Illia Ponomarenko, The Kyiv Independent’s defense and security reporter, has emerged over the past year as one of the top Ukrainian war correspondents. He has good sources within the Ukrainian government, particularly the Ministry of Defense, and has also embedded with Ukrainian troops on the front line in his native Donbas region.
On Tuesday, The Kyiv Independent published Ponomarenko’s analysis of how things stand as we look ahead toward the New Year titled: Ukraine to enter 2023 with frail upper hand over Russia. It is a must-read for anyone following the war.
Ponomarenko begins by noting how things looked just a year ago, in December 2021, when “most forecasts voiced in the media did not give Ukraine much of a chance in case of Russia’s full-scale invasion.”
He describes how much things have changed:
Despite all odds, Ukraine managed to do the unthinkable, having successfully repelled the initial Russian blitz, then withstanding the bloodletting war of attrition, and then retaking the strategic initiative.
Ukraine has destroyed the myth of Russian invincibility and persuaded the West to fully support its case instead of making yet another deal with the Kremlin. It has forced the “almighty” Russia to go to extremes and — unsuccessfully — adhere to general mobilization, nuclear threats, and overt terror bombing to make Ukraine surrender.
The war enters 2023, with Ukraine having a slight advantage over the greatly degraded Russian military, mainly thanks to the extensive Western military aid. Chances are high that the next months of winter and spring 2023 are going to be decisive for the war’s general outcome.
Ukraine is going to continue with its effort to retake the occupied land via new offensive operations.
And it is likely that the Kremlin, in a bid to save face in the increasingly critical situation, is preparing one more all-out attack upon Ukraine — such as the second massive rush on Kyiv in early 2023.
Ponomarenko then covers ground familiar to those who’ve read Mark and Kos’ Ukraine war updates:
__ The Battle of Kyiv which resulted in the failure of Russia’s all-out grand offensive in February and March. Overconfident Russian forces, expecting little to no resistance, attacked on multiple axes expecting to seize Kyiv and install a puppet government. But instead highly mobile and flexible Ukrainian combat groups managed to inflict devastating losses on vulnerable Russian convoys. Russia did have more success in the south where its forces seized Kherson before Ukrainian defenders stopped a further advance toward the port city of Odesa.
__ The Battle of Donbas in which Russia regrouped and concentrated its military power, mainly artillery, beginning in mid-April in an effort to capture the rest of Donetsk and Luhansk provinces not already under the control of pro-Russian separatists.
Russia kept having to narrow its goals, making small territorial gains while sustaining heavy losses in urban warfare in such cities as Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk. The Ukrainian defenders bought time so that new troops could be mobilized and trained. Battlefield successes helped secure more advanced Western military equipment. Russia had degraded its military offensive capability for the sake of “political and propagandistic goals.”
__ The Ukrainian counter-offensive. By mid-July the front line had stabilized. Thanks to Western aid, the Ukrainian military had accumulated resources to launch a strike in the southern Kherson region, causing Russia to divert its most combat-capable forces there. Then Ukraine inflicted a crushing defeat on depleted Russian forces in the northeastern Kharkiv region
The Kremlin had no choice but to declare a partial mobilization — a risky step Moscow had tried to avoid for months despite its setbacks on the battlefield.
Ukraine had seized the initiative in the war, using newly acquired HIMARS rockets to derail Russian logistics and command structures deep within occupied territory. The liberation of Kherson city and surrounding areas followed in mid-November.
Ponomarenko noted that Russia is now “trying to buy some time and slow down Ukrainian advances with units reinforced with barely trained manpower.”
He said that as of mid-December, muddy weather conditions will prevent both sides from making any substantial territorial gains. But once stable frosty weather prepares the ground for maneuvers, Ukraine’s military will have an opportunity to show it can carry out new successful counteroffensive operations.
Ponomarenko said it “remains an open question where the Ukrainian command decides to try and strike next.” He mentioned several options:
To Ukraine, the most attractive and most obvious goal is Melitopol, a city in Zaporizhzhia Oblast which is the key transportation point of the Russian-occupied south and also the gate to Crimea. Another potential target is Svatove, the liberation of which could undermine the Russian military presence in the north of Luhansk Oblast. And one more possibility is Volnovakha, another important railroad communication point between Donetsk and Mariupol.
The Ukrainian command’s choice between these three goals will probably open the year 2023, along with the war of logistics and the challenge of fighting in the winter environment. And then the spring campaign may be decisive for the war’s outcome.
But Ponomarenko cautioned that Russia may be preparing for a new large-scale offensive in the first three months of 2023, including a possible massive attack on Kyiv. In a recent interview with The Economist, Ukraine’s Chief Commander Valeriy Zaluzhniy suggested that Russia is preparing some 200,000 fresh troops for such an offensive and Ukraine needs extensive Western military assistance to successfully repeal a new attack and regain all territories occupied by Russia.
Ponomarenko then cited a Dec. 15 report by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a U.S.-based defense think tank, that such an attack by Russia is “extraordinarily unlikely to succeed.”
So the mood heading into 2023 is cautious optimism for Ukraine’s prospects in the war.