The legitimate interests of Russia and the United States in Ukraine are identical; their illegitimate interests are opposite.
Both countries share an interest in restoring stability to the region. Both would benefit from a healthy and stable economy and polity, and a responsible government. Russia has legitimate concerns about the participation of the far right Svoboda and Pravyj Sektor parties in the new government; these are parties with strong fascist and neo-nazi elements. Moreover, rumor has it that they are planning a coup; the United States will share Russia's horror if neo-nazis overthrow the current government. Even without a putsch, the United States has reason to share Russia's concerns about Ukrainian extremism. Russia may have been exaggerating the danger to Russian speakers and ethnic Russians living in Ukraine under the current government, but ethnic tensions and bigotry are a significant undercurrent throughout the region, and nazi ideologies enjoy the same kind of currency in both Ukraine and Russia that they do in Hungary. As the conflict worsens, ethnic tensions fester and grow violent. The United States should work with Russia to oppose bigotry on both sides of the border. To his credit, Putin has generally tried to distance himself from the overt prejudice rampant in Russian ruling circles.
Russia and the United States both have uglier, less legitimate interests at stake. Russia calls Ukraine a âbrother nation,â but expects Ukraine to play little brother to Russia's big brother; at bottom, Putin and many of his compatriots don't regard Ukraine as a fully separate country. âA chicken isn't a bird and Ukraine isn't overseas,â according to an oft-quoted Russian proverb. (There are identical proverbs about Poland and Bulgaria.) Kiev was the capital of the ancient land of Rus', and is still called the âmother of all Russian cities.â Numerous families have members on both sides of the border; some of these families are ethnically Ukrainian, some are ethnically Russian, and many are ethnically mixed. Eastern and southern Ukraine, in particular, have substantial Russian populations. Ultimately, Putin would rather annex them than see them part of a Ukraine with an unfriendly government. Russia does not want an inimical government on its border, let alone a government that welcoming NATO troops to its land. Annexation appears not to be Putin's preference, however, because it is too expensive an option. In Putin's preferred scenario, the southern and eastern regions will prove a vanguard for bringing all of Ukraine solidly back to Russia's sphere of influence.
Putin feels thwarted in his plans to establish a Eurasian Union as a counterweight to the European Union, NATO, and the US. He openly mourns the Russian loss of empire; reestablishing a friendly, more-or-less puppet government in Ukraine would restore his hopes for Eurasia. Most of the Russian population supports Putin's policy on Ukraine and mourns the loss of empire with him. There is a strong feeling that the West has âdissedâ Russia again and again, and that strong military action is an effective and admirable way to teach the world to reckon with Russia again.
The United States wants to expand its influence, markets, and capital to Ukraine. Ukraine offers rich mineral resources, coal, oil, and even some natural gas. Western interest in Ukrainian economic goodies, and in expanding its political influence, is understandable, but posting agents in Ukraine in order to foment dissent is not legitimate, nor should Western mercenaries be participating in armed conflict there.
The elephant in the room is the environment. The government hasn't been paying a lot of attention to it, and the West has expressed interest in making it worse, specifically, in using Chernobyl as an international nuclear dumping ground. This would have disastrous consequences not only for Ukraine, but also for whatever fragile stability may be introduced, as well as for the larger regional and global environment. Rumor has it that the United States is also eager to introduce fracking to Ukraine. Again, this will lead to environmental disaster and not to shared economic bounty.
Seemingly more legitimately, the West has offered to bolster Ukraine with loans from the IMF. Unfortunately, when the West makes loans, the austerity measures it imposes generally increase poverty among a broad swathe of the recipient country's population. This poverty, in turn, contributes to destabilizing the region. Economic shock treatment may facilitate extreme capitalism and allow US and international companies to buy up much of Ukraine, but this is as illegitimate an interest as Russia's wish for hegemony. A loan program with the usual draconian terms would add to regional instability, and is therefore not in the best interests of the United States, Europe, Russia, or Ukraine. Ukraine would benefit more from a joint aid package coming from both Russia and the west, in the form of direct aid with a minimum of loans offered at low interest and on favorable terms, allowing Ukraine to maintain and expand social programs in order to restore stability as well as well-being.
Russia understandably wishes to maintain Ukraine in its sphere of influence, and above all to prevent Ukraine from deepening its ties to Europe, joining the European Union, or joining NATO. Understandable as this is, it ignores the rights of Ukraine to self-determination and territorial integrity. At the same time, it is essential for the United States to understand and respect Russia's legitimate security concerns as well as the depth of Russia's historic, ethnic, and familial ties with Ukraine.
In seeking to work with Russia, the United States needs to appreciate the Russian need for respect as a major power. Putin's popularity is growing largely because the population sees its new international prominence as a kind of national rebirth. Labeling Russia a âregional powerâ and excluding it from the G8 plays into the national feeling that the United States does not respect Russia or regard it as an equal. Recognition of Russia's legitimate concerns, good-faith negotiations, and a restoration of cooperation, together with more careful speech, will do something to address these concerns.
Neither Russia nor any other country will benefit from a war. War between Ukraine and Russia means war between the Russian army, consisting primarily of Russians and Ukrainians, and the Ukrainian army, which consists primarily of Ukrainians and Russians. Many families have members on both sides of the border. The burgeoning conflict is slowly turning into a civil war; it may spread throughout Ukraine, and Russia may well enter the fray directly. The conflict could even spread even into Russia if enough Russian citizens become disgusted by a growing death count and the destruction Russia may wreak in Ukraine. The conflict could easily become internationalized, even to the point of world war. Russians are joking about marching clear across Europe. Russian anti-Western, and especially anti-American feelings are growing by the hour, nourished by both Russian propaganda and American oblivion to Russian concerns. Many in Russia are rattling sabers as their military makes contingency plans for preventative strikes against NATO. World War Three is in nobody's best interests, and neither is a war in Ukraine, even if it does not go beyond Ukraine's borders.
The alternative to war is diplomacy. Both sides should immediately hold a conference with the goal of restoring stability. They should work together toward the following goals:
1) Replace Russian troops with international troops to guarantee the safety of linguistic and ethnic minorities.
2) Put together a joint aid package for Ukraine under socially responsible terms.
3) Assist Ukraine in maintaining and expanding its social safety net.
4) Eliminate fascist factions from the Ukrainian government, and encourage the government to distance itself from fascism.
5) Help Ukraine adopt a constitution that guarantees minority rights, including linguistic, political, religious, and cultural rights, and that obligates any political party participating in the electoral process to respect those rights.
6) Hold new elections with international observers as soon as possible; in the meantime, establish an inclusive interim government with representatives of both the pro-Western, Ukrainian nationalist faction and the pro-Russian faction.
7) Create a special status for Ukraine that allows it to enjoy close ties with both Russia and the European Union without absolute allegiance to either.
8) Agree to respect the environmental needs of Ukraine, to provide international support for undertaking whatever clean-up is possible for the âexclusion zoneâ around Chernobyl without introducing additional nuclear waist, and to refrain from bringing fracking to Ukraine.
Ukraine may need to reject Russia's proposed federalization to show that it is not caving in to Russian pressure. Federalization in and of itself is not critical for Russia; guaranteeing neutrality and minority rights are far more important, and federalization is intended both to assist with that and to weaken the influence of western Ukraine. On the other hand, federalization with a strong central government responsible for a unified foreign policy may be an acceptable option. In the context of US and European involvement, and of Russian troop withdrawal, Ukraine will be more amenable to negotiations about this as well as the goals enumerated above.
If the US and Russia restore their partnership and combine forces to assist Ukraine, there is the dimmest of dim possibilities that they may be able to broach the subject of Crimea. If so, the US should acknowledge both Russian and Ukrainian claims. Perhaps Russia could lease Crimea from Ukraine for a period of 50 years, after which a new referendum could be held with international observers. In return, Ukraine could continue to provide electricity and other utilities without disruption. Alternatively, a joint Ukrainian-Russian administration could be created.
If we can counter passion with cool reasoning and negotiations, we can resolve this conflict and turn from the brink of war to renewed cooperation.
Nina Judith Katz
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