will.
Israel has shown some massive intelligence failures in Palestine recently, including a bombing in Jerusalem that still baffles Israel and the killing of a settler family that Israel only “solved” by rounding hundreds to thousands of Palestinians civilians over weeks. These events show that Israel must devote more resources to keeping Palestine down if it wishes to maintain control. Meanwhile, Palestinian factions in Gaza have shown the ability fire guided and unguided rockets at Israel. Israel has its magic “Iron Dome” defense, but as a Haaretz commentator quietly admits, this hyper-expensive system is largely “fantasy.”
Israel’s intelligence failures in Palestine come from a strategic choice it made in 2006. For 20 years, particularly after two Intifadas, Israel had concentrated its military resources against the Palestinians. However, the disastrous 2006 war with Hezbollah forced Israel to recommit energies to more formal combat with a foreign foe, decreasing the amount of energy Israel could spend on Palestinians. This worked well for Israel for 4 years, as the West Bank was subdued, Fatah compliant, and the anti-Hezbollah training could be used to invade Gaza. But now, Israel is under-prepared in the West Bank, is facing a renewed challenge in Gaza, is staring down a strengthened Hezbollah in Lebanon, must worry about whatever emerges in Syria, and faces increasing tension (and increasing expense) on the border with massive Egypt, all the while losing ground on the international diplomatic front. Israel is being pulled in too many directions. It can’t be everywhere at once, even with massive American subsidies.
Worse for Israel, the problems exacerbate each other. Each Israeli attack on the Palestinians will create new levels of outrage in the Middle East. Particularly in Egypt, this outrage will force the Egyptian government to end its participation in the siege of Gaza. The trigger could well be the international flotilla heading to Gaza in June. If Israel foolishly and brutally attacks this flotilla as it did the last one, it will face international condemnation and an end to Egyptian support for the siege. At this point, Israel will be faced with a choice: let Palestine act like an independent country in Gaza (thereby enhancing its reputation for independence), or else maintain the siege by taking it over directly and re-invading Gaza to occupy the border. Either option will hurt Israel in the long run.
Additionally, Israeli action will continue to increase tension with Egypt, forcing Israel to deploy more and more military force to the south. This is true even though war between Egypt and Israel will remain highly unlikely. As Egypt is larger and more power than all other Israeli neighbors combined, the Israeli military must focus significant efforts there no matter how unlikely war is.
Finally, each Israeli action will only gain the Palestinians more sympathy and support at the UN, guaranteeing world support for a Palestinian state and leading to the isolation that Israel has often talked about but has not really felt in the recent era.
I am hardly the only one to notice these facts. Stephen Walt notes The Whiff of Desperation in Israel these days, as does Issandr El Amrani (the Arabist). Steve Clemons of the Washington Note concludes:
I've argued for some years that Israel's security arrangements in the region were a lot like a New Orleans levee -- they were working for the time being, but some day a tsunami would come and wash out parts of Israel's protection. Israel needed to see that its security and long term interests lay in working hard to revision and restructure its relationships in the region -- and the best vehicle for that was something along the lines of the Arab Peace deal offered by Saudi King Abdullah.
…
The tsunami that Israel will need to deal with may be here -- and it's vital that Netanyahu and others recalculate their game plan while this wave of change is sweeping through the region.
None of these factors by themselves forces an Israeli strategic realignment. Rather, it is the factors in combination, the loss of resources and support, and the drain on resources from too many calls in too many directions that makes Israel’s current policies unsustainable. In the near future, Israel must make a realignment that reduces some tensions with its neighbors. As I said, Israel can choose to end its empire and allow a Palestinian state to be born. It can choose to allow the Palestinian who have always lived in Israeli-controlled lands to have their full civil rights. It can try to split the baby and do some of each. But it cannot stand pat. Its strategic position is no longer tenable.