Why is the American health care industry geared more toward the interests of insurance companies than the citizenry? Why was bankruptcy reform such a "necessity", given the significant profit margins of all the major lenders? Why was Iraqi "reconstruction" entrusted to private contractors on a no-bid basis? Why do energy companies have a larger voice in the crafting of American energy policy than any other U.S. entities? Why do so many of our politicians accept the absurd canard that voluntary corporate self-regulation is the anwer to most of our environmental problems? Why did our politicians feel comfortable raising the rates on student loans when doing so directly contravened the interests of so many of their constituents?
On all of these issues and many more, the political establishment has supported outcomes that diverge significantly from the preferences of the typical American citizen. Theoretically, the populace should serve as a check on such unpopular outcomes, but it does not. This is because:
- A person's vague and unarticulated dissatisfactions with the status quo can often be effectively counteracted by sufficiently loud and prominent messaging from supporters of that status quo. The relatively small and concentrated interests that these outcomes benefit can be easily coordinated to provide for such messaging, whereas those who are harmed often constitute too broad and diffuse a group for coordination. As a result, politicians who harm the interests of their constituents can achieve perverse gains by increasing their messaging power.
- Concentrated interests can do much to keep the citizen's opinions on an unpopular measure vague and unarticulated by providing media megaphones to sympathetic (or simply co-opted) voices.
Were the monetary link between these concentrated interests and our politicians severed, none of this would be possible, at least not nearly to the same extent. Concentrated interests could still advance their preferences in the public arena, but without the complicity of politicians, it would be much more difficult to sell these preferences as mainstream. Politicians would gain nothing from complicity, as their own personal messaging power would be unaffected by the wealth of their backers.
In politics, it is exceedingly rare to find a "magic bullet" capable of solving a broad array of problems at once. We may even view such attempts as inherently naïve and impracticable. Yet the public financing of elections really does provide us with just such an opportunity. Some may argue that true public financing is either misguided or a pipe dream, because:
- Money will always find its way to our politicians. Attempts at reform are only likely to create even more perverse avenues to influence.
- As evinced by their very positions in office, our representatives are winning under the current system. Thus, any true reform package would face opposition from nearly 100% of those with the power to enact such reform.
- The American public holds too low of an opinion of electoral politics to be willing to finance it with their own tax dollars.
- Public finance is unconstitutional, as it denies freedom of speech and organization, both of which require funding.
To the first of these objections, I would answer that most of the unintended consequences of contemporary campaign finance reform have been due precisely to the incremental and half-hearted nature of the reforms. A truly fundamental reform would effectively close off all routes to financial influence at once, eliminating the ability of lobbyist attorneys to find alternative routes to influence.
To the second objection, I would argue that most Americans at least intuitively understand that current campaign financing schemes work directly against their interests, and thus a well-crafted proposal has the potential to gain broad public support. If a concentrated interest, such as, say, the netroots could successfully grow this support, legislators could eventually face very credible challenges from pro-reform candidates that would force them to either run a losing campaign or, more likely, preemptively capitulate. The progressive movement should ultimately keep its eyes on the long-term, and such pessimism is anathema to our mission.
I agree with the third objection, and have outlined a plan (below) that I think would successfully address this concern.
As to the fourth objection, I am not a lawyer, and I look to fellow Kossacks to tell me where my plan might run into legal issues. Even if there are such issues, however, I do not believe they would be fatal – donation limits have already established that there is a limit to such "speech", and my proposal does not eliminate donations altogether.
[note - my discussion of the Ackerman-Ayres plan outlined in Adam B's diary last Wednesday would make this long piece too long, but I'll be happy to discuss it in the comments.
My Proposal
My plan is an attempt to publicly finance campaigns while 1) not invoking any direct tax mechanism and 2) leaving the door open for some measure of individual contributions. The entire thing hinges on the nature of ownership of the public airwaves – something I am not an expert in – so anyone well-versed in these issues is strongly encouraged to chime in.
It’s my understanding that the public has the fundamental property rights to use of any airwaves receivable by antenna. If I’m not mistaken, the major networks as well as radio stations are essentially leased these rights for free on a permanent basis. Under this plan, we would simply yank back a chunk of this time for use by campaigns. Each campaign would receive an equal number of advertising spots on the networks and radio. In addition, each candidate would receive time to basically run an infomercial, a la Perot in 1992 (maybe more than one for major races, such as the presidency). Finally, time would be allotted for an inclusive debate/s. This would apply to every race down to the state representative level, and to both primary and general races, with coverage obviously differing between states and between districts. There would be some mechanism, such as signature requirements (or major party nomination in the general), for determining which candidates are allotted time; this would be designed to strike the proper balance between inclusiveness and purposeless "noise". Most significantly, candidates would be barred from running any other television or radio advertising (including cable). Candidates would also receive a number of "freebie" mailings through the (also publicly owned) postal service. They could not send any mailings on top of this. I’m agnostic on the issue of print and internet advertising; we would obviously want to avoid a situation in which a pro-candidate diary on a site such as this legally transforms the site-owner’s outlays into "donations".
Citizens could still donate to campaigns. Candidates would have two accounts – a public account, accessible to all candidates, and a private account, and could allot their finances into either as they deemed fit. Staff expenses, the cost of producing advertisements, and grassroots campaigning could be financed from either account. There would perhaps be a limit on private account spending, with all excess needing to be placed into the public account. Campaign rallies that exceed some threshold of production cost could only be financed through the public account. Spending from the public account would be limited to the candidate’s proportional share of it (one fourth if there are four candidates, e.g.), perhaps with a qualification allowing candidates to dip somewhat more (their share plus 10-20%, e.g.) from their own contributions to it.
There would have to be severe limits on organizations such as 527s, in order to prevent campaigns from simply shifting their operations to thinly veiled and unregulated campaign fronts. One potential solution, which could run into constitutional problems, would be to strictly regulate 527 speech, such that advertisements would have to be single-issue based, and could not reference candidates. There might also be a simple ban on 527 advertising for a brief period (say one month) in the run-up to the election.
So there you have it. All television and radio advertising becomes publicly financed, and there remains an outlet for individual contribution. I’m open to any and all suggestions – this is just one of a number of proposals that might work. The main message of this diary is that there is a potential "magic bullet" that we should not ignore.