Mr. Zelensky’s decision to make London the first stop of his trip, only his second outside Ukraine since Russia invaded last year, attested to Britain’s role as one of the largest suppliers of weapons to Ukraine, and to the steadfast public support of Mr. Sunak and his predecessors, Liz Truss and Boris Johnson.
Still, training pilots to fly high-tech planes is more time-consuming and difficult than training soldiers to drive tanks. Britain’s likeliest jet for export to Ukraine, the Eurofighter Typhoon, is complicated to operate and maintain, military analysts said.
It’s also not clear that Britain has enough planes to make a difference; there are only about 30 of the older generation of the Typhoon jets that could be made available, according to Janes, a defense intelligence firm.
Even the role of manned aircraft in this war has been constrained, given the widespread use of missiles and drones, and the effectiveness of Ukraine’s and Russia’s air-defense systems. For all their symbolic value, analysts said fighter jets might make less of a difference on the battlefield than tanks.
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1- Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive actions northwest of Svatove on February 8. Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported on February 8 that Russian forces are increasing their presence northwest of Svatove in the Kupyansk and Dvorichna areas.[16] A former Luhansk People‘s Republic (LNR) deputy claimed that fierce fighting is ongoing 7km from the Kupyansk area, likely referring to areas near Synkivka, which Russian sources claimed Russian forces captured on February 6.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack near Novoselivske, about 15km northwest of Svatove.[18] Former Russian militant commander and nationalist milblogger Igor Girkin denied that Russian forces have made any significant territorial gains in Kharkiv Oblast, particularly in the Kupyansk direction, as of February 8.[19]
Russian forces also reportedly intensified offensive operations in the Kreminna area. Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on February 8 that there has been a ”maximum escalation” in the Kreminna direction and that Russian forces are attempting to break through Ukrainian defenses in this area.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Chervonopopivka (5km north of Kreminna).[21] Several Russian milbloggers circulated unconfirmed footage of unspecified Central and Western Military District elements which crossed the Zherebets River running north to south in western Luhansk Oblast, roughly parallel to the Svatove-Kreminna line) and captured Ukrainian positions in an unspecified location around February 6.[22] Russian sources also reported that elements of the 3rd Motor Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) are approaching the Zherebets River and are threatening Ukrainian positions in the area.[23] A prominent Russian milblogger posted footage of the 59th Tank Regiment of the 144th Motor Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) attacking towards Torske (13km west of Kreminna) and claimed the unit pushed Ukrainian forces back to secondary lines of defense.[24]
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut and continued making tactical advances on February 8. Geolocated footage posted between February 4 and 8 confirms that Russian forces have made marginal advances north of Bakhmut near Krasna Hora and Zaliznyanske (10km north of Bakhmut), in the Stupky area of northern Bakhmut, and southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske.[27] Russian forces are visually confirmed to be within 2.5 km of the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamyanske (30km northeast), Fedorivka (15km northeast), Spirne (27km northeast), and Vymika (20km northeast); north of Bakhmut near Paraskoviivka (5km north) and Krasna Hora (4km north); northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (12km northwest) and Dubovo-Vasylivka (7km northwest); and west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west) and Chasiv Yar (10km west).[29] The Ukrainian General Staff’s report that Russian forces are attacking towards Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Dubovo-Vasylivka is consistent with geolocated combat footage and indicates that Russian forces seek to encircle Bakhmut by cutting off Ukrainian forces’ access to the E40. Similarly, the report of a Russian attack on Chasiv Yar indicates that Russian forces have likely advanced closer to the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway southwest of Bakhmut. Russian sources claimed that Wagner Group fighters took control of Krasna Hora and are fighting northeast of Bakhmut.[30] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Wagner Group forces established fire control over a section of the T0504 highway between Stupochky and Ivanivske.[31]
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Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued small scale skirmishes and reconnaissance activity in the Dnipro River delta and on the Kinburn Spit on February 8. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that Russian forces are using small boats to try to maintain a presence on islands in the Dnipro River delta south of Kherson City and that Ukrainian forces have deployed long-range artillery to strike several Russian outposts on the islands.[43] The UK MoD reported that Russian and Ukrainian forces have likely deployed small groups on the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast, aiming to control the Dnipro Gulf.[44] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk previously stated that Russian forces are increasing the number of reconnaissance and sabotage attempts in the area of the Dnipro River delta as part of an information operation to create a perceived threat against Kherson City.[45]
Russian forces continue to construct defensive fortifications in Zaporizhia Oblast. Satellite imagery collected between January 26 and February 7 shows Russian forces expanding trench and field fortifications near Tarasivka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[46] Russian forces likely constructed these fortifications to further strengthen Russian positions along the T0401 highway between Polohy and Tokmak. Russian forces are likely establishing long defensive lines along critical grounds lines of communication (GLOCs) in Zaporizhia Oblast in preparation to defend against possible future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations along the Zaporizhia frontline. However, ISW has not observed Russian forces constructing defenses intended to halt a cross-country Ukrainian attack on a large front, and defensive positions remain limited to main roads.
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Ukraine Battle Map @ukraine_map Feb 1
Map of land that Ukraine 🇺🇦 will be able to reach using the GLSDB that they can’t reach now with GMLRS
GLSDB 🔴 has a max range of 150km and can hit 31% of Crimea and 82% of all occupied land
GMLRS 🟡 has a max range of 92km and can hit 2% of Crimea and 62% of all occupied land
Ukraine Battle Map@ukraine_map Feb 3
The map shows the areas of Crimea that Ukraine 🇺🇦 can reach with the (GLSDB) Ground Launched Small Diameter Glide Bomb
🟡 GMLRS max range is 92km
🔴 GLSDB max range is 150km
Maria🇫🇮🇺🇦@MariaSlavaUA Feb 6 The work of Ukrainian artist Mykhailo Skop. (ukraine.artists on Instagram)(The artist's Instagram neivanmade)