Via
Talking Points Memo
Iraq through the prism of Vietnam By William E. Odom, US Army(Ret.), Director of NSA 1985-1988
Wherein, General Odom does a nice job of discussing the history of Vietnam and comparing it to Iraq.
Odom lists Three Phases of conflict in Vietnam.
Phase 1 was strategic purpose, lasting from 1961-1965, with the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The belief that the US had to engage in Vietnam to contain Soviet and Chinese interests in the region.
President Kennedy was ambivalent about deeper involvement, but some of his aides believed that a North Vietnamese takeover of the south would bring Sino-Soviet dominion over all of Southeast Asia. They paid little attention to the emerging Sino-Soviet split, which the Intelligence Community was reporting in the early 1960s. Accordingly, the "containment of China" became their goal, their rationale for U.S. strategic purpose - that is, not allowing the Soviet Bloc to expand in this region.
Compare this to Iraq... The argument that there was a growing threat.
Phase One in Iraq, the run-up to the invasion, looks remarkably similar. Broodings about the "necessity" to overthrow Saddam's regime were heard earlier, but signs of action appeared in January 2002, when President Bush proclaimed his "axis of evil" thesis about Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, countries he accused of acquiring "weapons of mass destruction" and supporting terrorists against the United States. This became the cornerstone of his rationale for invading Iraq, and it was no less ill-conceived than the strategic purpose for President Johnson's war in Vietnam. It better served the interests of Iran and Osama bin Laden.
Odom then talks about Phase Two, which started with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which turned out to be bullshit. Similarly he says the invasion of Iraq on the pretence of Weapons of Mass Destruction follows a similar trend.
Phase Two in Vietnam was marked by a refusal to reconsider the war's "strategic" rationale. Rather, debate focused only on "tactical" issues as the war went sour.
So we were no longer interested in containing China or Soviet Union. We were now faced with the bodies on the ground. The tactical issues, rather than strategic. That being why the fuck are we here exactly?
This obsession with tactical issues made it easier to ignore the strategic error. As time passed, costs went up, casualties increased, and public support fell. We could not afford to "cut and run," it was argued. "The Viet Cong would carry out an awful blood-letting." Supporters of the war expected no honest answer when they asked "How can we get out?" Eventually Senator Aiken of Vermont gave them one: "In boats."
We're presently at Phase Two in Iraq. The same debates, the same discussion. We can't leave. We broke it, we have to fix it. What noble purpose do our soldiers serve?
This point was particularly interesting, as he talks about Congress growing nervous over Iraq.
When Democratic Congressman Jack Murtha, a highly decorated Marine war veteran, asserted that the war was hopeless and that U.S. forces should be withdrawn, supporters of the Bush White House attacked his patriotism. Sadly, the Democratic leadership refused to defend him.
He then goes into Phase Three of Vietnam... The Vietnamization of the battle, and the make believe peace talks in Paris. He notes, that this phase actually weakened the US further.
The assumptions about the Paris peace talks were no less illusory. Their designer, Henry Kissinger, believed that Moscow would "help" the United States reach a settlement short of total capitulation. In fact, by the late 1960s, the war was not only serving Soviet purposes against China, but also weakening NATO, hurting the U.S. currency in the international exchange rates, and making the charge of "imperialism" believable to citizens in many countries allied to the United States. Thus Soviet leaders had no objective reason to help the United States find a face-saving exodus. The deeper into "the big muddy" in Vietnam went the United States, the better for the Soviet Union. Second, Moscow could not have compelled North Vietnamese leaders in Paris to accept half a loaf in South Vietnam. Hanoi was playing off Moscow and Beijing with no intention of conceding its ultimate goal for any price.
He says we're now entering Phase Three, and refers to the bullshit constitution, the lack of understanding of reality that Shiite and Kurd are not very likely to share power with Sunni.
Will Phase Three in Iraq end with helicopters flying out of the "green zone" in Baghdad? It all sounds so familiar.
But his final point is ominous. He says the damage from Iraq is going to be worse than Vietnam.
The difference lies in the consequences. Vietnam did not have the devastating effects on U.S. power that Iraq is already having. On this point, those who deny the Vietnam-Iraq analogy are probably right. They are wrong, however, in believing that "staying the course" will have any result other than making the damage to U.S. power far greater than changing course and withdrawing sooner in as orderly a fashion as possible.
This is third in a series. All three are worth passing on to friends.
What's wrong with cutting and running
Want stability in the Middle East? Get out of Iraq!