The US House passed $61B in Ukraine aid today, and the US Senate is expected to quickly vote on the bill next Tuesday, where it is widely expected to pass. This critically necessary move will reopen the spigots of US ammunition in the form of artillery shells, anti-air missiles, JDAM smart bombs, HIMARS rockets, and numerous other armaments that only the US can provide in quantity that are crucial to Ukraine’s war effort.
The Pentagon under President Biden reports that they have been waiting for this moment for some time, and artillery shells and air defense missiles have been ready to go in US bases in Europe, and could arrive in Ukraine within days of Congressional authorization for their dispatch.
But $61B can buy a lot more than just ammunition. Furthermore, it’s clear Ukraine needs much more than just ammunition to win this war.
First, a few things should be understood about Ukraine’s 2023 Summer Counteroffensive.
- It failed to achieve any of its objectives.
- Subsequent events have amply demonstrated that the offensive did not come close to achieving any of its objectives, and was doomed from the start.
- There was a massive intelligence failure on the part of Western Allies and Ukraine in evaluating Russian reserves.
The Summer 2023 Counteroffensive was predicated on a few key assumptions, among which was that Russia had limited available material and reserves after its Winter 2022-2023 attacks in which it lost tremendous numbers of soldiers and materiel around Vuhledar and Bakhmut.
For example, the UK Ministry of Defense publicly stated on May 20, 2023:
It appears clear that Western intelligence was passing on similar evaluations of Russian reserve strength to Ukraine, and Ukrainian plans were built around an assumption that after breaking through the initial lines of Russian defenses, if enough Russian troops are chewed up in the Ukrainian attacks, the Russians would lack reserves to subequently plug those gaps without seriously compromising their defenses elsewhere.
The events of June 2023 — Present show definitively that these reports were catastrophically mistaken.
First, Russia was able to conduct a full rotation of their troops after losing Roboyne, rotating in 2 new VDV Division to bolster their defenses.
In early October, Russia successfully managed to rotate out exhausted elements of the 291st and 71st Motor Rifle Regiments, as well as significant elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division. American think tank ISW assessed that heavy losses had rendered many of these units combat ineffective, and thus required rest and reconstituting with replacement troops. In their place, Russia rotated in fresh VDV troops from the 7th and 76th Airborne Divisions.
Then, as Ukraine made surprising gains around Krynky, Russia rushed a new VDV division in with barely any training, but plenty of equipment to plug the gaps in the Southwest.
While Ukraine has shuttled what’s widely believed to be, at most, a few hundred marines into Krynky, Russia had initially garrisoned the village with elements of the Russian 810th Marine Brigade—which were thrown out of the western half of the village and urgently needed help. Russia then quickly committed its local reserves, elements of the 70th Motor Rifle Division.
Despite the arrival of reinforcements, Ukraine continued to make gains into late November, when Russia committed the 6000-strong 104th Guard Airborne Division (GAD). The 104th GAD was a newly created Russian Airborne unit, a fifth division in what was traditionally a four-division paratrooper organization. The unit was largely formed in early October, but after less than two months of training, it was rushed to Krynky as the Russian command believed their presence on the front was critically necessary.
Even this did not exhaust Russia’s available equipment reserves, as Russia began pouring resources into the Donbas region, launching assault after assault in the aim of capturing Avdiivka, then advancing further in that region.
Russia has lost between 20 to as many as 80 combat vehicles a day in these attacks, but they keep coming.
The village of Novomykhalivka is representative. The Russians began intensifying attacks on this village (pre-war population 1439 per 2001 Ukrainian Census) in December 2023, with the city being visually confirmed as completely annihilated by January 6, 2024., There are 314 confirmed Russian combat vehicle losses in the village, which remains contested as of April 20, 2024.
By any conservative estimate, Russia has managed to lose upwards of a thousand combat vehicles in attacks in the Donbas region in the past six months, yet continues to launch attacks. It’s true that it has gained only 15-20km at most, and the only significant city it has captured has been Avdiivka (pre-war population 30,000), a city they had surrounded on 3 sides at the start of the offensive.
Compared to Russian losses, the gains are very modest at most.
But what also must not be lost in this is to understand Russia had well over a thousand combat vehicles in reserve that they could afford to waste away to plug gaps in their line. Granted, Russia has refurbished and produced hundreds of combat vehicles since last September, but subsequent events strongly imply that Western intelligence estimates of depleted Russian reserves should be viewed with considerable skepticism.
So what must Ukraine do to regain the initiative in the War? To win the War?
They need the single most devastating weapon that has demonstrated its value in this War at every turn it’s been used: the M2A2 Bradley.
Ukraine has received just 186 Bradleys from the U.S. The Bradleys spearheaded the Ukrainian advance during the Battle of Robotyne proving one of the single most effective weapons during the fighting.
Designed for close quarters combat against enemy infantry and light vehicles, the Bradley has a powerful enough gun and antitank missiles to take on even Russian Main Battle Tanks in the right circumstances, but are utterly devastating against Russian infantry or light vehicles.
With its rapid firing autocannon, advanced electronic fire control system and night vision, the Ukrainian 47th Brigade operating Bradleys have been Ukraine’s most potent force since it entered the fighting.
The biggest question would be, why should Ukraine be limited to less than 200 Bradleys?
The United States has over 4,500 M2 and M3 Bradleys that do not meet the standards the US Army has designated to operate as front line combat vehicles for US Army units.
This is because the ability to operate an APS, the Iron Fist Light Active Protection System designed to automatically shoot down incoming antitank missiles or rockets is considered a critical part of the Bradley’s survivability for US troops. However, most of the older Bradleys held in US storage depots lacks the power supply to operate these electrical power hungry pieces of equipment.
Furthermore, the Bradley is expected to be retired out of US service by the XM30 infantry fighting vehicle by 2030.
This presents the question, what good are outdated Bradleys that the US Army doesn’t want, sitting in depots (costing tax payers maintenance funds) accomplishing?
Back in December, I wrote this in the hopes of a Ukrainian aid package passing:
A Ukrainian mechanized infantry brigade generally operates around 100 IFVs and 30 tanks. However, additional spare vehicles are necessary to account for combat losses, damaged vehicles, and simple mechanical repairs. Ukraine received around 180 Bradleys, which has proved enough to operate the 47th Mechanized Brigade for an extended period.
Assuming that Ukraine needs around 180 Bradleys per Mechanized Brigade, The US could theoretically equip all five new Ukrainian Mechanized Brigades with just 900 Bradleys. Ten mechanized brigades would require 1,800 Bradleys, just half the Bradleys in US storage.
A new M2A2 Bradley costs around $3.1M. Nine-hundred Bradleys would be just over $2.7B. Even 1,800 Bradleys would cost under $5.6B—only a fraction of the $61B aid package proposed by President Biden, and that’s not accounting for depreciation.
Nothing has changed, except we may have the money by Tuesday.
Certainly, it would take months to prepare sending a massive number of Bradleys, and many more months beyond that to train Ukrainian servicemen to operate the Bradleys. These Bradleys might not be entering the fight till late 2024 or early 2025.
But 10 new Ukrainian mechanized Brigades equipped with Bradleys could be, for once, a real game changer.
I wouldn’t expect that they would instantly push through Russian defenses and we’d be on to Crimea. I doubt that they would capture Tokmak even within a short span.
But what it could accomplish is to begin draining Russian strength faster than it can be replaced.
Basically this concept I laid out about attritional wars.
A single Ukrianian brigade equipped with Bradleys was enough to bend Russian defenses, and devastate numerically superior Russian armored forces determined to capture Avdiivka. In an attritional war, a unit that can take relatively few losses while dealing devastating losses in turn are incredibly valuable.
And Bradleys are relatively inexpensive, available in bulk, and 25mm shells are cheap.
My question would be, what are we waiting for?