The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 2 that Russian forces conducted an Iskander-M ballistic missile strike against Myrhorod Air Base in Poltava Oblast on June 1 and damaged and destroyed seven Ukrainian aircraft.[78] Former Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that the strike damaged some Ukrainian aircraft, but not as many as Russia claims.[79]
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The Russian army loses about 50% of its reconnaissance drones due to jamming by its own electronic warfare systems, according to Russian propaganda media.
- The interplay between ongoing Russian offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Avdiivka directions indicates that the Russian military command may intend to leverage the ongoing Toretsk push to create operational opportunities for advances in either the Chasiv Yar or Avdiivka areas. Russian preparations that can support multiple future branch plans in Donetsk Oblast suggest a more developed level of operational planning and foresight than the Russian command has proven capable of executing thus far in the war since early 2022. The ability of this operational planning to come to fruition, however, will be bounded by the overall poor tactical-level capabilities of Russian forces currently fighting in these areas.
- Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban likely used his unannounced visit to Kyiv on July 2 to posture himself as a peacemaker following Hungary's accession to the European Union (EU) Council presidency on July 1, but Orban’s efforts are very unlikely to bring about any robust peace in Ukraine.
- The Kremlin is waging an intensified information campaign aimed at pushing Ukraine to negotiate with Russia on Russian terms, and any Russian, Western, or other efforts to cajole Ukraine to prematurely negotiate with Russia would only weaken Ukraine and embolden further Russian aggression inside and beyond Ukraine.
- Several Russian State Duma deputies proposed a bill that would exclude a significant number of ethnicities from Russia's "compatriots" resettlement program, undermining the Kremlin's efforts to leverage its "compatriots abroad" to offset Russian labor shortages and set informational conditions to justify potential hybrid operations against other countries with Russian and Russian-speaking populations.
- Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot at a Russian military base in occupied Crimea on July 1 that reportedly housed Shahed drones.
- Russia may be intensifying its efforts to conduct reconnaissance and disrupt communications in the underwater and air space near NATO states.
- Russian authorities appear to be publicly fixating on crackdowns against fight clubs and restricting the niqab to signal that Russian authorities are adequately combatting terrorist threats in the North Caucasus instead of addressing systemic issues of Islamist extremism in the region.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 2 assigning the Russian 999th Air Base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan the "guards" honorific for "mass heroism and bravery.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
- Russia is reportedly recruiting women from Russian penal colonies to fight in Ukraine, and some of these recruits are reportedly fighting on the frontline.
The interplay between ongoing Russian offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Avdiivka directions indicates that the Russian military command may intend to leverage the ongoing Toretsk push to create operational opportunities for advances in either the Chasiv Yar or Avdiivka areas. Russian preparations that can support multiple future branch plans suggest a more developed level of operational planning and foresight than the Russian command has proven capable of executing thus far in the war since early 2022. The ability of this operational planning to come to fruition, however, will be bounded by the overall poor tactical-level capabilities of Russian forces currently fighting in these areas. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated in an interview with Ukrainian outlet Suspilne Donbas on July 2 that Russian forces are beginning to storm Chasiv Yar from the Toretsk direction (south of Chasiv Yar) and have been attacking in the direction of Toretsk-Chasiv Yar using mainly small infantry groups and occasional mechanized assaults.[1] Voloshyn's suggestion that Russian forces are trying to attack towards the southern flank of Chasiv Yar from the Toretsk area is noteworthy. If Russian forces are able to develop a larger salient in the general Shumy-Pivdenne-Pivniche-Toretsk area, then they may be able to more credibly threaten Chasiv Yar from the south, complementing ongoing offensive Russian efforts north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka. Russian forces have continued attacks in the area south and southeast of Chasiv Yar, particularly near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Kurdyumivka, suggesting that the Russian command remains interested, at least in principle, in maintaining access to the southern flank of the Chasiv Yar area. Recent Russian advances in Mayorske (east of Toretsk) affords Russian forces positions on the east (left) bank of the Siversky Donets-Donbas Canal, allowing them to advance towards Chasiv Yar from the south along one bank of the canal as opposed to trying to cross the canalizing terrain in northern and eastern Chasiv Yar.
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The price cap on Russian oil and refined products, conceived and implemented in the wake of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, was a novel attempt to reduce revenue from oil exports while maintaining global price stability. Successful application of the cap demands continued attention by the price cap coalition to sanction private entities that violate its terms. A particularly relevant issue today is whether further enforcement actions can dissuade Russia from utilizing an expanded “shadow fleet” to circumvent the terms of the price cap—and whether more aggressive sanctions enforcement will surge the price of oil. In this note, we argue that the coalition should sanction 15 Sovcomflot tankers that are especially active, shutting them down as a means of transport for Russia’s oil trade. Historical experience suggests that this enforcement measure is unlikely to have even a modest impact on global oil prices.
Russia is an important supplier of oil and refined products to the global economy. In the run-up to its invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s seaborne exports of crude and refined products were just shy of six million barrels per day, with a substantial share of these exports going to the European Union (EU) and other advanced economies. Before the invasion, the global benchmark price for oil—Brent—was very close to the price of Urals oil, which is the main reference blend for Russian crude sold on Baltic and Black Sea ports. The invasion changed that. Global oil prices spiked on fears of supply disruptions and a large discount on Urals versus Brent emerged as buyers shunned Russian oil (Figure 1). Yet, despite the unprecedented discount on Russian oil, revenues flowing to the Russian state rose to distressingly high levels
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The designation of 14 Sovcomflot oil tankers earlier this year is an important precedent. It suggests that—for comparable volumes—there is no adverse impact on global oil prices. As a result, further such action on the remaining Sovcomfleet is highly desirable, since it will drive Russia’s seaborne oil exports to Western-owned or shadow fleet vessels, both of which should adversely impact the revenue Russia generates from these exports.
Given that activity among the unsanctioned fleet of 100 Sovcomflot ships is highly concentrated, we recommend sanctioning these ships in multiple rounds to keep volume effects on par with the February 23 action. With such a process in place, we anticipate little to no impact on global oil prices but suspect the action will meaningfully lower Russia’s revenue from the oil trade.
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