Having written a diary about the tentative, interim, 6 month agreement between the "P5+1" and the Iranian government regarding the Iranian nuclear program, I was astounded by some of the responses and comments. Clearly, some people struggle to comprehend what they read. Some seem to react to "key words" and "dogwhistles," missing the main point of the diary. I suppose in the land of echo chambers and opinion bubbles, that's to be expected.
What I find disturbing, however, is the tendency of some readers and almost all the media talkers to see the issue in strictly black and white terms. The assumption seems to be that anyone not enthusiastic about this agreement wants war with Iran and opposes diplomacy.
Surely, that does apply to some. We, in America, have our vocal claque of neocon war mongers and jingoists. The Iraq War crowd was on TV in force after years of blessed silence. The "America is always wrong" crowd was less obtrusive and less vocal, but not entirely silent. What unites the two groups is the lack of any awareness
of nuance. Very few situations are clearly binary, good/evil, right/wrong, yes/no. The issue of policy towards Iran is not one of those.
Being opposed to this agreement - emphasis on THIS - does not presuppose a desire for war. It is not a morally clear position, nor is it the obvious solution to a problem. One, including myself, can favor diplomacy and oppose war - and still oppose this particular agreement and this particular policy.
There is good news and bad news in the outcome of these meetings, public and secret. The good news is simply the fact that the American and Iranian governments are talking to each other directly. Talk is usually better than no-talk. That in itself does not indicate a good outcome. I made reference to Neville Chamberlain, which elicited scoffing. Unlike some who referred to the Munich Pact, I was referring not to "appeasement" but to the mistaken frame of mind seemingly exhibited by Chamberlain. He, it appears, assumed Hitler was, like himself, reasonable, even as Hitler's behavior up to that point indicated otherwise.
Similarly, I am cautious about ascribing to the theocratic dictatorship of Iran the same goals and purposes as the American policy makers and negotiators. The goal of any negotiation is to find common ground and some degree of concurrence. If the goal of the Iranian rulers is to obfuscate their continuing development of nuclear weapons while easing the sanctions to save their economy, and therefore their rule, failing to do more than delay the achievement of that goal is not a desirable outcome for the United States. On the other hand, If return to the wider world and the lifting of sanctions is their primary goal, then some indication of willingness to give up nuclear weapons development for economic growth will result.
On the other hand, withholding relief in the face of tangible indications of a change in Iranian policy would prove counter-productive, hardening the resolve of the Ayatollahs to produce nuclear weapons. What would constitute tangible indications needs to be viewed in the context of stated policy goals and on-the-ground actions by the Iranian rulers.
The size and scope of the nuclear project in Iran is far beyond what would be necessary for peaceful applications. Twenty percent enriched U-235 is not appropriate for either medical applications or power generation. It is "breakout" level enrichment. The construction of a heavy water reactor, used to produce plutonium, is a strictly military technology. Taken with the active support of Bashir Al-Assad's Alawite regime in Syria, the arming and training of Hezbollah fighters, interference in Iraq, the holocaust denial, the open threat against Israel, the more veiled threats against other religious despots (of the Sunni denomination), taken together, do not speak well of Iranian intentions.
Given all these considerations, my concern is that the "P5+1" were too anxious to reach some agreement and may have given up too much for too little. I do not oppose bargaining, just bad bargaining.
Time will tell whether Obama's approach will bear sweet fruit, but the world does not need more fruit of the bitter kind. I suspect that a tougher negotiating line and longer time line would have produced a more salutary outcome as a first step.
No, I am not for another war, and sometimes Obama can be wrong. It is not either/or. it always is "sorta/kinda."