In my previous life as a freelance writer, back in the 80's and early 90's, I did a lot of magazine articles on chemical weapons, particularly about the "binary nerve gas" controversy during the Reagan Administration, and the proliferation of chemical weapons in the 1980's to countries like Syria, Libya, Iraq, Thailand, and others. I had a couple sources in the Pentagon and in disarmament groups like SIPRI. I started work on a book manuscript on the subject, but in 1993, when the Chemical Weapons Convention was signed, interest in chemical weapons plummeted, and I never finished it. I stored it on a floppy disk and left it in a drawer.
Well, today, given the renewed interest in chemical weapons, I decided to look for it, and found it. So I spent the day today reading through it, doing some research to update the parts that need updating, and preparing it to be published.
So what I am going to do is post the entire rough draft manuscript here, in a series of diaries. I hope it will provide some useful background info on CBW that people can keep in mind when reading about the situation in Syria. And I'd also like to recruit some editors--I'd appreciate any feedback from folks, especially about parts that might not be clear or are hard to understand. This is just a rough draft--none of it is chiselled in stone.
Previous parts of manuscript here:
Introduction
http://www.dailykos.com/...
One: The History of CBW
http://www.dailykos.com/...
(c) 2013 by Lenny Flank. All rights reserved.
TWO
The Debate Over Binary Chemical Weapons
In 1973, war broke out between Israel and her Arab neighbors, and the Israelis managed to capture huge supplies of Arab weapons, armored vehicles and ammunition before the end of the conflict. This event, which seemingly has little to do with the chemical/biological arms race, in fact marked the starting point of an ambitious American rearmament program that introduced a whole new generation of chemical weapons.
When US technicians examined the captured Egyptian and Syrian tanks, they were surprised to find that the Soviet-built equipment had a sophisticated system of filters and air seals which would have protected the crews even in a chemically-contaminated environment. The high level of Soviet CBW defense preparations revealed by this equipment, combined with persistent reports of Soviet “yellow rain” chemical attacks in Asia, convinced the Department of Defense that the USSR possessed a more massive and highly developed chemical warfare capability than was believed.
To counter the Soviet threat and close the perceived “chemical gap”, the Defense Department began an intensive new research program on a type of nerve gas munition known as a “binary” weapon. In the binary method of dissemination, the chemical weapon is filled with two separate chemicals, each of which by itself is relatively harmless. When the shell is fired, a thin barrier between the chemicals is ruptured, allowing them to mix and form full-strength GB. In the binary VX version of the aerial bomb, the chemicals were to be mixed mechanically just before the bomb was dropped.
The binary method was not a new idea. Binary types of munitions had been studied early in the US chemical warfare program, as far back as 1949. The technical problems of producing such projectiles, however, proved to be too troublesome, and the decision was made to stay with the simpler unitary weapons using pre-mixed agents.
By 1960, however, the Navy had become concerned with the safety problems of storing live nerve gas bombs aboard its aircraft carriers, and began to search for a safer method of storing the weapons. As a result, work was begun again on the binary program. Throughout the 1960’s, researchers at the Navy’s China Lake center worked on a binary version of the aerial bomb. By 1965, the design had been finished, and the first prototype was constructed in 1968. The weapon was christened the BLU-80/B “Bigeye”.
The Army also recognized the advantages of the safer binary storage system, and began to develop a two-chambered 155mm artillery shell designated the M-687. The Bigeye bomb was designed to attack airfields and rear areas with persistent VX, while the M-687 was intended for the battlefield use of nonpersistent GB.
The binary artillery shell contained two chambers, one filled with the chemical methylphosphonyl diflouride, known as diflour or DF. The other chamber contains isopropyl, a form of rubbing alcohol. When the shell is fired, the force of the projectile moving down the barrel of the 155mm howitzer causes the thin barrier separating the chemicals to rupture, allowing them to mix and form about six pounds of GB-2, the binary version of Sarin nerve gas.
The Bigeye bomb contained dimethylpolysulphide, a form of powdered sulphur, in a narrow chamber. Before the bomb is released from the airplane, an igniter apparatus drives the sulphur into the bomb’s reaction chamber, which is filled with the chemical ethyl 2 (diisopropylamino) ethylmethylphosphonite, known as QL. The resulting mixture is agitated by a blender and forms 0-ethyl-S2 diisopropylamino ethylmethyl phosphorothiolate, or Agent VX. The VX is sucked out of the bomb casing by two explosive units and forms a coarse spray that quickly settles to coat exposed surfaces.
By 1966, the Defense Department had completed its designs for the binary bomb and artillery shell, and asked Congress for an appropriation to begin construction of a plant to manufacture the new weapons. Congress, however, was facing increasing public outcry over the use of chemical weapons in Vietnam, and had no desire to stir up trouble by beginning another chemical weapons program. The appropriation was denied, and the 1969 Nixon moratorium on chemical weapons production ended the matter.
Undaunted, the Defense Department continued to make plans to replace all of its unitary weapons with binaries. Later, a new research program was begun to develop a binary missile for the planned Multiple Launch Rocket System, a tactical rocket launcher.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War prodded the Pentagon to re-examine its chemical capabilities, and the Defense Department took the opportunity to give the binary program another try. It asked for an appropriation of $200 million to begin constructing a binary production plant in 1973. The request was denied, but funding for binary research and development continued. In 1971, 1975 and 1976, the Pentagon re-introduced its request for funding. Each time, Congress, citing the 1969 moratorium, rejected the request.
In 1980, however, after the Defense Science Board concluded that there was a dangerous “chemical gap” between the US and the USSR, the Defense Department revived its binary plans and asked for $3.15 million to build a plant for producing M-687 artillery shells at Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The Pine Bluff facility was to be the first of several, costing a total of $155 million and giving the US the capability of producing binary GB and VX weapons.
The House Armed Services Committee accepted the Pentagon’s argument that the request did not violate the 1969 moratorium, since the money was to be used to build a factory for the shells, not the shells themselves. The Committee approved the measure despite open opposition to the program by the White House. The Carter Administration had steadfastedly refused to order the production of new chemical weapons, preferring instead to concentrate on improved defenses against chemical attack. Nevertheless, Congress approved the appropriation.
This, in turn, set the stage for the actual production of weapons, and in February 1982 President Reagan took the legal step of ending the 1969 moratorium and certifying to Congress, “The production of lethal binary chemical munitions is essential to the national interest.” As part of his planned military buildup, Reagan asked for over $700 million for chemical and biological defense programs. Some $508 million of this would go for improved CBW defenses, while $54 million would go for the production of the M-687 and the Bigeye. The new weapons, Reagan noted, were needed to provide a deterrent and would only be used in retaliation for a Soviet chemical attack.
This request touched off a bitter and emotional debate that lasted for years. The Pentagon, with the support of the White House and several influential members of Congress, argued vigorously for binary production. Congressional critics, alarmed by the Reagan Administration’s unprecedented military buildup and concerned about the practicality of the binary scheme, just as vigorously opposed the new weapons. Critics also pointed out that the binary program would have a destabilizing effect on global negotiations to outlaw chemical weapons. The decision to end the 1969 moratorium and resume chemical weapons production, critics argued, would only tell the world that the United States wasn’t really serious about chemical disarmament, and would sabotage the already-strained efforts to ban chemical weapons. The Reagan Administration, on the other hand, enthusiastically supported the binary program. Reagan argued that the binaries were needed as a “bargaining chip” to induce the Soviets to accept a ban on all chemical weapons.
In August, 1986, the Senate approved funding for binary production, but the House rejected it. Shortly afterwards, a compromise was reached. Funding for Bigeyes would be cut, but production of M-687 artillery shells could begin any time after October 1, 1987.
With this Congressional action, the 1969 moratorium finally met its end. The first binary nerve gas shell rolled off the assembly line on December 16, 1987.
The Pentagon immediately laid plans to expand its binary program, and announced that it would seek money for the production of binary warheads for the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). The MLRS was capable of delivering volleys of GB or VX rockets at ranges up to twenty miles. Plans were also made to continue to seek Bigeye production, despite the bomb’s continuing history of test failures and design problems.
With the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, however, the US binary program came to an end, and the seventy year chemical arms race between the US and the USSR ended with it.