As we consider the new proposal for a National Food Policy,[1] here’s some background on earlier national farming plans might be helpful. Here is a discussion of four such plans, with the first two sections covering the same basic approach, followed by three other, more recent reports.
PROPOSAL FOR "NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL PLANNING"
THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT, 1933
This section comes from information in Al Krebs book, The Corporate Reapers: The Book of Agribusiness. It explains how the original farm bill effort was the fulfillment of a goal for "national agricultural planning.
HENRY A. WALLACE STATEMENT:
"ACHIEVING A BALANCED AGRICULTURE" 1940
This is Henry A. Wallace's 1940 book in the farm programs. It serves better as a statement of national policy, as it's written after the farm bill had settled down into a more coherent form. It addresses a lot of concerns that are relevant to the Sustainable Food Movement of today, by explaining in a very well integrated way the original purposes of the farm bill as a whole, (including the "food" sections,) by filling in some gaps in our historical knowledge today, and by correcting a number of misunderstandings.
A CORPORATE STATEMENT ON NATIONAL FARM POLICY
"AN ADAPTIVE PROGRAM FOR AGRICULTURE," 1962
This is, perhaps, the most infamous of the corporate "think tank" reports that called for dismantling the basic farm bill programs. It shows the rationale for creating the problems that have so concerned farmers for 60 years, and that so concern the Sustainable Food Movement of today.
FARMING STRUCTURE AND FOOD POLICY GOALS
"A TIME TO CHOOSE," 1981
This is the report that was conducted at the conclusion of the Carter administration. It has a stronger section on farm workers than the earlier reports.
THE CASE FOR SMALL FARMS
"A TIME TO ACT," 1998
This report is a product of the Clinton administration. It is billed as a sequel to "A Time to Choose, (above,) and focuses more directly on the needs of small farms.
I'm posting this paper prior to it's completion, since there's a big discussion on a National Food Policy proposal today.
PROPOSAL FOR “NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL PLANNING”
THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT, 1933
According to A.V. Krebs, in The Corporate Reapers, a proposal for national agricultural planning was put forth as legislation during the early 1930s, leading eventually to the New Deal farm bill.[2] The proposal was led by M.L. Wilson, (Montana State University,) and was eventually supported by key New Deal “brain trusters,” Henry A. Wallace and Rexford Tugwell.[2]
In simple terms, the bill itself had a much more modest look to it, as a “domestic allotment plan,” but it also involved social scientists and included an emphasis on education in economics. By then the Great Depression had highlighted the chronic farm problems, cheap prices and oversupply, that had existed for at least 60 years prior to the Depression.[3] On a practical level, the bill sought to fix this. As Krebs put it, “The main goal of the bill was to enable farmers to produce crops they were equipped to produce, in the most efficient manner possible, and grow no more than they could sell at adequate prices.”[2] One thing needed to accomplish this was a major restructuring of USDA.[2]
All of this was summarized in the statement that “Wilson’s principal initial interest in farm legislation was not simply to raise farm income: he saw it primarily as a device for national planning, with the people participating and growing in understanding on a grand scale.”[4]
From a political point of view, it is significant that Wilson got support from the business community, including the Chamber of Commerce, in part because presented the approach as an alternative to what farmer movements were saying, which emphasized “‘trust busting,’” a “fear of business power and” an “insistance that business leaders change their ways.”[2] It failed to go anywhere in Congress, however.
Franklin Roosevelt picked up on the idea, and “spoke of the advantages of agricultural planning ‘to gain a better and less wasteful distribution of agricultural productive effort’ which would point the way ‘to readjustment in the distribution of the population in general.”[5]
This then became the first farm bill, the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Arthur Schlesinger described it as follows:
“Probably Never in American history had o much so cial and legal inventiveness gone into a single legislative measure ... For another quarter century agricultural policy caqme up with very little which was not provided for one way or another in the Agricultural Adjustment Act.”[6]
It is important for us today to understand that, while this legislation was severely reduced, (1953-1995) and eliminated (1996-2018), the underlying economic reasons for it’s existence have remained right into the 21st century, where we’ve had the lowest farm prices in history and much lower net farm income than during the height of the New Deal farm programs (1942-1952), in spite of greatly increased production and yields, (for crops and dairy, for example).[7]
To put this another way, it’s said that the New Deal farm programs are old fashioned and obsolete, a kind of “turning back the clock.”[8] If fact, however, they are the only programs that have effectively addressed the underlying economic problem, the “lack of price responsiveness”[9] “on both the supply and the demand sides for aggregate agriculture.”[3] Krebs addresses this question with his statement that “In one legislative act, the economy of rural America was suddenly uprooted from the 19th century and agriculture, a highly individualistic enterprise, was made a collective endeavor.” With the deterioration (1953-1995) and eradication (1996-2018) of the New Deal Programs, we’ve again turned back to 19th century ways of thinking. By New Deal standards, the major provisions of our newest farm bills are the most out-of-date programs that we’ve had since Herbert Hoover.
ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND RACE. Krebs notes that “The Federal government was placed in the unique position of attempting to raise the economic status of an entire social class of its citizens.”[2 p. 184] As measured by national agricultural “parity,” by 1932, the economic status of farmers, (who had had a depression throughout the 1920s,) had fallen to only 58% of what their urban counterparts were getting. This rose through the 1930s under the AAA, and reached 100% or more from 1942-1952, (before Congress started reversing the New Deal farm programs, starting with the year 1953).
While these programs were much better than today for, for example, the more independent black cotton farmers in the South, there was a big problem for the many who were tenant farmers. The supply management (i.e. reduction) mechanisms were a new place where racism could especially be inserted. Today we at least have greater awareness (and political will,) of the needs of “disadvantaged farmers,” especially minority farmers, as we see in relation to the Pigford settlement, and in some of the farm bill spending programs. Strong policy features based upon this kind of awareness were needed in relation to all features of the New Deal Farm Bill, to prevent the racist exploitation of tenant farmers and all minority farmers. Today such efforts remain inadequate. Meanwhile, without the New Deal programs since 1996, economic conditions for crops like cotton have been the worst we’ve seen since prior to the New Deal.
HENRY A. WALLACE STATEMENT:
“ACHIEVING A BALANCED AGRICULTURE” 1940
In real life, in certain ways, national farm/food policies, and the farm bill specifically, can tend toward becoming a hodge podge of political compromises among competing interests, that are then often funded and implemented in variously reduced ways. We can speak of it as we speak of sausage making. It’s not always what we want to look at, especially when we’re looking for clarity of purpose.
In contrast, the proposal for a National Food Policy calls for a general statement to sum up broad goals and ways of achieving them.
With this in mind, I recommend Henry A. Wallace’s book on the New Deal farm bill: Achieving a Balanced Agriculture: How the National Farm Program Meets the Changing Problem.[9] While the AAA, described above, was passed in Roosevelt’s first year in office, the 1940 version of this book about the farm program came in Roosevelt’s second term, and after a landslide re-election.
Wallace was the Secretary of Agriculture under who’s leadership the original farm bill was created. Wallaces book, which also addressed the food side of the equation, can serve as a model for work today toward a National Food Policy (or National Farm AND Food Policy).
As the title indicates, the central thrust of the programs was balance. Farmers know this in that the USDA agency administering the programs was known as the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, (ASCS,) until the name was changed to Farm Service Agency, during the 1990s, as the original programs were dismantled.
We also see here the two top goals of the program, balance and conservation, or as we might say today, justice and sustainability. In the forward, Wallace emphasized that “this program ... is aimed essentially at one underlying farm problem” that continues over time, but that also changes. He then begins the book by defining the problem that threatens “balanced agriculture,” initially in terms of “low income and low purchasing power,” plus “problems of the use and misuse of land.”[9 p. 1] Among the problems of land use identified by Wallace were the “Evils of One-Crop Farming.” Key among his solutions for all of agriculture were more diversified crop rotations.
Part V, “Aims of the National Farm Program,” spells out four general goals of the program more comprehensively, and specifically includes consumer impacts. These included:
“First, a fair share of the national income for the farm families and fair exchange of value for farm products.”
“Second, conservation and wise use of agricultural resources.”
“Third, safeguarding consumer supplies of food and fiber.”
“Fourth, stability of farm communities and the promotion of national stability.”[pp. 19-21]
These goals are then summarized as follows:
“The Aims of the National Farm Program--security, conservation, abundance, and stability--are interwoven through all its phases. The program, like the farm problem, is many-sided. But in all parts of the program these aims, recognized by Congress in the legislation authorizing it, are basic.”[p. 21]
The summary is then further summarized: “Beyond all these aims is the one all-inclusive aim of equality of opportunity for farm people.”[p. 21] This one point is then again specified in terms of each of the four aims, with the conclusion that what is good for the “agricultural welfare” is also good for the “general welfare.”[p. 22]
Following the discussion of the four aims are four chapters which explain the programs related to each aim. These are:
VI. “The Ever Normal Granary;”
VII. “Putting Abundance to Use;”
VIII. “Saving Soil, Water, Grass. and Trees;” and
IX. “Farm Homes and Farm Families.”
This is followed by a chapter evaluating the programs, and a chapter on future needs.
The series of 4 chapters on the 4 aims is introduced in chapter VI:
“...The National Farm Program necessarily includes separate programs which deal with separate phases of the central problem but contribute to the attainment of all the objectives of security, conservation, abundance, and stability.... These separate programs may be grouped as dealing with four parts of the problem: (1) Supply of agricultural products; (2) demand for and consumption of agricultural products; (3) conservation of the land and the living products of the land; and (4) assistance to farm homes and farm communities.”[p. 23]
We see, then, that, at it’s deepest root, the fundamental “farm problem” was one of economic injustice, and a the need for fair prices for farmers, but then also for consumers and industry. This problem, in turn, is directly related to the need to balance supply and demand, like other industries. While this problem had long existed, Wallace listed a number of events fairly recent in history that contributed to it, raising the problem to crisis proportions. Some of these were related to World War I, such as plowing up grasslands to plant crops in response to shortages, even as Europe’s desire for self sufficiency was rising. Other factors listed by Wallace included “new farm competition from pioneer countries,” elimination of draft power, (which required extensive land for fuel,) advancements, such as machinery, and the power of corporate monopolies.[pp. 4-5]
This “struggle for equality” and need to balance supply and demand were also understood by those working on earlier attempts at legislation, such as the McNary-Haugen bill, which was passed twice under Republican adminisstrations, (in 1927 and 1928,) but also vetoed twice, and the work of the Federal Farm Board, which was put in place, but which lacked a mechanism to address the problem.[pp. 8, 10-11]
Chapter VI begins with a focus on “efficiency,” which includes having enough. This is balanced with other tools. Supply reductions and price floors balance supply with demand on the bottom side, while reserve supplies to be released with price ceilings are reached provide top side balance. It’s a balance for both farmers and consumers and also for industry, as well as for both crops and livestock, plus a balance between domestic and export needs.
Marketing-agreement and surplus-removal programs for fruit and vegetable farmers are included. These programs are further discussed when programs are evaluated in chapter X. There Wallace states: “More than 1,300,000 producer are directly affected by 45 marketing-agreement programs which help to protect and improve the incomes of producers of fruits and vegetables and dairy products.” I’ve analyzed data on these results, and found that farmers received “parity” prices (essentially living wage prices,) for a wide range of fruits and vegetables during the 1942-1952 period.
Another focus of the ever normal granary is fosters conservation, such as through improved crop rotations. Under the program, the acreage of soil depleting crops, (“cotton, wheat, corn, tobacco, and rice,”) was reduced by 10%, as land was planted “in grass or legumes for a longer period in the crop rotation, with resulting better protection for the soil.” This moved the whole farming system, not just a small niche in specially funded programs, closer to what we know today as organic rotations.
Explanation of the need for the programs is divided into two groups. For crops like wheat and cotton, markets don’t self adjust, as consumers don’t respond much to changes in price. During the Great Depression, then, with oversupply, as farm production was reduced by only 6%, prices fell by 63%, reflecting the chronic farm problem. At the same time, production of agricultural implements was reduced by 80%, as is common in an industry dominated by big enterprises, and prices fell by only 8%.
For other farm products, including dairy and fruits and vegetables, declines in consumer income change the markets a lot. Wallace concluded that “The best solution to the problem of these producers, therefore, is to increase consumer buying power. Since full employment had not yet been achieved, the next best solution was “to distribute surplus farm products to needy families.”
Chapter VII, which focuses more directly on the consumer side, describes programs such as food stamps, cotton stamps, the school lunch program, the home-made mattress program, and the low cost milk program.[9 pp. 34-36]
Chapter VIII, “Saving Soil, Water, Grass, and Trees,” illustrates how, while economic solutions such as market management are crucial to conservation, they must be assisted by special programs which vary by region.
What’s amazing about chapter IX on “Farm Homes and Farm Families,” is how strongly supportive the Wallace plan is of family farmers and the rural scene generally. This too illustrates an extra step by the farm program beyond what market management alone can accomplish, though it’s built on that underlying foundation, (which is the primary goal of the whole program).
The various programs, such as farm ownership loans, helped farmers who had lost their farms and joined the ranks of migrant farm workers, to start farming again. Programs also directly assisted migrant farm workers, improving housing and labor standards, including fair wages, and, of course, they too could utilize programs to become farm owners.
Heading into the Depression, with cheap farm prices throughout the 1920s, and then on into the 1930s, farms were less industrialized than our cities. For example, they often lacked electricity and indoor plumbing. The Wallace programs, in response, called for “rural electrification,” including “home electrification and the construction of water systems and sanitary facilities.” For the broader rural infrastructure, support for co-ops was especially supported.
Chapter IX, “Progress Under the Farm Program,” emphasized two major farm interests, fair prices and keeping farmers in business, (and out of bankruptcy).[p. 54] This, in turn, served as an economic stimulus to help urban businesses as well.[p. 55] Many of the various categories of accomplishment are specified. Wallace concluded, in part, by pointing out that “farm problems that seemed so complex as almost to defy solution now are gradually being conquered.”[p.61]
A second conclusion, identified as “the most significant accomplishment,” was that “In the farm program the farmers have built a piece of machinery which is democratically operated an can be adapted to meet various situations as they arise.”[p. 61] This refers to the title of chapter IV, earlier, which described the succession of legislative acts that culminated in the creation of the farm bill. The title of chapter IV, “The Rise of Economic Democracy on the Farm,” illustrates a key emphasis.[p. 12] For example, “both marketing quotas,” (AAA of 1938,) and “marketing orders,” are “made conditional on the approval of two-thirds of the producers concerned voting in a referendum.”[p. 18]
Especially important is the way that economic democracy is related to economic justice for family farmers, in the achievement of balance between agriculture on one side, and industry and consumers on the other, bringing “farm income ... in balance with nonfarm income,[p. 1] starting with “parity,” “Establishment of a yardstick of economic equality for agriculture, in the definition of fair exchange value for farm products.”[p. 13; “parity price” and “parity of income” are defined on p. 19] This, then, “enabled” the farmer “to at last reap a larger benefit from the gains in productive efficiency he had made with the assistance of agricultural research and extension work.”[p. 13]
Here and elsewhere, Wallace specifically defended farmers from corporate exploitation. He pointed out, for example, that “When farmers were selling wheat for 30¢ a bushel in 1932, they could have given their wheat away and still consumers would have saved less than half a cent on the cost of a pound loaf of bread.”[p. 13] One of the key problems, hurting both farmers and consumers, then, “was the growth of monopoly and price fixing by corporations.”[p. 5] Wallace noted that this hurts farmers both when they sell, and when they buy.[p. 13]
This theme is also addressed with respect to agricultural research, such as the development of new uses for agricultural products that are produced in abundance. Wallace pointed out that,
“In some cases, successful industries might be developed for the utilization of farm products if those products could be acquired cheaply enough. But too often the price which industry could afford to pay is lower than the price which the farmer could afford to sell.”[p. 40]
A CORPORATE STATEMENT ON NATIONAL FARM POLICY
“AN ADAPTIVE PROGRAM FOR AGRICULTURE,” 1962
The Committee for Economic Development’s 1962 national policy statement, “An Adaptive Program for Agriculture,”[10] is another major statement related to the new proposal from Mark Bittman, Michael Pollan and others for a National Food Policy. The CED proposal is much simpler than the Wallace statement, and says very little about either food or conservation, or even about fruits and vegetables.
Another difference is that the CED report “is to be thoroughly objective in character,... to be from the standpoint of the general welfare and not from that of any political or economic group.” This, then, is a proclamation of value neutrality, which seems to exclude human values.
The general goal of the report, (and the meaning of it’s “objectivity,”) is quickly made clear. It’s to remove farmers and farm workers from farming in order to give greater opportunities to technological changes and to capital, and to the “free market.” It is these impersonal factors, rather than human values, to which the report is beholden, though the impersonal factors are then said to be beneficial to the general welfare and standard of living of humans.
“The Adaptive Approach,” (adapting to the impersonal elements,) is contrasted with two other approaches, “laissez-faire” or a free market approach, and “protectionism,” which is their name, essentially, for what Wallace called “achieving a balanced agriculture.” The CED report also uses the language of “balance,” though it’s not clear how the interests of farmers, or the interests of urban workers, are included in the balance. What’s balanced, the report claims, is “output and use.” [p. 42]
The “Adaptive Approach,” in spite of it’s emphasis on “objectivity” and the general welfare (instead of the interests of “any economic group,”) clearly sides with large agribusiness firms and other corporate interests at the expense of farmers, the rural economy, and the US economy, which is the largest farm exporter. It directly lowers the amount of money per unit that US and foreign corporations must pay to obtain raw materials. Second, it substitutes capital for labor, thus giving more business to the banking industry at the expense of farmers and farm labor. Third, it’s goal is to force 2,000,000 farmers off of their farms and into the cities to compete with the labor that is already there, thus tending to drive down the wages that corporations must pay. No mention is made that there’s a corporate interest being served in these three ways. These very direct benefits for the very corporations behind the report are not labeled as corporate “protectionism,” however. That term is reserved for the Wallace approach, (i.e. for support that includes the interests of the farmer victims).
This matter of alternative protectionisms can be better understood by looking at the explanation of the problem, the five “roots of the American farm problem.”[p. 15] The first is “swiftly rising productivity.”[p. 15] Farmers have increased in their capacity to produce more than is needed. The second is the increased use of labor saving machinery in agriculture, which is similar to the first point.[p. 15] The third is “slow growth of demand for farm goods.[p. 16] In part this means that ‘free’ markets don’t self-correct very well for agriculture, in response to low prices. The fourth factor is “low responsiveness of demand to price changes.”[p. 17] This too means that ‘free’ markets don’t self-correct well. The final factor is “inadequate flow of resources out of farming,” meaning that farmers find ways to stay in business rather than giving up and going to town. Here it is argued that, “although the exodus from agriculture int he past deade or longer has been large by almost any standards..., it has not been large enough.”
The basic idea, then, is not to help farmers get paid fairly for producing an abundant amount of food for consumers, but to lower farm prices so that corporations pay less for raw materials, and lower them so much that many farmers go out of business, so that the much lower pay is distributed to fewer people, and they each get more of it, even as the others go to town, where they compete for jobs (and likely drive down wages there).
On the productivity side of the question, statistics are used to show that between 1940 and 1960 fertilizer use on farms quadrupled.[p. 16] The CED approach is to have farmers adapt to the increased fertilizer which corporations have been selling them, that then contributes to the overproduction. That is, the solution is not to support a cut in fertilizer use, for example to protect the environment and better balance supply and demand, (as in the case today of the “dead zone” in the gulf of Mexico,) but rather to cut back on the number of farmers, in support of maintaining the fertilizer sales (which contribute to overproduction).
In a section on “The Consequences of the Policies followed since 1947,”[p. 23-24] the CED briefly outlines nine problems, including shortcomings of earlier programs. Note that the Wallace programs had been used as a private sector economic stimulus to aid in the war effort, following passage of the Steagall Amendment of 1941. As a result, agriculture as a whole achieved 100% of parity or more from 1942-1952. After that, Price Floors began to be lowered, and by 1962, the time of the CED report, they had been lowered considerably. The chosen period of examination, then, 1947 to about 1961, includes some years of the full Wallace programs (1947-1952) and some years in which the programs were weakened (1953-1961).
The first problem is that the Wallace programs did not “prevent a growing gap between farm and nonfarm earnings” after 1947, though it may have been “moderated” a bit. 1947, however, was the top year, when farmers received 115% of parity! They continued to receive at least 100% of parity through 1952. A related problem is that farm incomes would see “a sharp drop” if government programs were ended. In other words, the programs that overcame the chronic ‘free’ market problem of the lack of price responsiveness were criticized for not changing the nature of those markets permanently, so no government program would be needed at all. Note that the CED’s “Adaptive” program was designed to lower farm income, and calls that a good thing, but here, lower income (that didn’t exist at all until the programs were degraded,) is criticized.
Another criticism was that bigger farming enterprises benefit in bigger ways from good market conditions created by the programs.
The third and fourth criticisms contradicts the first one. The problem here, CED argues, is that the earlier programs didn’t run enough farmers out of business (i.e. by lowering their incomes).
A fifth criticism is that the programs “have diverted some land from its most economic use to less economic uses.” In other words, supply management “set aside” some land in order to prevent oversupply, which then raised farm income, even as costs were reduced (as fewer acres were planted). This, however, is viewed as “less economic.”
A sixth problem is that the costs of the programs have increased, and “Taxpayers have born a heavy burden.” Part of the cost is for “carrying accumulations of surpluses,” which cost “about $1 billion annually.” What’s not mentioned is that the programs initially had no costs, and in fact actually made money for the government.[16] What then happened is that, under the 8 years of Republican administration, the programs were weakened in ways that added to the costs. For example, through the Soil Bank, part of supply management was made voluntary, (weaker) and for pay. Also, any time the government doesn’t require sufficient supply reductions to match demand, then storage costs may be larger, and/or re-sale prices may be lower. Meanwhile, the CED itself called for a 5-year Soil Bank as part of it’s we-feel-your-pain cushioning. Additionally, there were no direct farm subsidies during the 1940-1961 period, but the CED proposed adding them for some crops for 5 years.
A seventh criticism is that subsidized exports cause other countries to put up barriers. Subsidizing exports is where, instead of reducing supply to meet demand, we grow an excess that can’t be sold unless we make less money on it (or lose money on it,) while at the same time paying subsidies to the exporters so they can dump it over seas (below fair trade price levels or below costs).
Eighth, giving food aid to poor countries is criticized as expensive, and it’s argued that they might have been helped better in some other way without our aid.
Ninth, “Some segments of agriculture have been subjected to controls on their freedom of action,” (i.e. in order that they can make a profit).
There is, of course, a basic contradiction in the whole approach. The basic goal, of getting rid of farmers, does not cause land to remain unfarmed, so the productive capacity doesn’t go away. All that happens is that corporations pay less for farm products, as unemployment is fostered in cities, driving down wages and incomes there, as well.
Consider also the report’s opposition to “limiting production,” as in the Wallace programs, and support for the goal of “full production.”[p. 12] Basically, they define this as a cause of the problem in one place, and then define it as the goal of the program in another. This highlights one of the “objective” or mechanistic values of the proposal. Limits are bad, a negative, while the pulling out the stops to full production is a positive. This is made to look like an important business principle. In fact, however, no other industry acts on such a principle. It would be sheer folly auto manufacturers to produce as many cars as they can, whether or not they can sell them, for example, yet this is exactly what is advocated here for farmers. Note that this point was highlighted in the Wallace report, in the response of farm implement dealers to the Great Depression. The same thing happened with auto manufacturers.[12] Auto manufacturers are large enterprises, and inventory management is very important for them,[13] though that’s not stated in the report.
The adaptive approach is much like “laissez-faire, but involves active government intervention on behalf of the impersonal elements, to speed up what would occur more slowly under laissez-faire.[p. 11] There is also active government intervention, at least in the short run, (i.e. for up to 5 years,[pp. 48, 50]) on behalf of the human victims, the “excess resources,” who are displaced from their farms, to reduce the pain of the experience. Like some other, similar proposals, the message is: we’re running you out of business, but for your own good, and we feel your pain,[12] so we’ll subsidize you, to a limited degree and for a few years, to demonstrate that.
The method given for accomplishing these national policy goals is basically to reverse the main Wallace program. Price floors for “wheat, cotton, rice, feedgrains and related crops” were to “be reduced immediately to prices that could be expected to balance output with use.”[p. 42] Of course, such a free market situation is exactly what we have long known does NOT balance supply and demand. More to the point, the CED jargon, (“balance output with use,”) really means that prices are low enough to force “one third” of farmers and farm laborers out of the business “in a period of not more than five years.”[p. 59] That would be , “about two million of the present farm labor force, plus a number equal to a large part of the new entrants.”[p. 59]
The “new entrants” issue is taken up separately. Part of the “we feel your pain” aspect of the proposal is an emphasis on keeping young people out of farming “before they are committed to it as a career.”[p. 34] They call for special programs to accomplish that, both at the high school and college levels. In part, it’s a call for subsidized education for various industries, such as those represented by the CED itself.
Strangely, decades later people are expressing concern about the rural “brain drain” and the fact that farmers are an incredibly old sector of the population. The emphasis, instead, is on support for “beginning farmers.”
The one way that the CED’s national policy statement expands beyond the farm policy arena is in expressing concerns about “a healthy economy as a whole,” which goes beyond “the usual farm policy scope.”[p. 32] A healthy economy with “An Improved Labor Market” can play a role in getting farmers to stop farming. Here they refer to another CED policy statement,[14] making two points, 1. Using “monetary and fiscal policy” to stimulate “total expenditures of goods and services,” and 2. “moderation of the rate of increase of wages and other labor costs....” In other words, the ideal situation, which, among other things, will help encourage farmers and farm laborers to quit the farming scene, is for consumers to buy more, even as they are not paid more. Farmers, having lower incomes themselves under the adaptive program, will then find plenty of jobs off the farm, and those jobs, apparently, will pay more than farming pay, as they are not similarly cut (drastically).
NOTES
[1] Mark Bittman, Michael Pollan, Ricardo Salvador and Olivier De Schutter, “How a national food policy could save millions of American lives”
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/...)
[2] A.V. Krebs, The Corporate Reapers: The Book of Agribusiness, Washington, D. C.: Essential Books, 1992, p. 183.
[3] Daryll E. Ray, “Are the five oft-cited reasons for farm programs actually symptoms of a more basic reason,” Policy Pennings, Agricultural Policy Analysis Center, University of Tennessee, 10/27/06, http://agpolicy.org/....
[4] Richard S. Kirkendall, Social Scientists and Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1966, pp. 59-60, quoted in Krebs, loc cit.
[5] Samual I Rosenman, ed., Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol 1, London: Macmillian Co., 1938, pp. 699-701, quoted in Krebs, loc cit.
[6] Arthur Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, the Coming of the New Deal, New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959, p.39, quoted in Krebs, op cit, p. 184.
[7] This comes from my crunching of the numbers. I had much of this online, but it got taken down in a web site reorganization at ZSpace. I’m gradually putting it back up at “Brad Wilson,” at SlideShare, under presentations, here: http://www.slideshare.net/....
[8] See my analysis of this in Brad Wilson, “Farm Bill: Turn Back? Take Back the Clock!” ZSpace, 9/3/12, https://zcomm.org/...
[9] Henry A. Wallace, Achieving a Balanced Agriculture: How the National Farm Program Meets the Changing Problem, Division of Special Reports, Office of Information, USDA, 1934, 1940, http://catalog.hathitrust.org/....
[10] An Adaptive Program for Agriculture, A Statement on National Policy by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, 1962.
[11] See, for example, “The Food Production System in Iowa, Gaining World Market Share,” Iowa Animal Agriculture Council in collaboration with the Iowa Business Council, January 1993.
[12] Gilbert Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity, Norman Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 1954, p. 6.
[13] See “GM Cuts SUV, Truck Production Citing Lower Demand,” IST Agencies, 7/29/08, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/... “From Clunker to Cruiser, Ford Posts Quarterly Profit,” All Things Considered, National Public Radio, 4/24/08, http://www.npr.org/... Daryll E. Ray, “Agribusinesses practice inventory management, farmers should not (?),” Policy Pennings, Agricultural Policy Analysis Center, University of Tennessee, 8/25/06, http://agpolicy.org/....
[14] Fiscal and Monetary Policy for High Employment, A Statement on National Policy by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, January 1962.