The Washington Post ran a story about the Workers at Calvert Cliffs and how they
are all so worried about the Japanese workers at Fukushima and how they all want to help out. The Article
http://www.washingtonpost.com/...
Included this amazing line in the History of Shilling
That sense of duty is widespread among nuclear power industry workers, said Margaret Harding of the American Nuclear Society, an Illinois-based group serving nuclear industry professionals.
“If they could help in Japan, they would be on planes right now,” she said. “The problem is the controls are in Japanese.”
Um Margaret? Ever hear of a translator?
Ever hear of something called a Dymo Label Maker? Wow, I bet if a couple hundred American Nuclear Power plant workers volunteered to come over to Fukushima, the Japanese would bang out some labels for them.
Oh Hey, Margaret, I bet if GE who made those reactors were asked nice, they could make labels and drawings available.
Look, If Margaret doesnt want to help the Japanese out, I get it. It's scary and it's melting down. But please don't try and pass off fear as courage.
Now let's look into Margaret Harding:
now who is Margaret Harding:
http://www.linkedin.com/..._
Vice President, Engineering Quality at GE Nuclear Energy
Master Black Belt Fulfillment at GE Nuclear Energy
I have worked in the nuclear industry for over 27 years.
Early in my career, I performed core and fuel designs for every BWR reactor design in current operation. Some of my designs still form the basis for the reload work done today for those reactors.
I have led large engineering groups, interacting with every major BWR utility. I am experienced in working with the NRC to resolve technical issues and develop new products and procedures.
In addition, I am a certified Nuclear Quality Assurance auditor. With my wide ranging experience in engineering design, I have some unique perspectives on the auditing process and bring more than just strict procedural compliance to the table.
Interested in opportunities to work with companies in the nuclear industry.
Um So Margaret Harding Oversaw the groups that supported these reactors.
Um Margaret Harding while doing QA never bothered to ask if it was a wise idea to store 5 years of fuel on top of a reactor.
[EDIT: Radical Def notes that her audit skills include creative auditing, kind of in the
the ENRON Style ]
Margaret Harding while doing all those Black Belt QA courses, never bothered looking if it made sense to leave fuel tanks outside instead of in hardened shelters
Margaret Harding never asked if the suppression pools were sized right, or if leaks
from the reactor may get out of primary containment and up in the Refueling deck.
Margaret Harding never asked if the Labels should be in Japanese and English.
http://theenergycollective.com/...
Margaret Harding who wrote this
http://theenergycollective.com/...
The BP Disaster: Why Something Like It Could Never Happen at a Nuclear Facility
New equipment used in safety-critical areas of the plant must be demonstrated to perform the function at least as well as original equipment. That includes testing under worst case accident conditions and detailed specification reviews to assure that the equipment is adequate for the job. Equipment is tested to be sure that it remains completely functional during the upset. It is also tested to make sure that it can perform its intended function over a period of time. For example, valves must be shown to maintain their ability to isolate segments during an event. This requires verification of the seal and the mechanism that operates the valve. The same logic applies to motors whether they are operating valves or pumps.
There is a regulation (10CFR21) that requires individuals to report anything they believe might be affecting plant safety. The utility is required to assess the concern and determine the impact on safety. The NRC has strict reporting requirements regarding these assessments. If an individual fails to report something, he or she can be held legally liable as individuals. Consequences include the potential for jail time.
Every operating nuclear power plant has a resident on-site NRC inspector. These folks are rotated periodically to prevent complacency on the part of the inspector or the utility. The inspectors review 10CFR21 investigations, watch activities, and generally assure that the utility is operating the plant safely.
INPO is built on trust and the trust goes in all directions. It is within INPO, within each utility, between INPO and the utilities. The trust is built on interaction between INPO and its members. One of the best tools INPO uses is the Peer Review. A Peer Review is a visit to a utility and its power plant(s) conducted by a team of INPO employees, employees loaned to INPO by utilities, and peers from other utilities with similar plants. These teams review plant operations and check all aspects of the support provided by the utility’s corporate offices. During these reviews the information provided by the utility to INPO in response to industry events is also discussed. INPO reviews the utility’s plans to preclude events and provides feedback if they deem the response to be short of the mark.
So Lets see Margaret? Can I call you Meg?
Meg? So all that stuff in Japan? It tested under worst case conditions? Like a Earthquake
in Japan? A country with Earthquakes? It tested under Tsunami? The Nation that invented the word? All those cooling systems? They tested out? Huh?
Trust goes in Both Directions and we have Peer Review? Does that mean you went to Japan and did Peer Review? Does that mean your idea of Peer Review is that a japanese plant should only have 50 radiation suits? Oh Does that mean Good peer review is Japanese plants should fudge the paperwork? As a GE Black Belt did you approve those practices?
Or another piece of BS from Meg
http://theenergycollective.com/...
Engineers don’t step into the limelight easily. I’ve often said that you can tell an extroverted engineer because he looks at your shoes instead of his own when talking to you. But we, the engineers who know the nuclear power industry, know how hard we have all worked to make it as safe as possible, and know what these machines can do better than anyone else, have a duty to step up to the plate and take a swing. We have to help people understand our industry, not shroud it in techno-speak and jargon. Acknowledge the flaws and fix them, point out the best practices and make them stronger.
This is why I stepped up and spoke out. To set an example and live by my own words.
Um Meg. You aren't an Engineer. You are a manager. You are a Coffee Swilling, Jelly Donut munching GE Company squid. They sent you to management school at Croton, they taught you to BS, they taught you how to dress good, take a great picture, but, the last time you had a pen in hand, did some serious calculations, did a review without worrying about ROI?
or
http://theenergycollective.com/...
On August 24th, Mr. Lochbaum posted a story on the Union of Concerned Scientists website about an event in 1988, then proceeded to link it to a 2005 event at a different plant and makes the case that the nuclear industry is filled with screw-ups and near misses. You can read the original article here. As it happens, my career has included learning about these particular events and leading the team that developed some of the solutions that are currently in place to prevent/mitigate the effect. From that, I can say – Mr. Lochbaum got it wrong.
Um, Judging by you Meg? I think Lochbaum is right.
or how about this?
http://inthearena.blogs.cnn.com/...
Margaret Harding: 'Everyone involved in nuclear science and technology is committed to a culture of safety
Really? Where were those Everyone when TEPCO was gundecking maintenance logs?
Where was Everyone when TEPCO faked Repairs
Where was Everyone when the Japanese had a criticality event and
http://www.wise-uranium.org/...
Since the evacuation started only 5 hours after the begin of the criticality, residents may have received doses of more than 75 mSv, that is 75 times the permissible annual dose of 1 mSv.
The government has so far said 69 people were exposed to radiation, but the latest survey says the number of affected people could increase.
On Oct 11, 2000, six former executives and current employees of JCO Co. were arrested on suspicion of negligence resulting in two employees' deaths. Ibaraki Prefectural Police spent more than one year investigating the nuclear accident and have apparently concluded that JCO's systematic rule violations and a lack of safety measures jointly caused the disaster. Ibaraki police arrested Kenzo Koshijima, 54, who was the head of the JCO Tokai plant where the accident took place on Sept. 30, and five other officials of the company. (Mainichi Shimbun Oct. 12, 2000)
Six former top officials at JCO Co. pleaded guilty to charges of negligence resulting in death as the trial opened into Japan's worst nuclear accident. The pleas were entered at the initial hearing at the Mito District Court in Ibaraki Also, current JCO Co. president Tomoyuki Inami admitted to a charge that the company violated the nation's nuclear regulations law, said Mito District Court spokesman Michiru Sakurai. (Reuters Apr 23, 2001)
So Meg, Does that Everyone include the Tokai Managers convicted of negligence and systemic rules violations?
Or hear's a great one
http://www.nytimes.com/...
“It’s not like they have a breach; there’s no broken pipe venting steam,” said Margaret E. Harding, a nuclear safety consultant who managed a team at General Electric, the reactors’ designer, that analyzed pressure buildup in reactor containments. “You’re getting pops of release valves for minutes, not hours, that take pressure back down.”
And a day later the first reactor exploded....
http://www.zerohedge.com/...
These two comments on ZH sum up her presentation better then anything i can say
Wouldn't it be great if we could dispose of all hazardous/nuclear waste by dumping it into the ocean? After all, according to Margaret here, dilution of toxic and radioactive waste streams into large bodies of water is an acceptable treatment.
A good followup question might have been:
"so, you wouldn't want me to pee into your coffee cup, but if I piss in the pot it's all good?"
Meg
You are a shill, and judging by your resume responsible in part for this accident.
I could imagine in 1945 Herman Goering giving lectures titled "Collateral Damage:
A view towards improved accuracy as a humanitarian gesture" and Klaus barbie
"Effective Police interrogation tactics: Results without tears"
Margaret, you need to worry about your criminal negligence here.